





Lynch School of Education and Human Development 
Department of 




EXPLORING DIFFERENCES IN SCHOOL QUALITY ASSURANCE MEASURES 
AT PUBLIC, PRIVATE, AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP SCHOOLS 






submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 






















Exploring Differences in School Quality Assurance Measures at Public, Private and Public-
Private Partnership Schools Using PISA Data 
Author: Romita Mitra 
Dissertation Chair: Dr. Zhushan “Mandy” Li 
 
Educational public private partnerships (PPP), referring to the shared delivery of 
education services by the government and private providers, have been increasing in recent 
decades, especially in low- and middle-income countries (LMIC). Yet to date, there has been 
limited research on their role in the education landscape, in part due to the difficulty of 
classifying PPP schools in large-scale datasets, which typically classify schools as either public 
or private. In addition, few studies have assessed PPPs and school quality assurance indicators 
typically associated with them.  
 
The study had two purposes. First, to explore the possibility of classifying PPP 
schools in a large-scale dataset using a statistical method. And second, to use these 
classifications to examine the differences between PPP, public, and private schools on school 
quality assurance measures, including but not limited to achievement. These analyses were 
performed using data from the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA), with 
schools from six of the global emerging economy countries: Brazil, China, Indonesia, Mexico, 
Russia and Turkey.  
 
 
Schools were classified using a two-step clustering method using funding and 
management variables. This revealed three good-quality clusters with a silhouette measure of 
cohesion and separation of 0.6 (IBM, 2015b; Wendler & Gröttrup, 2016). These were classified 
as public, private, and PPP based on the characteristics of each school type.  
 
With these classifications, the study assessed the relationship between school type 
and achievement in mathematics, science and reading, and 24 school quality assurance 
measures from PISA. The analyses controlled for school resources and socio-economic and 
cultural status. The study found that overall, PPP schools performed better than public schools 
on three indicators, and better than private schools on five indicators; public schools performed 
better than PPP schools on one outcome and better than private schools on three outcomes, 
although with mostly small effect sizes. Private schools did not outperform other school types 
on any outcome. A country wise analysis showed that these results differed by country. 
 
The study highlights the possibility of using two-step clustering to identify PPP 
schools, the effects of shared funding and management on school performance, and the 
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Background on Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) 
 
The United Nations declared education a human right in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 (United Nations, n.d.). Education is widely considered a public 
good and a basic human right and there has been significant progress in education systems and 
literacy rates around the world in recent decades. However, while many governments prioritize 
education spending, governments in many countries, especially low- and middle-income 
countries (LMIC), do not and often cannot afford to devote adequate funds or have the 
expertise to ensure high quality public education systems. Corporations, philanthropists and 
other non-governmental organizations have relatively more resources at their disposal. So, 
incorporating funding and management expertise from both public and private sources seems 
like the logical way forward to ensure quality education accessible to all. This concept of 
shared responsibility through joint public and private funding and management is broadly 
known as a public private partnership. Around the world, governments are increasingly 
collaborating with non-governmental entities in education policy-making (Baum, 2018) and 
these partnerships in various forms are growing in popularity as a governing model for delivery 
of public goods and services (Forrer et al., 2010).  
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While public and private schools have existed around the world for hundreds of years, 
these partnerships have only come into focus over the past few decades. With the rise of the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and promotion by the World Bank, PPPs have 
garnered attention globally as a strategy to improve the quality of education. Gopalan (2013) 
views PPPs as ‘the only logical large-scale alternative to public education’ as hard-pressed state 
education departments struggle to meet goals for equity, quality and innovation. So, PPPs are 
often designed as a policy measure that involves collaborating on capacity building to increase 
educational resources and expertise that are beyond the scope of the government, and where 
shared responsibility can be used to ensure better quality education. 
 
The majority of discourse on educational PPPs associates them with school and 
education quality (see Verger, 2012; Robertson & Verger, 2012; Patrinos, Barreara-Osorio, & 
Guaqueta, 2009). PPPs are in theory believed to improve school quality through market based 
competition and private sector provision that implies higher efficiency and accountability 
leading to the overall improvement of quality of education for students, teachers and 
educational personnel (Baum, 2018; Verger, BonaL & Zancajo, 2016; Gauri & Vawda, 2003). 
School quality is multifaceted and multidimensional, and measured through quality assurance 
processes that are composed of a number of different factors (Mok et al., 2003). Quality 
assurance measures entail a systematic assessment of the provision of education, by an 
institution itself, to maintain and improve its quality and efficiency, which can include internal 
and external evaluations, evaluations of teachers and school leaders, and student assessments, 
to produce measurable educational outputs for use (European Commission, n.d.; Smith & 
Ngoma-Maema, 2003). Quality assurance and evaluation is multidimensional and includes a 
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range of practices to evaluate quality, from student testing and assessment to evaluation of 
programs, curricula, auditing, and school personnel and institutional evaluation (Kellaghan, 
Stufflebeam, & Wingate 2003; Kauko, Rinne & Takala, 2018). While achievement in cognitive 
skills is the most commonly used indicator of school quality, it also includes other processes 
and actions that are taken by schools to estimate or improve various standards and track 
progress (Hanushek, 2002). Accountability and program evaluation are widely accepted 
concepts around quality assurance in education, where through conducting assessments, 
measuring outcomes, and using results to inform school improvement, lead to more quality 
education systems (Madaus & Stufflebeam, 1984; Stufflebeam & Zhang, 2017; Alkin & King, 
2016). Keeping these aspects of school quality in mind, PPPs are increasingly seen as a way to 
leverage the private sector, assumed to bring in expertise and efficiency, to improve services 
and increase access to high quality education. 
 
The Emergence of PPPs in Education 
  
For most of modern history, schools have been public or private. Although there was 
some fluidity, the differences were straightforward: a public school tended to be government 
run and funded, and private schools tended to be privately run and funded by non-governmental 
entities. Over the last few decades, however, a third type of school has rapidly changed the 
educational landscape: the public private partnership, which blurred the traditional lines 
separating different school types. The term PPP typically refers to the involvement of the 
private sector in the delivery of public services, in which public and private entities commit to 
mutualize the risks, responsibilities, design, and benefits of a service. It has become widespread 
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over the last twenty years (Draxler, 2015). The concept of PPPs was first applied to 
infrastructure projects where “governments could avoid constraints on public borrowing by 
making long-term contractual arrangements with private entities for the provision of public 
services” (p.444), and it is now synonymous with non-governmental involvement in policy 
formulation and delivery of public services (McGrath & Gu, 2015). While at first PPPs were 
usually used in areas like infrastructure and transportation that needed high investments, they 
have become increasingly common in areas traditionally under the purview of the government, 
including those that by nature are associated with public good and basic human rights such as 
education. PPPs in healthcare and education have emerged as a tool to address inequalities in 
provision and access to public services across developing countries (Gideon & Unterhalter, 
2017). This shift has been driven in large part by governments, particularly in LMIC, seeking to 
address shortfalls in resources and skilled management. 
  
PPPs in education are related – although not the same – as PPPs found elsewhere in 
government. In education, PPPs broadly refer to arrangements in which government and non-
government actors share responsibility across the spheres of school finance, ownership, and 
management (Patrinos, Barrera-Osorio, & Guaqueta, 2009; Baum, 2018) and work together to 
achieve important educational, social and economic objectives (LaRoque, 2008). PPPs in 
education can be framed as joint initiatives focused on shared objectives to deliver a service in 
the social sector (de Koning, 2018). They can include specific infrastructural initiatives, 
vouchers or use of facilities, or they can be defined more broadly to include all forms of 




Therefore, PPPs broadly include some forms of partnership between public and non-
governmental entities which could include the private sector, non-profit organizations, and 
families of students. In education, specifically schools, there can be partnerships around 
funding, operations, management, infrastructure building or short-term contracts like teacher 
training. In Table 1 below are some commonly used definitions for PPPs. The terms that stand 
out are long-term contracts, shared risk, management, and quality. There are some minor 
variations in these definitions but the general concept is the entrance of a non-governmental 
entity in a traditionally public service, in order to enter into an agreement to provide a service 
or to share responsibilities around funding, management and risk taking from that service. 
 
 Table 1.  
Definitions of PPPs by different entities 
Source PPP Definition 
The World Bank (World 
Bank Institute and 
Public-Private 
Infrastructure Advisory 
Facility (PPIAF) 2012) 
“a long-term contract between a private party and a government 
agency, for providing a public asset or service, in which the 







“… a long term agreement between the government and a 
private partner where the service delivery objectives of the 
government are aligned with the profit objectives of the private 
partner. The effectiveness of the alignment depends on a 
sufficient and appropriate transfer of risk to the private 
partners.” 
  
“Arrangements whereby the private sector provides 
infrastructure assets and services that traditionally have been 
provided by government, such as hospitals, schools, prisons, 
roads, bridges, tunnels, railways, and water and sanitation 
plants.” 
United Nations UN 
General Assembly, 60th 
Session, Report of the 
Secretary General. UN 
Doc A/60/214. 
“Partnerships are defined as voluntary and collaborative 
relationships between various parties, both State and non-State, 
in which all participants agree to work together to achieve a 
common purpose or undertake a specific task and to share risks 
and responsibilities, resources and benefits.” 
World Health 
Organization (n.d.) 
“Public-private partnerships are seen as an effective way to 
capitalize on the relative strengths of the public and private 
sectors to address problems that neither could tackle adequately 





Source PPP Definition 
World Economic 
Forum/UNESCO 
(Ginsburg, Brady et al. 
2012) 
“...the pooling and managing of resources, as well as the 
mobilization of competencies and commitments by public, 
business and civil society partners to contribute to expansion 
and quality of education ...” 
  
“Public-private partnerships (PPPs) can be broadly defined as 
arrangements between public and private actors for the delivery 
of goods, services and/or facilities. In many different settings, 
PPPs are increasingly perceived as an innovative policy 
approach to provide education for all, and especially to provide 
the most vulnerable population with new educational 
opportunities.” 
Government of UK, 2017 “a risk-sharing relationship based upon an agreed aspiration 
between the public and private (including 
voluntary) sectors to bring about a desired public policy 
outcome. More often than not this takes the form 
of a long-term and flexible relationship, usually underpinned by 
contract, for the delivery of a publicly 
funded service.” 
Canadian Council for 
PPPs, n.d. 
“a cooperative venture between the public and private sectors, 
built on the expertise of each partner, that 
best meets clearly defined public needs through the appropriate 




Source PPP Definition 
OECD, n.d.  “Arrangements whereby the private sector provides 
infrastructure assets and services that traditionally 
have been provided by government, such as hospitals, schools, 
prisons, roads, bridges, tunnels, 
railways, and water and sanitation plants.” 
Deloitte, 2009 “Public-private partnerships (“PPPs” or “P3”s) are contractual 
relationships in which the public and private sector agree to 
share the risks and rewards associated with a public asset.” 
 
How are PPPs different from privatization? 
 
When it comes to the role of the private sector in education, there are a number of 
similar terms that can cause confusion, as they relate to concepts that, while sharing certain 
overlapping attributes, are distinct. Education privatization is one such term and refers to the 
involvement of private entities in a range of education activities and responsibilities that have 
traditionally been under the authority of the state. Privatization of education takes place for a 
number of reasons in low, middle and high-income countries, the most common being the 
state’s inability to accommodate increasing education demands. Privatization of education has 
been promoted for different social, economic, political and educational reasons. According to 
Verger, Fontdevila and Zancajo (2016), different actors encourage privatization of education to 
promote improved choice, quality, efficiency and equity. On the other hand, education 
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privatization is also viewed as a major challenge to the concept of education as a public good 
and a universal basic right, because the very concept of privatization with its notions of 
competition and profit can undermine quality and equity (Tilak, 2010; Gopalan, 2013; Verger, 
Moschetti & Fontdevila, 2020). 
  
The most important distinction between education privatization and education PPPs is 
that a PPP does not usually involve a change in ownership but has more to do with the level of 
service provision, management and sources of funding like non-government actors providing 
resources for educational activities (Verger, Fontdevila and Zancajo, 2016). In education PPPs, 
there is a shift in public resources and services from traditional modes of education processes 
and delivery but ownership remains with the state. What additionally differentiates education 
privatization and PPPs in education is that a PPP is a contract between the public and the 
private sector, where the former avails of a service from the latter for a predetermined amount 
of time at a fixed price, and through that duration has shared interests, risks, knowledge, and 
other resources in delivering the service (Forrer et al, 2010, Hodge, Greve, & Boardman, 2010; 
Patrinos, Barrera-Osorio, & Guáqueta, 2009). 
  
Other terms often confused with PPPs are contracting and outsourcing. The former 
refers to a specific service by the government where bids are invited for a project and the 
government dictates the terms and conditions for service production and delivery. The latter 
involves a transfer of ownership from the government to private vendors who can provide some 
public services more cheaply or effectively than government agencies. Neither outsourcing nor 
contracting necessarily have any element of partnership. Patrinos and Sosale (2007) use the 
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term ‘contracting’ to refer to “the process whereby a government procures education or 
education-related services, of a defined volume and quality, at an agreed price, from a specific 
provider for a specified period where the provisions between the financier and the service 
provider are recorded in a contract (p. 2).” 
  
Ball and Youdell (2007) identify exogenous and endogenous features of education 
privatization. Exogenous factors include opening of the education sector to private sector 
providers, while endogenous factors entail incorporating the core characteristics of the private 
sector into education. These features of privatization can also be applicable for PPPs that are 
between the government and the private sector. These can be viewed as a hybrid version of 
education privatization, that can address the threats of privatization to education, widely 
accepted as a public good in the sphere of human development. It addresses those aspects of 
privatization of education that are most commonly critiqued by minimizing the adverse effects 
of private sector involvement, and strengthens the positive effects of the power and role of the 
public sector (Tilak, 2016). 
  
Private expenditure in education has steadily increased for all education levels as 
evident from all OECD countries from the 1990s (OECD, 2019). Even with this expansion, the 
efficiency and quality gains of privatization have not been empirically and rigorously tested 
globally (Verger, Fontdevila and Zancajo, 2016). Given the constraints faced by some 
governments to allocate sufficient finances towards education, and the skepticism around 
privatization of education, it seems logical to recognize the growing usage and popularity of the 
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option of partnership between the two as a middle ground, by not considering it the same as 
privatization and making it an important area of study (Gopalan, 2013). 
  
PPPs and Global Action 
 
PPPs have been promoted as an important development financing mechanism in the 
United Nations’ (UN) Millennium Development Goals (MDG) followed by the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDG), and by the World Bank. In 2000, world leaders from 189 countries 
came together at the United Nations Millennium Summit and signed a declaration that 
described eight goals for reducing global poverty. The resulting MDGs describe benchmarks 
that need to be met for (1) eradicating extreme poverty and hunger; (2) achieving universal 
primary education; (3) promoting gender equality and empowering women; (4) reducing child 
mortality; (5) improving maternal health; (6) combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; 
(7) ensuring environmental sustainability; and finally (8) developing a global partnership for 
development (United Nations, 2015). Goal 8 of the MDGs elaborates on having open and rule-
based partnerships, to address the debt problems of developing nations, and work towards 
technological advancement in collaboration with the private sector. 
  
The societal function of PPPs was further elaborated on in the SDGs which grew out of 
the MDGs in 2012 and consist of intergovernmental strategies and actions to end poverty and 
other deprivations by improving health and education, reducing inequality, and stimulating 
economic growth while tackling climate change and preserving natural habitats (United 
Nations, n.d.). SDG 17 proposes partnerships between governments, the private sector and civil 
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society ‘built upon principles and values, a shared vision, and shared goals that place people 
and the planet at the centre’, at all levels by encouraging ‘effective public, public-private and 
civil society partnerships, leveraging the experience and resourcing strategies of partnerships’ 
(UN, 2015). It is through these collaborations that it envisions large amounts of resources to be 
mobilized and redirected to sustainable development objectives (UN, 2015). SDG 9, 
recommends ‘building resilient infrastructure, promoting inclusive and sustainable 
industrialization and fostering innovation’, all of which require investment that can be available 
through private sector mobilization. According to Moheildin (2018), since the gap between the 
needed investment for infrastructure and the actual investment is significant, PPPs will be 
central in achieving SDG 9 by ‘increasing access to capital, allowing off-balance sheet 
borrowing, increasing innovation, and helping transfer risks.’ According to de Koning (2018), 
educational partnership arrangements have an important role in accomplishing the goals under 
SDG 4 for education and SDG 17 as a way to address inequalities in the provision of and 
access to public services. 
  
This is at the crux of education PPPs. PPPs are proposed by bilateral and multi-lateral 
donor agencies like the World Bank, USAID and the IMF, which put conditions on financial 
aid and loans dependent on the adoption of neoliberal policies for free market forces by 
governments (Miraftab, 2004). With declining aid to developing countries and increasing debt 
(MDG Monitor, 2016), PPPs are promoted by international agencies as a policy measure to 
address shortfalls of funding, and in some cases expertise, since many governments lack the 
resources to develop sustainable and high-quality education systems. 
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Factors Behind the Emergence of PPPs in Education 
 
Educational PPPs have been used in various forms like providing or improving 
infrastructure, increasing access to schools, reducing gender gaps in countries where it is a 
problem, and providing other services such as teacher training or after-school programs. What 
has driven the emergence of PPPs? Factors have included the following: 
  
Funding shortfalls. One of the main reasons for the emergence of PPPs was the 
stagnation of the amount of public funds available for education, especially in poor countries 
(Draxler, 2015; Chattopadhay & Nogueira, 2013). Therefore, even though education is a public 
good, public funding is often not enough to cover all the needs for a quality education system. 
  
Desire to improve services. Policymakers have also turned to PPPs to improve services 
at local levels while maintaining government control at the higher levels, and allowing high 
levels of government to remain focused on other responsibilities. As a result, PPPs are being 
increasingly seen by developing countries as “a way to leverage the private sector to increase 
access to quality education” (Aslam, Rawal & Saeed, 2017, p.4). 
  
The broad conceptual idea behind PPPs is to adapt the best parts of non-governmental 
sector operations in order to improve the performance of schools, teachers, and students 
through improved school choice, competition, accountability, and autonomy (Baum, 2018; 
Gauri & Vawda, 2003). The private sector is perceived to have less bureaucratic processes and 
higher efficiencies compared to the public sector. Bringing the private sector into the field of 
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education also meant establishing market dynamics of competition that would promote quality 
and efficiency (Verger, BonaL & Zancajo, 2016). Outsourcing education-related services is 
justified from an economic viewpoint since collaboration among sectors brings in different 
operators to the education field prompting competition, which can improve quality, and higher 
demand which leads to economies of scale (Patrinos, Barrera-Osorio & Guaqueta, 2009). 
  
Changing philosophies about the role of government. Educational PPPs also likely 
emerged due to changing philosophical beliefs about the role of government that came about 
with the neoliberal reforms in the 1980s and 1990s that aimed to use market forces of supply 
and demand to improve public education and reduce the inefficiencies of state bureaucracy 
(Steiner-Khamsi & Draxler, 2018). Shared responsibilities in risk taking, funding and 
management were believed to lead to higher education quality. This, along with an increase in 
international agencies encouraging governments to open up markets, has led to a growth of 
educational PPPs. 
 
PPPs: A Contentious Issue 
 
The use of PPPs, in education and elsewhere, has proven to be contentious with strong 
opponents and proponents (Peterson 2003; Woessmann 2006). Concepts that have drawn the 
most debate and will be discussed include: the lack of strong empirical evidence about their 
success, non-governmental entities managing and funding public services, issues of equity, 
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accountability and autonomy, transparency and autonomy, and possible conflicts between profit 
motives and social/public good. 
   
Proponents of educational PPPs often view the concept as an innovative method to 
share risk and responsibility that can benefit all involved parties (Patrinos, Barrera-Osorio, & 
Guaqueta, 2009; Latham, 2009). In these views, PPPs are seen as having the ability to adapt the 
best parts of private sector operations in order to improve the performance of schools, teachers, 
and students through improved school choice, competition, accountability, and autonomy 
(Baum, 2018; Gauri & Vawda, 2003). It is believed that achieving quality education and 
addressing systemic education challenges require governments to engage in productive 
partnerships with non-state sectors (Alpert & Nagarajan, 2016). PPPs are seen as a logical way 
of increasing educational resources and expertise that are beyond the purview of the 
government, and that the shared responsibility can be used to ensure better quality, equity and 
access. Equity and access in educational PPPs have to do with inclusion and lack of 
discrimination in education opportunities that typically exist around socio-economic status, 
ability, gender, or lack of previous schooling. According to Verger, Moschetti and Fontdevila 
(2020), equity includes any measure of the effect of PPP programs on learning inequalities, 
school segregation along the lines of socioeconomic status or ethnicity, and the inclusion of 
students with special needs. Educational PPP supporters may also believe that “market forces 
have the potential to improve school governance, increase accountability to students and 
parents, and improve student cognitive outcomes at a lower cost than providing all basic 
education services through the state” (Baum, 2018, p. 4). 
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Critics, on the other hand, often view PPPs as a failure of the state in its obligation to 
fulfill its basic responsibilities toward public education, which is widely considered a human 
right (Robertson, 2008). Some contend that, in educational PPPs, private involvement and 
profit motives diminish the intended social impacts in the education delivery system (Baum, 
2018). Rikowsi (2003) views PPPs as shifting teaching and learning responsibilities from local 
education authorities to profiteering, private companies. Probably the most critical risk of PPPs 
in education is the introduction of a private sector profit motive into a public service. Critics 
also question whether market forces of competition actually translate to better school quality, 
higher accountability and transparency, noting that rather than leading to cost-effectiveness, 
improved choice and services, and increased equity, market forces could result in exclusionary 
practices, and lower equity from lack of regulation and oversight. 
 
The contentiousness of educational PPPs stems in part from the high variability in 
outcomes, with no clear evidence on the successful performance of PPPs. Part of this is the 
challenge around classifying PPPs to begin with. There is a lack of large scale data analyses to 
identify PPPs and examine whether they actually fulfill the lofty goals of the MDGs and SDGs, 
and if there are any unintended consequences. PPPs have been promoted by the World Bank for 
decades without substantial evidence on overall positive education outcomes, adding to the 
debate on if they are worth it. In theory, PPPs are able to stimulate resources from the private 
sector, which can improve overall quality, put effective regulations in place, and also improve 
access and equity. Yet PPPs can also lead to higher costs resulting from implementation and 
regulation processes, and low cost-effectiveness (Bous & Farr, 2019). Governments, especially 
those in LMIC countries, may also lack capacity to effectively regulate quality at PPP schools, 
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leading to watered down and unclear responsibilities and low school accountability. PPPs 
change the dynamics of public accountability by involving private partners in government 
decision making and program delivery and there is a need for conscious protection of public 
services at the risk of private profits (Forrer et al., 2011). 
 
Disagreements may also stem from the inherent complexity of the concept. PPPs are 
complicated because their implementation and impacts are context-specific, and they rely on 
the different actors and their relationships as well as the history of the public and private sectors 
in each region (Gideon and Unterhalter, 2017; Verger & Moschetti, 2017; Edwards Jr., 
DeMatthews & Hartley, 2017). PPPs in education can be very complex due to the interplay 
between ‘social, cultural, political and economic forces in each country’s educational system 
making PPP a highly context-dependent phenomenon’ (Chattopadhay & Nogueira, 2013). 
Further, the effectiveness of educational PPPs has largely focused on achievement outcomes, 
while the advantages of PPPs in theory go beyond student achievement. These issues often 
make it hard to identify PPPs in addition to examining whether there is added value. 
 
Description of the Problem 
 
Educational PPPs are on the rise and they frequently inspire contentious debate. And yet 
for policymakers seeking to make informed decisions regarding educational policy, there is a 
conspicuous dearth of research on the empirical impacts of PPPs and mixed results on their 
effectiveness. Especially in LMIC, PPP models are often transferred from education systems 
18  
that may be better funded or regulated (Lewin, 2007), without adequate evidence on indicators 
to track progress and inform regulatory policy. This makes it necessary to conduct more 
empirical studies to examine whether in fact having shared funding and management is more 
effective than private and public schools. Other than specific PPP case studies, there is no way 
of consistently classifying schools and no international data that can be compared to look 
across nations. Existing studies also do not examine the value of PPPs for improving 
educational quality outcomes beyond academic achievement. Defining and identifying school 
quality indicators other than achievement can inform policy and partnership frameworks and 
help design tools and procedures to evaluate their performance. 
 
Therefore, lack of information falls into the following categories: 
 
School classifications lack clarity. It is evident from studies around the world that 
schools are not always exclusively public or private, and that there are schools in-between that 
have some degree of shared public and private funding and management. This increasingly 
broad spectrum of schools has made it more difficult for today’s researchers and policymakers 
to consistently classify schools in order to study their impacts on educational outcomes and 
other measures. Researchers are accustomed to looking at schools as public or private with 
their respective characteristics. However, findings from analyzing schools based on this 
typology could be inaccurate when considering the shared attributes of schools with both 
governmental and non-governmental resources and operations. It does not consider the value 
added, if any, from the shared roles of the public and private sectors. This issue can be 
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addressed by exploring ways of consistently classifying schools from international data that can 
be compared to look across nations. 
 
Existing research has largely ignored school quality assurance and improvement 
measures in PPPs. Having systems in place to track and report important education outcome 
indicators enables evaluation of progress, and research suggests these systems are critical for 
providing quality education. It is perceived as one of the strengths of the private school sector 
(Mbiti 2016) and considered to be an advantage of PPP schools, due to assumed private sector 
efficiency. Yet to date, most education PPP research has focused primarily on academic 
achievement outcomes, while ignoring other school quality assurance measures – even though 
improving school quality is often touted as a major strength of PPPs. Indicators of school 
quality assurance such as accountability and evaluation have not been the focus of research 
when comparing school types or assessing PPPs. There is importance in examining the value of 
PPPs in improving educational quality beyond academic outcomes for a holistic analysis of 
PPPs. Exploring the performance of PPPs on school quality assurance indicators can contribute 
to decision making on educational PPP practice and policy making, to assess the effects of 
PPPs on a comprehensive set of outcomes. 
  
Dearth of national-level, empirical analyses. There have been few cross-country, 
empirical analyses on differences between PPPs and other school types. As governments gain 
interest in education financing and provision through partnerships with non-governmental 
entities, it becomes necessary to conduct more country level empirical studies to examine 
whether in fact having shared funding and management is more effective than private and 
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public schools, in what areas, and identify the contexts in which they are successful in what 
they set out to achieve. There are only a handful of studies that have attempted a national level 
analysis to evaluate the effects of PPPs in education versus traditional schools, especially using 
quantitative, comparable data. Prior research on the forms of partnerships, vouchers, and school 
competition has not reached clear conclusions regarding the cost-benefit aspects nor the issues 
around quality and equity of these arrangements (Waslander et al., 2010). The significant 
studies conducted so far, which are discussed in detail later, are Baum (2018) who used 
international student achievement outcomes to compare PPP schools and public schools; 
Woessmann (2006) who used international data and analyzed PPP schools based on the extent 
of government and non-governmental support in school operations and funding with student 
achievement; LaRoque (2008) who assessed different forms of PPPs around the world to draw 
lessons for the design and implementation of PPPs including achievement and a few school 
quality outcomes; and Aslam, Rawal & Saeed (2017) who conducted a systematic review on 
international case studies and presented generalized findings on learning outcomes. 
  
Inadequate national regulatory frameworks. Though increasingly governments, 
especially in developing countries, have engaged in different forms of educational PPPs, there 
is limited research at the national level on the framing of contracts, bidding and regulations. In 
low-income countries, educational PPPs are being implemented without adequate regulatory 
frameworks to ensure accountability and quality (de Koning, 2018). This has led to issues of 
corruption, fraud, and resources being misused, arising from this influx of funding without 
proper regulation. They are also a controversial concept in terms of the value of additional 
funding due to ‘the complexity and limitations of current systems to assess their impact beyond 
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the notion of value for money’ (Berrone et al., 2019), where little has been examined other than 
the idea that the private sector can contribute financially to the education sector. Despite a lack 
of analysis on the effects of PPPs in education, and whether there are differences between them 
and private and public schools, states are engaging in PPPs under different arrangements 
especially in LMIC in Africa, Asia and Latin America (de Koning, 2018). A significant amount 
of effort and resources have been invested in policy changes and funding for PPPs and it is an 
increasing trend worldwide without sufficiently looking at it holistically to develop effective 
regulations. So, evaluating the added value of PPPs compared with public and private schools 
can contribute to identifying indicators to create a policy and regulatory environment and a 
strong legal framework. Monitoring these indicators as well as government education 
expenditure over time can help countries track and understand its efficiency and effectiveness. 
  
So, acknowledging this dearth in the literature of national level analyses of educational 
PPPs and the need to shift the focus to include factors other than academic outcomes, the next 
section describes the research purpose. 
Research Purpose 
 
The rise of educational PPPs has not been accompanied by sufficient research to enable 
policymakers to make informed decisions regarding shared educational funding and 
management, with knowledge on how those decisions will impact overall school quality. 
  
This paper aims to address this problem in two ways: 
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First, to create a data-based approach for classifying schools based on their funding and 
management structure. It is evident that in most education contexts there are schools that are 
not simply public or private but rather have a mix of private and public funding and 
management. An exploratory clustering technique based on school management and school 
funding will be used to create and examine a PPP school type for schools of shared public and 
private nature. It is hypothesized that school types in the paper will be classified based on the 
level of public and private funding and management: whether they are publicly funded and 
publicly managed, privately funded and privately managed, and PPP schools with shared public 
and private funding and management which could include publicly funded and privately 
managed or privately funded and publicly managed schools. 
  
Second, to examine the relationship between these school types both with school quality 
assurance measures and with achievement outcomes, in order to address the issue of existing 
research overlooking school quality assurance measures other than achievement in PPP 
schools. 
  
The goal of this research is to examine the possible differences in school quality 
assurance measures between school types based on funding and management in LMIC. It aims 
to fill the lacuna in the literature on PPPs in education by designing an empirical framework for 
identifying PPP schools, and examining differences between PPP schools with public and 
private schools at the national level. In keeping with these goals, the next section consists of the 





1. Can PPP schools be identified and classified from school funding and school 
management variables in the sample countries? 
2. Do PPP schools in the sample countries have higher achievement outcomes than private 
and public schools, and does this effect vary by country?  
3. Are PPP schools in the sample countries more likely than private and public schools to 
have school quality assurance measures, and does this effect vary by country? 
4. Can differences in achievement outcomes be attributed to conducting school quality 
assurance measures by school type in the sample countries, and does this effect vary by 
country?  
 
Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses 
 
The conceptual framework defines and conceptualizes the variables of interest in this 
study and allows exploration of differences in school funding and management with school 
quality assurance outcomes.  
 
With reference to the first research question, school types in education systems are not 
limited to public or private schools, and assessing school quality assurance based on this binary 
typology could ignore the effects of shared public and private funding and management. The 
variable of interest and the basis of this model is “school type”, for which there are three broad 
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school groupings hypothesized: public schools which are primarily publicly funded and 
publicly managed, private schools which are primarily privately funded and privately managed, 
and PPP schools with shared public and private funding and management. The analyses in this 
study are grounded in a conceptual model of the relationship between these school types and 
school quality assurance measures discussed. For the second and third research questions, it is 
hypothesized that PPP schools will have higher achievement outcomes and a higher likelihood 
of having school quality assurance measures than private and public schools. The conceptual 
model is based on the premise of PPP schools having more efficient management and higher 
resources that lead to better performances on school quality assurance measures. It also allows 
examination of whether PPP schools perform better than public and private schools on 
outcomes other than achievement. The fourth research question hypothesizes that having school 
quality assurance measures would significantly moderate the strength of the relationship 
between school type and achievement outcomes which is discussed in further detail in Chapter 
Two. The grounding for this hypothesis is based on the assumption that schools with 
monitoring and evaluation systems collect information on school quality indicators, then assess 
that information, take action based on the assessment of the information, which then leads to 
progress and the establishment of standards (Plomp, Huijsman & Kluyfhout, 1992; see Figure 
1). Schools that are more likely to have school quality assurance processes and practices, are 
predicted to have higher achievement outcomes. PPP schools are hypothesized to have higher 
achievement and have a higher likelihood of conducting these measures, so achievement 
outcomes could be significantly associated to the likelihood of conducting school quality 
assurance measures. This analysis can provide insights on whether the school quality assurance 
processes and practices of PPP schools lead to higher achievement outcomes. School quality 
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assurance measures are examined both as a predictor of achievement and as an outcome of 
school type. The models also take into consideration the complexities of school settings by 
controlling for school and student socio-economic factors, and country membership. 
 
 
Figure 1. Elements of monitoring (Plomp, Huijsman & Kluyfhout, 1992) 
 
School quality assurance. School quality assurance encompasses a combination of 
indicators that track the delivery of education to identify areas for improvement, ensure 
standards of efficiency, and work towards improvement (Mayer, Mullens & Moore, 2001; Mok 
et al., 2003). They are processes and practices put in place by schools to estimate or improve 
various standards in education such as around achievement, teacher professional development 
or student satisfaction, track their progress, and are aimed at improving the overall quality and 
standard of education. Examples of school quality assurance include school accountability 
towards students, parents and communities, transparency in reporting the performance 
standards of teachers and students, evaluations to assess curriculum, staff and teaching 
practices, and teacher training, that are all aimed at improving schools and education systems. 
Student achievement is a common indicator of overall school quality, and it is often linked with 
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student learning. Mayer, Mullens & Moore (2001) explained the relationship between school 
quality indicators at different levels and how they are related directly or indirectly with 
achievement outcomes. The levels included i. school level contexts such as school leadership, 
school goals, academic environments, ii. Teacher level contexts such as teaching experience 
and professional development, and iii. Classroom level contexts such as pedagogy, technology 
and class size, which have all been found to be associated with achievement outcomes. Because 
these school quality assurance processes and practices can lead to improved achievement 
outcomes, they themselves can be used as proxy measures of school quality. In this paper, the 
term school quality assurance measures or indicators refers to all these processes and practices 
that are related to improving school standards. School quality assurance measures in this study 
will be used both as outcomes with school types as predictors, i.e. in the third research 
question, and as predictors of achievement, i.e. in the fourth research question. 
 
Data. The proposed analyses will be conducted using data from the Programme for 
International Student Assessment (PISA). PISA data includes measures of achievement in 
mathematics, reading and science for 15 year olds in multiple countries as well as quality 
assurance measures at the school level. Information from PISA on school funding sources, 
school sector, and school management in terms of the amount of autonomy schools possess, 
will be used to classify schools into public, private and PPP school types. The PISA 2015 cycle 
focused on school quality assurance using PISA’s Policies and Practices for Successful Schools 
survey to collect data on quality assurance processes like having school accountability 
measures, internal evaluations, external evaluations, systematic recording of school and student 
data, specifications of school and student goals, feedback from students, teacher mentoring, and 
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external consultations for school improvement, as well as implementing school improvement 
actions as a result of the internal and external evaluations. Thus, going forward, school quality 
assurance measures will include processes and practices, and improvement actions. While this 
is not an exhaustive list of school quality assurance measures, it provides extensive and 
multidimensional information on school quality. With reference to Figure 1, PISA’s school 
quality assurance processes align with the collection and evaluation of information, and the 
school improvement actions align with taking action based on these evaluations. Using PISA 
data in this study is appropriate since the impact of large scale assessment on macro level 
policies is evident - they have influenced policy changes at higher levels along with school and 
district level changes such as teacher training practices, curriculum, or information systems 
assessments (van Staden & Zimmerman, 2017). While the PISA 2015 quality assurance 
measures are not comprehensive, they are apposite to compare school types on their 
performance. 
 
Sample. PPPs are often created as the result of economic circumstances (i.e., budget 
constraints and inadequate skilled management), and this is a particularly common 
phenomenon in LMIC (Draxler, 2015; Chattopadhay & Nogueira, 2013). This study sample 
was selected based on countries’ economic classifications. Countries are often classified 
through an economic lens as developed, developing and lesser developed, indicating the state 
of their economy and different indicators around quality of life. The World Bank (2019) 
classifies countries into four income groupings: low, lower-middle, upper-middle, and high, 
based on gross national income (GNI) per capita, where the developing economies are divided 
into low income and middle income. The World Bank acknowledges that GNI per capita does 
28  
not completely summarize a country’s level of development or measure of welfare, but it has 
proved to be a useful and easily available indicator that is closely correlated with other, non-
monetary measures of quality of life, such as life expectancy at birth, mortality rates of 
children, and enrollment rates in school (n.d.). All of these terms are often criticized for being 
capitalist or neocolonialist in nature and there is no agreement on the need or the appropriate 
classification of countries. Acknowledging this bias, and the fact that most countries that 
participate in PISA are high-income countries, the sample for this study will use data from the 
‘emerging economies’, since LMIC have an increasing number of educational PPPs.  
 
The ‘emerging economies’ – Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Mexico, 
Indonesia and Turkey – have been recognized as countries with rapid economic growth over 
the last two decades thereby “fostering a narrative of the growth of the South” (Krozer, 2016, p. 
3). They represent some of the largest populations in the world, with strong economies along 
with high levels of inequality. These countries have had the opportunity to learn from and 
incorporate the failures and successes of the industrial economies, as well as set precedent for 
lesser developed countries, providing useful learning opportunities from developing economies 
for various policy and practice issues, especially in the field of PPPs (see Ristov, 2018; 
Melville, 2017; Fabre & Straub, 2019; Leigland, 2018; Kang, Mulaphong, Hwang, & Chang, 
2019; Aslam, Rawal & Saeed, 2017; Sithole, Gore & Gondo, 2017; Mgaiwa & Poncian, 2016).  
They have been grouped for numerous studies on different social, political and economic 
aspects. They also have similar characteristics in addition to economic growth such as large 
populations and fast population growth, diversity in race, language and culture, and are seen as 
leaders in their respective regions. From these eight countries, six – subsequently referred to as 
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‘BRCMIT’ – are members of PISA and data from these six countries will be used in the 
quantitative analysis. It is expected that any findings will be applicable to other LMIC 
economies as well as provide direction for future studies in other countries.  
 
Therefore, this conceptual model allows testing of school type for potential differences 
on four separate outcomes using PISA 2015 data. First, it will explore the possibility of 
classifying PPP schools using large-scale datasets. Next, it will test whether there are 
differences between school types in achievement outcomes. Third, it will explore whether 
school types differed in having school quality assurance processes and conducting school 
improvement actions. Fourth, it will test whether having these school quality assurance 
processes and implementing school improvement actions had a moderating effect on the 
relationship between school type and achievement outcomes.  
 
Significance of the Study 
  
The use of educational PPPs has increased in recent years, despite little being known 
about the full range of effects of PPPs on education practices. Thus, a comprehensive review of 
PPPs in education, comparing their outcomes in school achievement and other quality 
assurance measures with private and public schools, both fills a critical research gap, lays 
groundwork for further research, and can inform policymakers making educational funding and 
management decisions. 
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This study attempts to create a new foundation for studying PPPs and their educational 
effects, which can be built on in a variety of ways. First, the study creates the possibility of 
applying and using existing datasets to PPP research. Currently, identifying and grouping PPP 
schools using existing data is challenging. This study demonstrates that such grouping is 
possible and worth exploring using clustering techniques. Future studies may be able to either 
build on this basic method, or a similar method to study PPP effects on a wide range of 
outcomes. Room likely exists for building on this method in both complexity and scope. In 
terms of findings, future studies may be able to apply the classification system created here for 
assessment of the relationship between PPPs and other metrics. 
  
In educational practice and policy making, this study will allow policymakers to assess 
the effects of PPPs not just on achievement outcomes, but additional school quality assurance 
related measures as well. Often, PPPs are proposed from a place of resource shortfalls. But, if 
this study finds that PPPs benefit different educational outcomes, some policymakers may look 
to propose PPPs for educational, rather than economic reasons. Or, in contrast, if PPPs are 
found to negatively impact or make no difference to educational outcomes, policymakers may 
approach new PPP structures with increased wariness, and may look to either put educational 
safeguards in place, or seek other funding and management structures. 
  
A national level study and comparison can help examine the contexts within which we 
can see the differences between PPP schools, private schools and public schools. Comparing 
school quality systems and student achievement at schools at the national level will help 
researchers, policy makers and practitioners in the field to understand whether PPP schools are 
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effective, in what contexts, what type of frameworks may work towards better achievement and 
school quality measures, and whether factors regarding student background plays a role. 
Implications for Policy and Research 
  
In education policy PPPs have been introduced since they are often believed to play an 
important role in enhancing the supply as well as the quality of schooling. Keeping in mind the 
gaps and contradictions in the field of PPPs in education, and the lack of empirical, national 
level studies, the purpose of this dissertation is to inform future policy regarding PPPs in 
education through examining the relationship between school types with school quality 
assurance measures and achievement. Large-scale achievement data cannot be used to establish 
cause and effect (Braun, Wang, Jenkins & Weinbaum, 2006, p. 6). However, results from the 
study can offer insights into the relationship between factors such as school type, school quality 
assurance measures and achievement, as well as provide directions for future research. 
  
In recent years the use of PPPs has become increasingly widespread around the world. 
The International Finance Corporation (2013) estimates that there was over USD40 billion 
worth of PPPs in the education sector between 1995 and 2012. As governments gain interest in 
financing education through non-governmental entities, it becomes critical to conduct more 
empirical studies for evidence to examine whether in fact having shared funding and 
management is more effective than private and public schools, in what areas, and identify the 
contexts in which they are successful in what they set out to achieve. This is of interest to 
policymakers and practitioners in the field who are aiming to be resource efficient as well as 





The literature review consists of an introduction to literature on PPPs in education, 
research around school quality measures and academic achievement with PPPs, case studies 
from around the world, and a review of the most significant studies conducted on this topic. 
This will help frame the study and guide the research questions by demonstrating the increase 
and importance of education PPPs in the developing world, highlight where there are gaps in 




I am a sociologist and sustainable international development professional with a 
research focus on evidence-based capacity building in LMIC. Growing up in India’s capital, 
New Delhi, I attended minority religious, private schools and witnessed the vast differences in 
the standard of education depending on the type of school in the country. Despite being one of 
the world’s fastest growing economies, economic growth in India has not been inclusive, with 
widespread poverty and illiteracy due to enormous disparities in wealth, resulting stark 
differences in education funding, access, and outcomes. My interest around educational PPPs 
grew from observing the World Bank and other international agencies promote PPPs over other 
measures to provide quality public education - despite seemingly little evidence on the 
performance of PPP schools. Having worked across countries in education evaluation and 
33  
policy analysis, and through my academic research, I believe that using evidence to inform 
policy and practice in LMIC can reduce poverty and improve development indicators. 
Educational PPPs comprise an area of capacity building that should involve evidence-based 
policymaking to address the risks it can bring around education quality and equity.  
 
For countries without adequate budgets and/or expertise to devote to improve education, 
increasing funding and skills in education by tapping into the private sector seemed like a 
reasonable policy move to me. However, it does not seem like a one-size-fits-all solution, and 
could come at the cost of some critical risks. As a sociologist, development practitioner, and 
quantitative methodologist, with a focus on educational issues in LMIC, I aimed to use my 
disciplinary and methodological training to approach some aspects of this research gap. My 
doctoral training in measurement, evaluation, statistics and assessment, provided me with the 
skills to approach the research problems, frame the research questions, design the methodology, 
and conduct data analyses.  
 
Being both curious and apprehensive about educational PPPs as a growing phenomenon 
in LMIC, these factors motivated me to undertake this research, to explore if their effectiveness 
can be measured and how they can be improved, while maintaining the hope of the possibility 
of meeting shortfalls in education budgets to invest in public education through alternate 




PPPs in Education 
 
In education, the term PPP is a generic descriptor that can be used for any form of 
shared responsibility between public and private actors across the spheres of school finance, 
ownership, and management (Patrinos, Barrera-Osorio, & Guaqueta, 2009; Baum, 2018). It is 
used when non-governmental sectors become involved in various aspects of governmental 
services. PPPs in education can be used to include almost any involvement of the non-public 
sector with the public, whether through contracts for specific services, family involvement or 
philanthropy (LaRocque & Lee, 2008). Another term for similar groupings of partners that 
include both for-profit and not-for-profit participants is multi-stakeholder partnerships (MSPs) 
as they imply shared values, objectives and risks and are less controversial amongst critics than 
the term "privatization" (Wong & Unwin, 2012). 
 
According to Woessmann (2006), in almost every country the education system and its 
operations lie with the state, but under this layer of supervision there are varying degrees of 
public and private involvement. Some PPP stakeholders like Steiner-Khamsi & Draxler (2018) 
argue that neoliberal reforms brought about a shift from government to governance to ‘break 
state monopoly’ and use market forces to improve the quality of public education and reduce 
the inadequacy of state bureaucracy. The public and private sectors are believed to be able to 
complement each other in providing education services and assist countries with their education 
needs and to make schools more equitable and improve learning outcomes, since PPPs can be 
“tailored and targeted specifically to meet the needs of low-income communities” (Patrinos, 
Barrera-Osorio & Gaqueta, 2009, p.1). This type of partnership is an arrangement where public 
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and private entities agree to mutualize the design, investment, risk, responsibilities and benefits 
of a project in different ways. The most common characteristics assumed of these educational 
PPPs are shared purpose, responsibilities and risk. In theory, a well-designed PPP can lead to a 
mutually beneficial partnership among the parties involved (Forrer et al., 2010). 
 
There has been an increase in the involvement of international aid organizations, 
corporations, philanthropies, and other private agencies, not only in the education practice but 
also policy. Partaking in policy-making by philanthropists is often referred to as ‘advocacy’, 
and ignores the possible motives, both financial and political, that these organizations may have 
(Avelar, 2018). The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, USAID, DFID and other 
international and bilateral aid agencies have played a major role in promoting PPPs as a ‘global 
education policy’ (Steiner-Khamsi & Draxler, 2018). PPPs in education have been in the 
spotlight of agendas of these international organizations and development agencies dealing 
with educational affairs since they are designed to rectify “inefficiencies in the public delivery 
of education and to mobilize new resources to increase the access to and cost-effectiveness of 
education in low-income contexts” (Verger, 2012, p.3). At the same time, their involvement has 
seen a shift in treating donations as investments, results as returns (Ball & Junemann, 2012), 
and a say in decision making processes that could be seen as undemocratic and controversial.  
 
Spreen and Kamat (2018) focus on education policy in the emerging economies with a 
focus on India. Their research suggests that privatization and the formation of PPPs in 
emerging economies in Africa, Asia and Latin America have grown with technology-based 
education reform without adequate evidence where multinational companies see a profit 
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potential in their education markets. Public education in these regions have been unable to 
match the rise in demand for quality education, but commercialization and marketization of 
education has led to the poorest having decreasing access to quality education. There are many 
different benefits expected from PPPs in different sectors, however, one of the main benefits 
for a school is that the board of trustees and school leadership do not have to worry about time 
consuming management and operational issues, but can focus on teaching, learning and 
improving educational outcomes (New Zealand Ministry of Education, 2019). Government 
motivations towards PPPs in education have usually been driven by one or more of the 
following aims: (1) to increase the quality of education services, (2) to increase access to (and 
participation in) basic education, and (3) to meet one or more of these objectives at a lower cost 
relative to public provision (Patrinos et al., 2009). PPPs in education are thus seen as a way to 
increase funding thereby raising access, efficiency, and innovation, but the involvement of 
these non-governmental organizations with their individual motives is controversial. 
 
The concept of PPPs breaks away from the traditional approach to delivering education 
services. Education systems have been considered a public service and have been built upon 
public finance for the public provision of education, and this new notion of partnerships 
between state and non-state entities arose in order to overcome shortcomings in the traditional 
system and have shared responsibilities, provisions and risks. Though private education has 
been part of the education landscape around the world for decades, private delivery of 
educational services only started in the 1990s, due to impetus from international bodies and 
corporations, to be considered "partners" and be involved in policy and move towards quality 
education for all (Draxler, 2015). However, according to Baum (2018), education PPPs are not 
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a particularly new phenomenon. Different combinations of school finance, management, and 
ownership have been used and historically been considered important components of national 
education systems in different countries (Baum, Lewis, Lusk-Stover, & Patrinos, 2014).  
 
Verger, Fontdevila, and Zancajo (2017) conducted an in-depth review of education 
privatization in a number of countries through a political and historical lens, and identified six 
paths toward privatization where they explained the categories and circumstances under which 
countries have privatized education or entered into PPPs. This included privatization as a 
radical state sector reform measure (like Chile and the U.K.), as an incremental reform (like the 
U.S.A.), in social-democratic models in welfare states, traditional or historical public–private 
partnerships (like in the Netherlands and Spain), as de facto privatization in low-income 
countries, and privatization after disasters. Therefore, PPPs in education can be defined and 
classified in multiple ways along different dimensions. 
 
PPPs remain a contentious issue, due to factors discussed in the introduction. They are 
controversial in their very formation due to the involvement of the private sector and inevitable 
profit motives. Verger, Zancajo & Fontdevila (2018) state that PPP schools operate with vested 
interests against those of the public, and so should require more complicated regulatory 
frameworks, not less. They claim that the cost-effectiveness, scalability and sustainability of 
PPPs are increasingly called into question. While the involvement of the private sector is 
supposed to increase access to funding, increase innovation and promote equality in education 
by increasing access to quality education, Wall (2012) found that private involvement does not 
increase overall performance, brings about more marginalization, and is often seen as a public 
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relations or advertising effort by corporations and philanthropists who are not invested in the 
idea of education as a public good. Keeping in mind these disadvantages, the next section 
discusses PPPs and school quality assurance measures on which literature has been 
contradictory. 
 
Educational PPPs and School Quality Assurance 
 
The premise of PPPs in various forms has been in theory to improve the quality, 
effectiveness, and accountability of education outcomes, through the efficiencies thought to be 
associated with the private sector and to balance the bureaucracy, lack of autonomy, and 
inflexibility of the public sector (Tilak, 2016; LaRocque, 2008; Akyeampong, 2009). 
According to Languille (2017), quality social services require resources, risk and innovation, 
and these are generally associated with the private sector along with the notion of ‘choice’ 
which promotes competition and quality. Therefore, it is often believed that treating parents 
and students as ‘clients’ exercising their purchasing power can lead to higher standards of 
social services. It would then be logical to assume that PPPs in education should be associated 
with higher quality as a result of private involvement. The United Kingdom Forum for 
International Education and Training (UKFIET) (2017) states that opinions about PPPs with 
regard to school quality processes and equality are highly polarized. This is because proponents 
of PPPs believe that they can stimulate resources from the private sector that could improve 
quality, put effective regulations in place unlike for private schools, while also improving 
access and equity. Critics argue that governments, especially those in developing countries, do 
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not have the capacity to effectively regulate quality at these schools, which leads to less clarity 
on each party’s responsibilities and lower accountability.  
  
Before further discussing the association between educational PPPs and school quality 
assurance, it will be helpful to get an idea of what quality assurance in education is, and how 
school quality assurance measures have been defined in the literature. The concepts of school 
and education quality have been around for decades. The Education for All conference in 
Jomtien in 1990 highlighted the importance of increased monitoring and evaluation of the 
quality of education systems around the world to meet the challenges of a technology driven, 
diverse and global society, to have high quality and equitable education for everyone. The term 
quality assurance in education is broad, and teachers, educators, school leaders, policy makers, 
and scholars can have different views on what quality actually is, and which standards should 
be used to assess that quality is assured (Scherman, Bosker & Howie, 2017). In the context of 
education, Kistan (1999) designed an ‘amalgamated definition of quality assurance’ (Figure 2) 
to explain the intuitive notions about quality assurance and common parlance around quality 
assurance. Quality can be defined as a set of measurable dimensions, with standards associated 
with each of these dimensions, used to track adequate quality or a lack of quality. Literature on 
education quality assurance broadly categorizes quality assurance indicators under the themes 
of monitoring, evaluation and accountability. 
 
Data on schools and education systems are more prevalent now, and school quality 
indicators can be measured through data from surveys, assessments, observations or student 
background information (Schildkamp & Arthur, 2017). Monitoring and evaluating education 
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systems have to do with school officials relying on their working knowledge, but also on data 
that is collected in order to support decision making, improve performance and reduce 
inequalities (Howie & Scherman 2017). Schildkamp and Arthur (2017) divide quality 
monitoring systems into school performance feedback systems (SPFS) and accountability 
systems. The former measures school improvement and consists of assessment systems and 
school self-evaluation systems, while the latter includes practices that hold schools responsible 
as publicly funded institutions, though there can be overlap between the two. Tracking and 
using data from these systems can lead to increased student achievement since they can inform 
classroom and school practices (Schildkamp & Arthur, 2017; Campbell & Levin, 2009, Chen, 
Heritage & Lee, 2005). There is now considerable focus on designing frameworks of systems 
evaluations that include a range of factors that can explain student achievement, in order to 
improve the quality of education for all groups of students (Howie, Scherman & van Staden, 
2017). The system of monitoring and evaluation of school activities, including instruments, 
procedures, information reporting and evaluation, consists of three mechanisms of regularly 
collecting information, evaluation of information and evaluation of results through an 
institutional action (van Staden & Zimmerman, 2017). School evaluation processes include 
different internal and external processes that indicate whether a school is using student data and 
information regarding teachers and other school factors to inform policies. Therefore, school 
quality assurance measures consist of a number of internal and external processes, and an 
establishment of certain standards, that are instrumental in improving overall school quality and 
student achievement. It includes monitoring, evaluation and accountability processes that 
contribute to education quality. In this study, PISA’s school quality assurance measures that are 
discussed in the conceptual framework and Chapter Three consist of a combination of internal 
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and external processes of monitoring, evaluation and accountability to collect and assess 
information on school quality, followed by actions for school improvement as a result of 
collecting and assessing this information. 
 
 
Figure 2. Amalgamated definition of quality assurance (Kistan, 1999) 
 
School accountability is a broad term that can include high-level governmental 
processes to have democratic accountability or market-based reforms to increase accountability 
to parents and children, where rewards and consequences are aligned with measurable 
outcomes (Figlio & Loeb, 2011; Rockoff and Turner, 2010). Accountability systems are meant 
to increase transparency and allocate clear responsibility. It entails furnishing different types of 
information about the processes and outcomes at schools that can be used to track progress and 
has been linked to higher achievement outcomes. For example, Madaus and Stufflebeam (1984) 
state that accountability and evaluation are the two main concepts associated with education 
quality assurance. They define accountability as assessments of performance of students, 
teachers or administrators, which are judged against a standard, to compare their relative 
effectiveness or set benchmarks. Evaluation for them includes ongoing monitoring processes 
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that can inform better practices. Figlio and Loeb (2011) define school accountability as ‘the 
process of evaluating school performance on the basis of student performance measures’. Ladd 
& Loeb (2013) state that the three most common proxies for school quality are measures of 
resources, measures of internal processes and practices, and student outcomes. They explain 
how these three measures are interdependent since some schools may use their resources more 
effectively and because it is difficult establishing a direct link between these proxies and 
student outcomes in every case. A combination of these three measures can provide a holistic 
view of school quality, though an ideal configuration may differ from school to school. Rockoff 
and Turner’s (2010) study claims that accountability systems can improve school quality and 
student achievement, and their results suggest that putting pressure and focusing on 
accountability can induce improvements in student achievement over a short period of time. 
Figlio and Loeb (2011) also indicate that while school accountability programs and processes 
can increase student achievement, the predicted effects for particular groups of students or 
types of schools can differ based on the design of the accountability system.  
 
Existing research shows that there is a relationship between school accountability 
practices and student achievement (Hanushek and Raymond, 2004), and policies around school 
level accountability practices are increasingly being adopted (Forrer et al., 2010). Forrer et al. 
(2010) claimed that PPPs in education can lead to an increase in accountability of schools and 
public services. They explain how accountability traditionally has been a vertical hierarchy 
between the government and other parties, and with PPPs it has become more of a horizontal 
relationship. They identify six dimensions for strengthening accountability in PPPs that include 
risk allocation and sharing factors, cost-benefit analyses for overall value to the government 
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and ultimate benefactors, social and political impact, expertise from the public and private 
sectors, partnership collaboration in terms of effective leadership and expectations, and 
performance measurement that can capture the implementation and intended outcomes of the 
partnership. Measures of accountability by the government need to expand with increasing 
partnerships since PPPs change the dynamics of public accountability by involving private 
partners in government decision making and program delivery and there is a need for conscious 
protection of public services at the risk of private profits (Forrer et al., 2011). According to de 
Koning (2018), all stakeholders in a PPP should be transparent and accountable, and any 
quality assessment should be conducted holistically through a social justice perspective which 
includes equity, inclusiveness, and democratic processes. While there have been theoretical 
arguments for and against PPP school quality assurance including accountability and 
evaluation, it has not been widely empirically tested. 
 
Some literature in the field claims that the involvement of non-governmental actors in 
education can affect the prevalence of educational accountability measures for a variety of 
reasons. One major factor is the perception of higher school quality at private schools as a 
result of low accountability and quality in public schools possibly resulting from lower 
resources (Mbiti, 2016). On the other hand, PPP schools are also widely regarded as having 
lower accountability due to the involvement of both sectors that dilute the level of 
accountability through shared responsibilities. School and student data has become more 
readily available in recent years, with multiple stakeholders involved in decision making about 
education and many countries making education more decentralized, giving higher autonomy to 
districts and schools. According to Burns and Köster (2016), this increased complexity in 
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governance arrangements with increased stakeholders has led to a higher availability and use of 
evaluation and accountability data.  
 
Hanushek (2002) equates school quality and education system quality with economic 
growth and states that school quality has an impact on individual earnings and the growth of the 
economy. However, he questions whether achievement in standardized scores can be the sole 
proxy for holding schools accountable for school quality. Student achievement, usually 
standardized test scores, is the most common indicator of school quality since it is more 
straightforward than other measures for schools and states to track and compare. Measures of 
student achievement are the easiest way for a school to measure what its students are learning 
and how they are performing. Reporting on other measures like teacher quality, professional 
development processes, transparency, compliance with state policy, etc. that are conducted by 
trained observers based on set rubrics can also provide a holistic measure of school quality 
(Ladd and Loeb, 2013). Thus, policies and practices are evolving where rather than focusing 
solely on learning outcomes, schools are encouraged to include measures of robust internal 
processes and practices that can be associated with positive education outcomes. According to 
OECD’s 2016 PISA report, schools use measures other than student assessments to monitor the 
quality of the education they provide and these standards of quality assurance, accountability 
and school improvement practices for educational institutions indicate a shift in the norm of 
school quality solely being based on academic outcomes. The logic behind these evaluation 
systems is that since schools differ in terms of available resources and skills, these alternative 
measures can help determine whether the resources are being used to improve overall learning 
(Ladd and Loeb, 2013). The limitation of focusing on these evaluation processes, as discussed 
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by them, is that they are not ultimately related to student outcomes, since they have not been 
validated in the literature as being linked to those outcomes or the validation is based on 
measures of quality that are imperfect or narrow.  
 
There have been contradicting theories and concepts regarding school quality assurance 
measures in PPPs, and whether theoretically they should be higher or lower performing than 
other school types, as discussed above. What is evident from the literature is that there is value 
in including both student achievement and other school quality assurance outcomes to 
understand school quality, and focusing on these indicators can help understand how 
educational PPPs may differ from other school types. To learn more about PPPs on the ground 
and identify indicators associated with their performance, a literature search was conducted on 
reports on education PPPs for information on what types of PPPs exist, the reason for their 
formation, and what went wrong and right. The next part of this paper examines case studies 
around education PPPs through the lens of these school quality assurance measures. 
 
Education PPPs around the World - Case Studies  
 
In many countries, especially LMIC, governments clearly outline the reasons for 
entering into PPPs in different sectors. These are usually part of the ministries of economics, 
education, finance and human development. Public perceptions of shared ownership and 
funding, and their ability to deliver societal benefits, likely depend heavily on the social and 
political contexts in which they are formed. Appendix A provides some statements on PPPs, 
particularly those in education, from a selection of countries. According to Verger (2012) there 
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are two main factors for the growth of education PPPs in developing countries. First, these 
countries may need innovative measures to improve education outputs and partnering with the 
private sector can be an attractive cost-effective measure that may not require government 
resources. And second, PPPs are promoted by influential international organizations such as the 
World Bank, United Nations, International Finance Corporation and the World Economic 
Forum. In addition to these there is an interplay of various social and political factors that 
contribute to the formation, success and failure of PPPs. As a concept that is widely disputed 
with varied and limited findings, it may be considered an irresponsible move for these 
organizations to push governments to enter into these partnerships without strong empirical 
evidence on its success. Table 2 below showcases eight case studies that were selected to 
provide field examples of the concepts discussed thus far, analyzed through the lens of school 
quality assurance measures. The rationale for this is to showcase the good, the bad and the in-
between of PPPs, with a focus on the outcomes of interest in this study, so that these findings 
can be used to inform recommendations for this dissertation. 
 
While these summaries of case studies and characteristics of educational PPPs in 
different countries are not comprehensive, they highlight the contextual factors that play a role 
in the success of education systems in any country. Demographic and socio-cultural fabrics of 
countries are as important to consider as financial and political aspects. The successes of the 
Jordanian and Colombian PPP arrangements would be difficult to replicate in a country where 
the government cannot commit to a high level of funding, or those with larger and less 
homogenous populations, or without as narrow and focused an issue as Information and 
Communications Technology (ICT) improvement. At the same time, while most PPPs are 
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formed with a focus on learning outcomes, the common indicators identified for the success or 
failure of partnership schools appear to be school quality assurance processes such as 
accountability, transparency, and evaluation measures. 
 
These case studies influenced this study in two ways. First, the explication of the role of 
school quality assurance practices and processes that contributed to the success or failure of 
educational PPPs. School quality is central in these PPP case studies. The goal of the PPPs was 
to increase overall school quality; however, indicators of school quality were not always 
explicitly measured, but identified as instrumental in the performance of the PPPs. For 
example, accountability in a PPP may not have been measured during implementation, but 
during program evaluation have been identified as a cause of success or failure of the PPP. And 
second, it highlighted how contextual factors are important to consider when assessing PPPs. 
The performance of PPPs can be influenced by the existing education systems, the nature of 
partnerships with regard to resources and management, the goals, the measures in place to 












Table 2.  
Case studies of PPPs in education (1) 
Country 
Liberia 












93 public primary 
schools, sparsely 
distributed across the 
country, were given out to 
the private providers to 
manage 
A universal voucher 
system with the 
government providing 
funding to private schools 
for each student and 
allowing them to operate 
largely autonomously 
Government partners 
with two private 
organizations and 
provides subsidies to 
public elementary grads 
to enroll in private high 
schools 
The Ministry of 
Education (MoE) 
partnered with ICT 
Ministry, Microsoft and 
USAID. Focus on 
infrastructure through 
providing schools with 
computers and teacher 
training 
Goals 
Free and high-quality 
education to low SES 
students 
Improved choice of 
schools, lower cost 
Help overburdened 
public high schools, 
relieve the government 
from building more 
schools, improve public 
school performance  
Enhance literacy skills 
and build the capacity of 




Increased resources for 
education, marginally 
higher test scores 
High performance in 
PISA, and compared to 
public and private schools 
PPP schools in the 
country have higher test 
scores and school 
quality. 
Increased literacy and 
technology skills, clarity 






overcrowding of public 
schools, lack of 
accountability and 
transparency in decision 
making, overall higher 
operational costs 
High inequality, some 
studies find no overall 
higher academic 
performance, teaching to 
the test-no innovation 
Discriminatory 
admission practices, no 
accountability 
mechanisms, public 
schools still over 
capacity with low 
quality education 
High monetary 
investments, no rigorous 
evaluations, inadequate 
data collection 
Year 2016 1981 1982 2003 
Partners 
Ministry of Education, 
non-profits, charities and 
for-profit organizations 
Department of Education, 
Fund for Assistance to 
Private Education, and 
private schools 
Department of Education 
with Fund for Assistance 
to Private Education 
(FAPE) & Private 
Education Assistance 
Committee (PEAC) 
 MoE with ICT 
Ministry, Microsoft, 








(2017); Romero, Sandefur 
and Sandholtz, 2017 
Aslam, Rawal & Saeed, 
2017; Mizala and Torche, 
2012; Elacqua , 2012 
Alba, 2010; Saguin, 






Case studies of PPPs in education (2) 
  











autonomy in school 
management and 
teaching pedagogy. 
Low-fee private schools 
(LFPS) receiving funding 




public funding to 
admit students as part 
of the Universal 
Secondary Education 
(USE) program  
Higher Education Students’ 
Loans Board (HESLB) 
which provided loans to 
students in need on a cost 
sharing basis between the 
government, the private 
sector and the student. 
Goals Improve achievement 
outcomes at public 
schools 
Increase access to out of 
school children, improve 






Increasing access to and 
quality of higher education 
What 
worked 
Higher achievement in 
some PPP schools, 
regulatory framework 
with limits on private 
school tuition, school 
autonomy, flexible 
budgets 
No known benefits from 
current research 
Increased enrollment 
for boys and girls, 
higher test scores, 
higher school 
governance at PPP 
schools, more 
resources 
Improved access to higher 
education by an increased 





Lower education quality 
with under-qualified 
teachers, low salaries, and 
poor quality of curriculum 
and instruction, low 
accountability and reports of 
bribery, student selection 
leading to exclusion 
Selection bias, 
structure of private 
schools did not 
change due to the PPP 
Underqualified academic 
staff, students above 
capacity in each classroom 
due to unchecked profit 
motives, no quality 
assurance agency for 
accountability 
Year 1999 1991 2007 1995 
Partners 
Private schools had 
autonomy in school 
management and 
teaching pedagogy, 




World Bank  
Government, public 








Hartley, 2017 Afridi, 2018 
Barrera-Osorio et al., 




Existing Studies on Education PPPs and School Outcomes 
  
Four significant pieces of research in the field are included in this section that are 
relevant for the research purposes of this study. They are all empirical studies that address the 
dearth of current research and highlight the need for further research. 
Baum’s 2018 study was undertaken because he believed that “public-private 
partnerships are meant to facilitate high performance of schools, teachers, and students by 
leveraging private sector activity and increasing levels of school choice, competition, 
accountability, and autonomy” (p. 4). Not finding adequate empirical data or evaluations of 
PPP programs, Baum conducted a multi-country analysis of PPP schools that combined public 
finance with private provision using PISA 2009 data. For his study he defined a PPP school as 
being operated privately while receiving at least 50% of total funding from the government, 
which could be through subsidies, voucher programs, or private management contracts. He 
estimates the achievement effects of attending a PPP school in 17 countries to learn whether 
performance differences can be explained by the productive efficiency of schools, or are due to 
differences in student peer group composition between public and PPP schools, and the extent 
to which participation in PPP schools is conditioned by student background characteristics such 
as socioeconomic status and prior academic ability. The outcome variables used in the study 
are student math and reading scores, the treatment variable of interest is school sector, and the 
covariates include student sex, grade, immigration status, native language, attitudes towards 
school, family structure, and school location. 
The main findings from Baum’s study show that after matching students on important 
background characteristics, in 74% of cases there are no differences in math and reading 
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outcomes between school sectors, and when there are differences they are slightly more likely 
to favor PPP schools. In terms of unconditional performance differences, he found students in 
PPP schools outperform public students in 53% of PISA outcomes across countries. However, 
a sizable amount of these performance differences can be attributed to positive student 
selection into PPP schools. After accounting for selection bias through propensity score 
matching, Baum concluded that school sector accounts for only 3.4% of the variation in PISA 
performance. 
Woessman (2006) used PISA 2000 data to understand the role of shared public and 
private involvement in the operation and funding of schools for student achievement. He 
identified the advantages of public sector involvement as being inclusive for operations and 
enabling school choice for low SES families, and of the private sector as encouraging quality, 
innovation and cost-effectiveness in operations and increased accountability in funding. Since 
there are contrasting findings for and against private involvement in the operation and funding 
of schools, the author used a true achievement model which includes separate effects of 
operation and funding. The analysis employs weighted least squares (WLS) estimation using 
sampling probabilities as weights. 
The main finding of the study is that across countries, public operation of schools is 
negatively associated with student performance in math, reading and science, while public 
funding of schools is positively associated with student performance in the three subjects. This 
sub-group includes PPP school systems where the state finances schools that are operated by 
the private sector. Those PPP school systems where there is private funding but public sector 
operations fare more poorly than systems where operation and funding is either both public or 
both private. 
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LaRoque (2008) looked at PPPs at the basic education level in different countries. He 
identified the main forms of PPP as private philanthropic initiatives, private sector management 
initiatives, private school funding programs like subsidies and vouchers, adopt-a-school 
programs, capacity building initiatives and school infrastructure partnerships. He analyzed 
different cases and then provided recommendations from the lessons learned from the design 
and implementation of PPPs. 
  
From this thorough review of over 30 case studies, the author made the following 
deductions about educational PPPs: 
It leads to increases in the level of financial resources committed to basic education. 
Educational PPPs supplement government schools’ capacity to absorb growing numbers 
of children. They allow for greater innovation in the delivery of education by focusing 
on the outputs and outcomes desired from an educational provider, rather than 
specifying how those outcomes should be achieved. Education delivery is more 
transparent through the use of explicit contracts and improved costing mechanisms. The 
process increases competitive pressures in the education sector, thus generating 
efficiency gains and spurring greater innovation in education delivery. 
  
LaRoque acknowledges the risks of PPPs where there can be a loss of control for 
education authorities and so a loss of accountability to the public, and that the benefits of 
school choice and competition could lead to increased instead of decreased inequalities. 
However, he states that PPPs can be beneficial in many ways in basic education but the 
contexts in which they are successful are important. Some of the issues and lessons he outlines 
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are having well planned PPPs, an enabling policy and regulatory environment and a strong 
legal framework, and a transparent and competitive bidding process. 
  
Aslam, Rawal and Saeed (2017) conducted a study on programs where public finance is 
combined with private provision through vouchers, subsidies and/or contract schools. They 
aimed to answer questions around the impact of PPPs on learning outcomes, the impact of 
learning outcomes on low SES students, the mechanisms through which PPPs impact learning 
outcomes, ways in which educational PPPs have supported improvements in education 
systems, and the key elements of an effective PPP policy. They conduct a systematic review of 
22 studies since 2009. They focused on what they found were the three primary channels 
through which PPPs improve learning outcomes: increased choice and diversity of schooling 
provision from competition between schools, increased accountability measures through 
stronger system-wide accountability, and increased autonomy resulting in improved quality of 
all schools. 
Overall, the authors found limited evidence of the relationship between PPP school 
arrangements in developing countries and learning outcomes, mainly due to limited evaluations 
and empirical studies. They state that while the evidence is inconclusive, there are other 
indicators that could have improved from it such as school enrollment and school management. 
They conclude by highlighting the need for further research in specific areas of educational 
PPPs and provide recommendations for PPP designing: 
Country-level scoping studies should be conducted to identify the landscape of PPP 
arrangements within a given context. The extent to which government discourse in the 
legislation and policy framework recognizes and facilitates given arrangements should 
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be clearly outlined. Capacity should be built both within the government engaged in 
managing PPPs, as well as the private education sector. The contracting process should 
be clear and transparent, roles and responsibilities of all parties should be outlined, and 
governments should have the capacity to carry out the accountability measures. 
Measuring accountability by monitoring educational service providers can measure 
improvements in the education system. 
  
These four studies have been central to inspiring and guiding the research for this 
dissertation research. Building on the recommendations of these studies, the gaps identified in 
their research and using new methodologies, this research undertakes the examination of the 
differences in school quality between schools based on the level of public and private funding 
and management. The studies identify the issues of accountability and evaluation as important 
concepts in educational PPP research but they are not included as actual measures. They also 
highlight the challenges of using large scale data to identify PPPs. This study enhances these 
methods and findings by using a new methodology to identify school types; uses school quality 
assurance measures empirically, and explores whether they moderate academic achievement. 
 
Table 3.  
Summary table for significant studies on PPPs in education 






PISA 2009 data, PPP 
schools are classified 
as private schools 
receiving at least 50% 
of total funding from 
the government 
PISA 2000 data, PPP 
schools are private 
schools with above 
mean public funding 
and public schools 
with above mean 
private funding 
Involvement of the 
private sector to 
improve both the 
delivery and financing 
of education 
Collaborations 
between the private 
sector and the state 
to help governments 




Purpose Estimate the 
achievement effects of 
attending a PPP school 
in 17 countries 
- Differences in 
performance due to 
differences in student 
peer group 
composition  
- How participation in 
PPP schools is 
conditioned by student 
background 
characteristics 
Understand the role 
of shared public and 
private involvement 
in the operation and 
funding of schools for 
student achievement. 
Examine the 
effectiveness of PPPs 
at the Basic Education 
level, including 
different forms of 
PPPs, to draw lessons 
for the design and 
implementation of 
PPPs 
A systematic review 
of 22 case to 
examine the impact 
of PPPs on learning 
outcomes, on low 
SES students, 
mechanisms through 
which PPPs impact 
learning outcomes, 
PPPs support in 
improvements in 
education systems, 
and key elements of 
an effective PPP 
policy 
Findings After matching 
students on important 
background 
characteristics, in 74% 
of cases there are no 
differences in math 
and reading outcomes 
between PPP and 
public schools, and 
when there are 
differences they are 
slightly more likely to 
favor PPP schools. 
PPP schools, where 
privately operated 
schools are funded by 
the state, have the 
highest achievement, 
while PPP schools, 
where publicly 
operated schools have 
private funding, 
perform the worst. 
The risks of PPPs 
include possible loss of 
control for education 
authorities and so a 
loss of accountability 
to the public, and 
increased inequalities. 
PPPs can be beneficial 
if they have an 
enabling policy and 
regulatory 
environment, a strong 












dearth of high 
quality studies to 
make generalizable 
conclusions, overall 
limited evidence of 
the relationship 




outcomes   
 
Conclusions from the Literature Review 
 
Previous research thus shows that there are claims associating educational PPPs with 
student achievement in terms of school funding and operation (Woessmann, 2006; Baum 
2018), but there is a continued need to examine their real effects. The results are varied and 
there is no consensus on education PPP effectiveness, design or principles. Although there is 
some scattered evidence of educational PPPs leading to higher achievement outcomes and 
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school quality and equity, the existing literature has not specifically investigated the what 
factors tare intrinsic to the concept of successful educational PPPs. Additionally, the literature 
on educational PPPs has focused primarily on case-by-case studies and not at a national level 
through a policy lens and so have not been nationally representative and generalizable. Though 
the merits of effective educational PPPs have been discussed in the literature and an increasing 
number of policies are being made globally allowing for expansion of this practice, there 
rightfully appear to be a number of skeptics. So, it is important to gain a better understanding of 
the relationship between PPPs and school quality measures, as well as how this relationship 
relates to and informs academic outcomes. This gap in the research must be addressed for both 
future research and future policy in order to better understand the relationship of interest, as 
well as to inform future policy decisions. The proposed study will seek to fill this gap by 
presenting a secondary data analysis using results from the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) PISA assessment. This dissertation will enhance 
existing research on aspects of PPPs that have not been previously examined, essentially a 
national level study examining PPP schools compared with public and private schools, on 

















Research Design  
 
The overarching purpose of this study is to identify PPP schools, and explore and 
compare the relationship between school types – public, private and PPP – with school quality 
assurance measures. Schools are the primary institution for learning almost universally, so 
analyzing PPP schools and comparing them on different outcomes with public and private 
schools, can provide valuable insights on the overall functioning of educational PPPs. A 
national level analysis of international assessment data from PISA allows answering the 
research questions posed and can help identify possible systemic effects and policy issues. The 
PISA school survey, used in the study, measures different constructs related to school quality 
assurance like accountability (for example, achievement data are tracked and reported), 
evaluation (for example, conducting internal evaluations and external evaluations), and school 
improvement (for example, evaluation results were used for school improvements). PISA states 
that a “shift in public and government control away from resources and curriculum and towards 
outcomes and accountability has led to the establishment of standards of quality for educational 
institutions” and these evaluation and assessment systems are used to improve teaching, 
learning and leadership outcomes (OECD, 2016, p. 138). This highlights the trend of lower 
government involvement in education, along with an increase in standards that allow the 
government to maintain some kind of oversight. It is these standards that will be used to 
compare schools in this dissertation.  
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The theoretical model first explores how measures related to school funding and 
management characteristics in PISA data can be used to classify PPP schools. After identifying 
this school category, it explores whether there are differences between school types in 
achievement, and whether these differences can be attributed to schools implementing school 
quality assurance processes, after accounting for cross-country differences.  
  
In this chapter, the methodology used to address the following research questions is 
discussed: 
 
RQ1: Can PPP schools be identified and classified from school funding and school 
management variables in the sample countries? 
RQ2: Do PPP schools in the sample countries have higher achievement outcomes than private 
and public schools, and does this effect vary by country? 
RQ3: Are PPP schools in the sample countries more likely than private and public schools to 
have school quality assurance measures, and does this effect vary by country? 
RQ4: Can differences in achievement outcomes be attributed to conducting school quality 
assurance measures by school type in the sample countries, and does this effect vary by 
country?  
 
The discussion of the methodology used to address these questions is divided into two 
sections. The first section provides a background on the PISA International Database, 
specifically the 2015 data cycle. The second section describes the quantitative procedures that 
will be used to address the research questions.  
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 PISA International Database 
Population and Sample Design 
PISA was developed by OECD countries through the OECD’s Directorate of Education 
and aims to provide OECD member and partner countries with a means to measure quality 
education within an agreed framework that allows for valid international comparisons (OECD, 
2006). The motivation behind PISA is to measure how well young adults, at age 15 who are 
approaching the end of compulsory schooling, can use their knowledge and skills to meet real-
world challenges (OECD, 2006). PISA uses a two-stage stratified sampling design in which 
schools are first sampled using probability proportional to size of the school’s enrollment of 15-
year-olds, and then students are sampled with equal probability within schools (OECD, 2018). 
Prior to sampling schools are grouped by explicit stratification variables which differ based on 
country, which are mutually exclusive groups used to improve the precision of sampling-
estimates (OECD, 2016). So, the probability of a school being selected is proportional to the 
number of eligible 15-year-old students that are enrolled in the school. And next, within each 
school a target cluster size is determined, which is usually 35 students, and students are 
selected with equal probability. 
 
PISA Conceptual Framework 
 
The PISA framework is policy orientated and it is designed to connect data on student 
learning outcomes with data on student characteristics and learning in and out of school, and to 
identify the characteristics of schools and education systems to understand performance 
patterns (OECD, 2009). PISA collects information at the student and school level on a cross-
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nationally comparable basis, making it possible to aggregate and disaggregate results for 
international comparisons and to inform policy discussions, as well as for school-level results 
for benchmarking and school-improvement purposes. PISA provides rigorous data on student, 
family and institutional factors to methodological experts in the context of trend indicators 
(OECD, 2009). Through this it is possible to see whether differences in student performance lie 
between or within countries, or between schools within countries, and or between students. 
Table 4 presents the conceptual framework for PISA and shows the types of variables and how 
they are organized. 
  
The grid in Table 4 shows how PISA captures the relationships between outcomes at 
multiple levels. An education system and its policies are bound by a number of social, cultural 
and political contexts at the macro level in every country. Outcomes at this level are not only 
related to learning but also quality and equity. Educational institutions and other providers in 
the community implement policies and practices at the institutional level for learning overall 
and between groups of students, as well as for school climate. Teachers and classrooms form 
the level of instructional units and learning outcomes are aggregated individual outcomes. At 








Table 4.  
PISA’s Conceptual Grid of Variable Types 
Antecedents Processes Outcomes 
Level of the educational system 
Macro-economic, social, cultural 
and political context 
Policies and 
organization of 
education Outcomes at the system level 
Level of educational institutions 




Outcomes at the institutional 
level 
Level of instructional units 
Characteristics of instructional units Learning environment 
Outcomes at the level of 
instructional units 
Level of individual learners 
Student background and 
characteristics 
Learning at the 
individual level Individual learning outcomes 




PISA looks beyond school curriculum and states that the assessments focus on student 
ability to apply their knowledge and skills in the real world. PISA assessments are carried out 
in participating countries on a three-year cycle. There are three subject domains - science, 
mathematics and reading - and each cycle focuses on students’ literacy competencies in one of 
three domains. In 2015 the focus was on science literacy and the minor domains were 
mathematics and reading literacy. The overall goal for PISA is to provide countries with a 
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stable instrument that is internationally valid to collect contextual data that can show which 
factors are linked to student performance and wellbeing (OECD, 2010). 
  
With regard to testing booklets, no student in a PISA assessment takes all of the items 
that are administered in that cycle, instead, each student is given approximately two hours’ 
worth of test material (OECD, 2016). In order to have a representative coverage of all items 
across all types of test takers, a balanced incomplete block (BIB) design is used to rotate test 
booklets - “each cluster (and therefore each test item) appears in three of the three-cluster test 
booklets, once in each of the three possible positions within a booklet, and each pair of clusters 
appears in only one booklet” (OECD, 2016, p. 16). 
Assessment Domains 
 
OECD (2009, p. 14) defines the assessment major domains as follows: 
“Reading literacy: An individual’s capacity to understand, use and reflect on written 
texts, in order to achieve one’s goals, to develop one’s knowledge, and potential and to 
participate in society. 
Mathematical literacy: An individual’s capacity to identify and understand the role that 
mathematics plays in the world, to make well-founded judgements and to use and 
engage with mathematics in ways that meet the needs of that individual’s life as a 
constructive, concerned and reflective citizen. 
Scientific literacy: An individual’s scientific knowledge and use of that knowledge to 
identify questions, to acquire new knowledge, to explain scientific phenomena, and to 
draw evidence-based conclusions about science-related issues, understanding of the 
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characteristic features of science as a form of human knowledge and enquiry, awareness 
of how science and technology shape our material, intellectual, and cultural 
environments, and willingness to engage in science-related issues, and with the ideas of 
science, as a reflective citizen.” 
Mathematics, reading and science scores from students will be aggregated to the school level in 
the quantitative analysis for this study. 
 Scaling 
 
The PISA 2015 Technical Report (OECD, 2017) explains that a linking design is used 
for the PISA main survey to establish comparability across countries, languages, assessment 
modes (paper-based and computer-based assessments), and between the 2015 PISA cycle and 
previous and future PISA cycles. Since each test booklet has different items and each student is 
given a subset of the total items, scaling techniques, in this case item response theory (IRT), are 
used to create common scales. 
Plausible Values 
 
Using the conditioning approach and anchoring all of the item parameters at the values 
obtained from the final IRT scaling, plausible values (PV) are generated for all sampled 
students, since students do not get every item on the assessment (OECD, 2017). 10 PVs were 
imputed for each student in 2015 as a range of likely proficiencies of each student. To cover the 
entire range of content, while students only complete a part of it, the full set of tasks is 
distributed across several different electronic test forms with overlapping content.  
64  
Student Background Questionnaire 
 
Along with the three assessment domains, PISA also collects additional information 
from students using a background questionnaire. These are completed by all the students once 
they finish with the cognitive section. The background questionnaires consist of student 
characteristics questions like on age and gender, family background information such as 
parental level of education and languages spoken, engagement at school and academic and out-
of-school time spent. In 2015 students also received two optional assessments on Educational 
Careers and ICT Familiarity. 
School Background Questionnaire 
 
The school background questionnaire is administered to all schools selected to 
participate in the PISA and is filled in by school principals. The school questionnaire included 
questions on school characteristics such as school structure and organization for enrollment, 
funding, grade levels in school, school staffing and management, school resources such as the 




PISA 2015 is the sixth PISA survey and was conducted in 72 countries including 35 
OECD countries and 37 partner countries and economies. Approximately 540 000 students 
completed the assessment in 2015, representing about 29 million 15-year-olds in the schools of 
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the 72 participating countries and economies (OECD, 2018). The number in the 2018 
assessment increased to 80 countries. Data from the 2015 PISA international database is 
primarily used to address the research questions that guide this dissertation research. This study 
includes six of these countries - Brazil, China, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia and Turkey - based 
on the criteria discussed earlier. 
Variables from PISA 2015 Used in the Primary Study 
 
The variables of interest and their operational definitions for the purpose of this study 
are discussed below, and the school quality assurance measures used in the study are illustrated 
in Figure 3. 
 
●   Student achievement in this paper is the measure of the scores obtained by a student 
in the PISA math, reading and science assessment. PISA reports use student 
achievement interchangeably with student learning and student outcomes to include 
knowledge and skills in areas other than academic scores to assess how students in 
different countries are prepared for life (OECD, 2014). For the purpose of this research, 
student achievement refers to a student’s score on an assessment. 
  
●   Country IDs for the six countries – BRCMIT – in the analysis will be included. 
PISA provides a unique identification number and code for each participating country. 
For China, data is included from the four PISA-participating Chinese provinces: 
Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu and Guangdong. 
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●   School sector refers to whether a school is publicly or privately owned and 
managed and is a binary variable. Public schools are managed by a public education 
authority or agency, and private schools are managed by a non-government 
organization, such as a church, a trade union or a private institution (OECD, 2012). 
Schools are often classified as either public or private according to whether a private 
entity or a public agency has the ultimate power for decision making concerning its 
affairs (OECD, 2016). 
  
●   School yearly funding refers to financial resources on which a school is run and is a 
continuous variable. Funding can broadly be classified as public meaning the 
government provides finances to run the school, or private where non-governmental 
entities provide finances to run the school. Schools respond to the PISA question on 
funding by including what percentage of their funding comes from the government, 
from tuition parents charged to parents, from donations, sponsorships and fundraising, 
or from other non-governmental sources. 
  
●   School quality assurance and improvement measures refer to processes and 
practices, other than student assessments, used by schools to monitor the quality of the 
education they provide (OECD, 2016). The survey included nine questions on whether 
these school quality assurance processes take place at the school, twelve questions on 
school quality implementation, and three on accountability around achievement scores. 
Going forward in the study, these 24 measures from three parts of the survey are 
67  
collectively referred to as school quality assurance measures. The school quality 
assurance processes include: 
1. Internal evaluation / Self-evaluation 
2. External evaluation 
3. Written specification of the school’s curricular profile and educational goals 
4. Written specification of student performance standards 
5. Systematic recording of data such as teacher or student attendance and professional 
development 
6. Systematic recording of student test results and graduation rates 
7. Seeking written feedback from students (e.g. regarding lessons, teachers or resources) 
8. Teacher mentoring 
9. Regular consultation aimed at school improvement with one or more experts over a 
period of at least six months 
 
These questions have three response options: (i) Yes, mandatory based on district or 
state policies, (ii) Yes, based on school initiative, and (iii) No. The two central questions in the 
survey check whether schools conduct internal and external evaluations. PISA defines internal 
school evaluation as “as part of a process controlled by a school in which the school defines 
which areas are judged; the evaluation may be conducted by members of the school or by 
persons/institutions commissioned by the school” (OECD, 2017). External school evaluations 
are defined as part of a process controlled and headed by an external body where the school 
does not define the areas which are judged (OECD, 2017). There are no definitions for the 
remaining seven school quality assurance processes and schools can interpret them broadly. 
The next part of the survey includes school improvement actions implemented as a 
result of internal and external evaluations. There are eight areas of school improvement actions 
68  
as a result of internal evaluation processes. There are three response options: (i) Yes (ii) No, 
because the results were satisfactory, and (iii) No, for other reasons.  
1. Educational staff (e.g., workload, personal requirements, qualifications) 
2. Implementation of the curriculum 
3. Quality of teaching and learning 
4. Parental engagement in school 
5. Teacher professional development 
6. Student achievement 
7. Students' cross-curricular competencies 
8. Equity in school 
 
There are four areas of school improvement actions as a result of external evaluation 
processes. These are binary variables with a yes or no response option. 
1. The results of the external evaluation led to changes in school policies. 
2. We used the data to plan specific action for school development. 
3. We used the data to plan specific action for the improvement of teaching. 
4. We put measures derived from the results of the external evaluation into practice 
promptly. 
 
Accountability procedures, part of the school quality assurance measures, refer to 
evaluation and assessment systems that use performance data related to students, 
teachers and school leaders to report to stakeholders in order to improve teaching, 
learning and school environments (OECD, 2013). Schools were asked to report on 
whether achievement data, as aggregated school test scores, graduation rates or in some 
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other form, were used in the following accountability procedures (OECD, 2016). Each 
of the items is a binary variable with a yes or no response option.  
1. Achievement data are posted publicly. 
2. Achievement data are tracked over time by an administrative authority, such as a 
district, state, or national education agency. 
3. Achievement data are provided directly to parents. 
 
●   School autonomy is an index of responsibilities held or decision making powers 
possessed by the principal, the teachers, and the school governing board versus the local 
or regional authorities and the state (PISA, 2015). Some of these responsibilities include 
decisions on hiring, curriculum, teacher salaries, school budget, and student assessment. 
The value entered by the school principals is the percentage of responsibility held by 
each of the five actors. The final index score is calculated on the basis of the ratio of 
“yes” responses for school governing board, principal or teachers to “yes” responses for 
regional/local education authority or national educational authority, with higher scores 
indicating higher levels of autonomy held by the school. It is standardized to have an 
OECD mean of ‘0’ and a standard deviation of ‘1’ for the pooled data set with equally 
weighted country samples (PISA, 2015).  
  
●   Demographic variables that will be included in the study include student and 
school socio-economic characteristics using the PISA index of economic, social and 
cultural status (ESCS) and the PISA school resources index. 
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The PISA ESCS index is a composite score derived from several variables related to 
students’ family background: parents’ education, parents’ occupations, family wealth 
possessions, and a number of home possessions like the number of books and other 
educational resources available in the home that can be taken as proxies for material 
wealth (OECD, 2016). For the purpose of reporting, the ESCS scale is a continuous 
variable, transformed with zero being the score of an average OECD student and one 
being the standard deviation across equally weighted OECD countries. 
The PISA school resources index has eight items based on the principals’ perceptions of 
factors hindering school instruction. Four items have to do with school staff such as 
staff shortage and lack of qualified staff, and four items have to do with educational 
material such as shortage of quality educational material, and lack of physical 
infrastructure. The response options range from ‘not at all’ to ‘a lot’. The mean score on 
the school resources index is a continuous variable in the analysis, ranging from 1 to 4, 
with higher scores indicating higher levels of instructional hindrances due to school 
resources. All items were inverted for scaling, so higher values on this index indicate 
better quality of educational resources (PISA, 2016). 
 
Use of PISA Data in this Study 
 
Some of the variables from PISA were recoded or manipulated in order to simplify 
them and make them more meaningful. 
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●   The school quality process variables each have three response options: (i) Yes, 
mandatory based on district or state policies, (ii) Yes, based on school initiative, and 
(iii) No. The two yes response options were collapsed to yes, making it a binary 
variable since the focus in this study was only whether or not a quality process was 
carried out.  
●   The variables for school improvement action taken after internal evaluation 
processes have three response options: (i) Yes (ii) No, because the results were 
satisfactory, and (iii) No, for other reasons. For this variable, the two no options were 
combined to make it a binary variable. This is because the research question is focused 
on whether or not consequential action was taken following internal evaluations. School 
improvement actions are continuous improvement measures, and the actions included as 
a result of internal evaluations should be included as part of a continuous monitoring 
process.  
●   Student level achievement scores in math, reading and science were aggregated to 
the school level since the other variables in the study are at the school level and since 
the PISA design “ensures that PISA can provide valid and reliable estimates of 
performance at aggregate levels when considering many students together within a 
country, or with a particular background characteristic in common” (OECD, 2018, p. 
42). Analyses were run with 10 plausible values for the school and the pooled statistics 
were used for reporting. 
●   Student level ESCS scores were also aggregated to the school level. PISA 2015 




Figure 3. PISA School Quality Assurance Measures 
 
Outline of Methods 
 
There are two main components in the methodology of this study, centered on 
examining the relationship between school quality assurance with the level of public and 
private funding and management of schools at the country level in the BRCMIT countries.  
  
The first component is to explore and create school types based on school funding and 
management using a two-step cluster analysis, discussed in detail below. The second 
component of this dissertation is the use of appropriate statistical models to examine the 
relationship between school quality assurance and achievement in mathematics, reading and 
science across different school types and sample countries. Data will be analyzed using 
descriptive statistics, MANCOVA, and multiple regression analyses. PISA 2015 data is used 
for this analysis since the cycle focused on school quality assurance measurement.  
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Data Analysis Procedures 
 
A clustering process using school funding and management variables is hypothesized to 
result in three school types, public, private and PPP. The relationship between these school 
types and school quality assurance measures will be assessed through multiple regression 
analyses. Statistical significance will be established at <0.05 and Cohen’s d (1998) criteria will 
be used to interpret effect sizes, where ηp2 = 0.01 is small, ηp2 = 0.02-0.05 is medium, and ηp2 
over 0.05 is large. Table 5 summarizes the statistical models and the variables included in each 
model. 
 
Table 5.  
Summary of Statistical Models 
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Data Analysis Methods for Research Questions 
 
RQ1: Can PPP schools be identified and classified using school funding and school 
management variables in the sample countries? 
The first step in this study was to create a school type variable using a clustering 
method, since PISA only provides schools as public or private sector schools. PISA does not 
elaborate on schools that are not pure public or private schools but only mentions 
‘government-independent’ private schools where 50% or more of funding comes from 
private sources or ‘government-dependent’ private schools where 50% or more of funding 
comes from the government (OECD, 2012). The two main limitations of this categorization 
are first, it ignores public schools that receive private support, and second, there is no 
justification for selecting a threshold of 50%. 
It is evident from the literature that along with public and private schools, there are 
private schools that are managed and operated by non-governmental entities and receive 
public funding, and public schools that are managed and operated by governmental entities 
that receive private funding, essentially PPPs. Three variables were used to explore PISA 
data in an attempt to create a school type variable based on shared funding and management: 
the school sector variable where PISA asks schools to identify whether they are private or 
public, which refers to the ownership and operational aspects of school management; the 
school autonomy variable which is the level of decision making power and management 
responsibilities held by the principal, the teachers, and the school board versus local and 
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national education authorities; and the funding variable where schools share what percentage 
of their funding comes from governmental and non-governmental sources.  
  
The log of processes followed to identify methods to create school type is described 
below to support the selection of two-step clustering. Based on previous studies in the field, I 
went through a number of methods to find grouping techniques for schools using funding and 
management. Since any kind of collaboration between a private and public entity is considered 
a PPP, there are a number of ways schools can be grouped. OECD PISA reports do not directly 
define or address PPP schools but acknowledge that private schools can be either government-
dependent or independent of the government, with the former receiving more than 50% of their 
core funding from government agencies. This grouping was used by Baum (2018) for his 
analysis, where he also includes public schools that receive over 50% of funding from private 
sources. However, there is no justification for this 50% criteria. Another method to identify 
school PPP type from large scale data is to consider schools that identify as public and receive 
100% of their funding from public sources as public schools; schools that identify as private 
and receive 100% of their funding from private sources as private schools; and identify all 
others that have any amount of funding from a source other than their school sector as a PPP 
school. Since the percentage of funding received is a continuous variable in the PISA dataset, 
this study makes use of this rich data by conducting a two-step cluster analysis to understand 
the natural groupings in the dataset. Thus, PPPs identified through the clustering technique 
utilize the underlying characteristics in the data to group schools. 
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Clustering is the process of grouping a population or data points such that data points in 
the same groups are more similar to other data points in the same group than those in other 
groups (Kaushik, 2016). So, groups are formed that have similar traits. Two-step clustering is 
an exploratory tool that is used to reveal natural groupings within a dataset that would 
otherwise not be apparent (Bafadal, 2019). Bacher, Wenzig and Vogler (2004) encourage the 
use of two-step clustering in social sciences since mixed type attributes can be handled and the 
number of clusters is automatically determined. They also claim that the process results more 
frequently in correct decisions and in less unbiased estimators. The two-step cluster analysis 
process has two steps: pre-clustering and clustering. In the first step, all the cases in the data are 
scanned and the log-likelihood distance between them is measured to determine the formation 
of pre-clusters based on some threshold distance criterion. Next, sub-clusters from the pre-
clustering step are grouped into the optimal number of clusters using an agglomerative 
clustering algorithm (Li and Sun, 2018). The algorithm can automatically determine the 
optimal number of clusters using Schwarz’s Bayesian Criterion (BIC) or the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC). The main strengths of algorithms used in the procedure are i. the 
ability to create clusters using both categorical and continuous variables, ii. an automatic 
selection of the number of clusters without the need to specify, and iii. the ability to analyze 
large data files efficiently (Bafadal, 2019). Using the IBM SPSS Modeler, a Silhouette Ranking 
Measure based on the Silhouette value is calculated which is a measure of cohesion in the 
cluster and separation between the clusters and provides thresholds for poor (up to +0.25), fair 
(+0.5), and good (above +0.5) models (Wendler & Gröttrup, 2016). 
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Two-step clustering has been used in quantitative studies in education and health where 
the groupings in the data are not discernible or the researcher is interested in learning about the 
latent groupings in the sampled data when it is noisy or ambiguous. Hume and McIntosh (2013) 
used a two-step cluster analysis to cluster the 217 schools based on responses to the School-
wide Universal Behavior Sustainability Index–School Teams (SUBSIST) items. This procedure 
was used to identify whether the SUBSIST separates schools into different groups based on 
patterns of the presence or absence of critical features for sustainability. First, a clustering 
procedure identifies the most optimal solution, then the solution is examined to identify which 
SUBSIST items are most different for the clusters. Finally, internal and external criterion 
analyses are used to assess the validity of the clustering solution and describe the clusters 
obtained. Ariouat et al. (2016) encouraged using a two-step clustering approach to improve 
educational process mining. Rijbroek et al. (2019) used clustering to find homogeneous 
subgroups and identify characteristics of each group in an effort to provide effective tailor-
made case management support in Child Protection Services (CPS). They used the two-step 
cluster method due to the presence of some categorical variables. 
  
Therefore, two-step clustering is an appropriate, exploratory tool in this study since it 
was designed to reveal natural groupings that are not apparent within a dataset (IBM, 2105b) 
and are not selected based on predetermined thresholds. It has a number of advantages over 
other techniques and the main features relevant for this study include the possibility to use both 
continuous and categorical variables, to run large datasets, and to automatically determine the 
ideal number of clusters without specification. The validity of the clusters will be checked after 
the two-step clustering process. Milligan (1996) recommends checking the validity of the 
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cluster solutions using both internal and external criterion analyses. Internal validity can be 
checked using statistical information from the clustering process to assess how well the 
variables cluster. The structure silhouette measure of cohesion and separation compares the 
closeness of variables within clusters to closeness between clusters. External criterion analyses 
include post hoc tests to check for significant differences among the clusters using variables not 
directly used in the clustering procedure.  
 
RQ2: Do PPP schools in the sample countries have higher achievement outcomes than private 
and public schools, and does this effect vary by country? 
   
Multiple analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) and analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) 
were conducted to address this research question, with school mean achievement in each 
subject as the dependent variables, school type and country as the independent variables, and 
ESCS scores and the PISA school resources index as covariates. MANCOVA is similar to 
ANCOVA (as well as ANOVA and MANOVA) in that it uses one or more categorical 
variables as predictors on a continuous dependent variable, but it differs from ANCOVA since 
it can have more than one dependent variable. MANCOVA reduces the probability of Type I 
errors when there are multiple dependent variables. MANCOVA and ANCOVA are 
appropriate methods for this research question since they can be used to determine the main 
effects of school type and country on achievement, as well as the interaction effect between 
them, on math, reading and science outcomes, while controlling for socio-economic covariates. 
These analyses can be followed up to determine the effect that the different groups of each 
independent variable had on the dependent variables, after controlling for the covariates. For 
79  
example, it could tell us whether achievement in math was lower for PPP schools in one 
country compared to public schools in another country, after adjusting for socio-economic 
factors. Alternatively, if there was no interaction effect, the analysis could be followed using 
only main effects. 
  
ANCOVA is a combination of regression and ANOVA, and allows researchers to 
determine whether the group mean scores differ after the influence of one or more variables on 
the scores has been equated across groups (Rutherford, 2011). Accounting for more variance in 
the model can reduce the size of the error term. It allows for covariation between the predictors 
and the dependent variable, and then removes that variance from the dependent variable scores 
before determining whether the differences between groups are significant (Rutherford, 2011). 
  
PISA 2015 provides 10 plausible values (PV) for each subject for each student.  In order 
to obtain estimates of desired quantities in secondary analysis such as group differences or the 
parameters of a regression model, calculations are carried out K times, once for each set of PVs 
and the results are averaged (Braun & von Davier, 2017). PVs are not individual scores in the 
traditional sense, and should therefore not be analyzed as multiple indicators of the same score 
or latent variable (Mislevy, 1993). Following this procedure, pooled regression coefficient 
estimates, obtained by combining the 10 sets of PVs, will be used to get unbiased measures. 
  
RQ3: Are PPP schools more likely than private and public schools to have school quality 
assurance measures, and does this effect vary by country? 
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This research question examines the relationship between school type and country 
membership with school quality assurance measures. PISA includes school quality assurance 
processes and school improvement actions, which include schools undertaking activities around 
a non-comprehensive list of quality standards. The school quality assurance process survey (see 
Appendix B1) includes two questions that are central to this study - whether schools conduct 
internal and external evaluations, and seven other questions on schools’ adherence to quality 
standards. School improvement actions include 12 measures undertaken by schools as a result 
of conducting internal and external evaluations (see Figure 2, Appendix B3 and B4). School 
accountability procedures include three practices. Each of the 24 school quality assurance 
processes and school improvement action items were analyzed separately. ESCS scores and the 
school resources index were included in the model as covariates. 
 
The nine school quality assurance processes and 12 school improvement actions are 
binary variables, and binary logistic regression models were used to predict the likelihood of 
implementing these by school type and country. Logistic regressions were used to calculate 
odds ratios (OR) with 95% confidence intervals (CIs) as estimates of effects for each outcome. 
Logistic regression uses maximum likelihood estimation to evaluate the probability of 
categorical membership and is an appropriate statistical technique in this case. An OR is a 
measure of association between an occurrence and an outcome, where it indicates the odds of 
an outcome given a particular occurrence, compared to the odds of the outcome in the absence 
of that occurrence.  
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The accountability section consists of three questions on accountability procedures 
around achievement data (see Appendix B2) and have a yes or no response option. Schools are 
asked about achievement data being posted publicly, achievement data being tracked over time, 
and achievement data being provided to parents. Binary logistic regression models were 
conducted to predict the likelihood of school types conducting each accountability measure. 
 
Thus, this research question examines 24 school quality assurance measures, including 
nine school quality assurance processes, 12 school quality assurance improvement actions, and 
three accountability measures. 
 
 
RQ4. Can differences in achievement outcomes be attributed to conducting school quality 
assurance measures by school type in the sample countries, and does this effect vary by 
country? 
  
A moderator analysis was used to determine whether the relationship between school 
type, country membership and achievement is moderated by schools conducting school quality 
assurance processes and taking school improvement actions following internal and external 
evaluations. Baron and Kenny (1986) outline the properties of moderators as variables that 
affect the strength and/or direction between an independent and dependent variable. 
Moderation analysis tests if a change in the relationship between an independent variable and a 
dependent variable depends on the level of a third variable which is the moderator variable. So, 
this set of analyses examined the possibility that the nature of the relationship between school 
type and country with achievement varies depending on conducting school quality assurance 
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measures, in that the relation could be stronger for schools that do and less strong for schools 
that do not. As discussed in Chapter Two, conducting measures around school accountability 
and evaluation have sometimes been positively associated with achievement outcomes. Figure 
4 below illustrates how a school quality assurance measure variable (Z) is assumed to have a 
moderating effect on the relationship between school type (W), country (X), and achievement 
(Y). Fairchild and MacKinnon (2009) recommend an a priori model guided by theory to 
identify moderators and then examining interaction effects, since the product of coefficients 
can be easily applied in complex models. According to them, 
  
“Moderator variables affect the strength and/or direction of the relation between a 
predictor and an outcome: enhancing, reducing, or changing the influence of the 
predictor. Moderation effects are typically discussed as an interaction between factors 
or variables, where the effects of one variable depend on levels of the other variable in 
analysis (p. 4).” 
  
Based on this, the moderation effects in this research are checked with separate 
MANCOVA analyses for each school quality assurance measure, to test for the interaction 
between the predictors and moderators on math, reading and science achievement, while 
controlling for the same socio-economic covariates. The predictor variables are school type and 
country membership, and the moderators include nine school quality processes, 12 school 
improvement actions - eight actions from internal evaluations and four from external 
evaluations, and three accountability procedures. MANCOVA in these analyses will be used to 
explain the variance in achievement explained by school type, country membership, and the 
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interaction effect of school type and country membership with each school quality assurance 
measure.  
  
It is expected that: i. The school type and country membership explain a statistically 
significant portion of variance in the school quality assurance measures, ii. The school quality 
assurance measures explain a statistically significant portion of variance in achievement, iii. 
When school quality measures are included in the model with school type and country 
membership, the portion of variance in achievement explained by school type is significantly 
reduced. The equation for the moderation model is: 
 
 Y = i5 + β1W + β2X + β3Z + + β4WZ + β5XZ + β6WXZ + e5 
 
Where W and X are the independent variables, school type and country, Y is the dependent 
variable, achievement, and Z is the moderating variable, a school quality assurance measure. 
β1 and β2 are the coefficients of the independent variables, school type and country, to the 
outcome, achievement, when school quality assurance = 0. β3 is the coefficient relating the 
moderator variable, school quality measure, to the outcome.  
i the intercept in the equation, and e is the residual in the equation. 
The regression coefficients for the interaction terms, β4, β5 and β6, provide an estimate of the 
moderation effects. If β6 is statistically different from zero, there is significant moderation of 
the predictor-outcome relation in the data. Plotting interaction effects aids in the interpretation 
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of moderation to show how the slope of Y on X is dependent on the value of the moderator 
variable. 
Therefore, 
Achievement = i5 + β1school_type + β2country + β3quality_assurance_measure + β4 
school_type*quality_assurance_measure + β5country*quality_assurance_measure + β6 
school_type* country * quality_assurance_measure + e5 
 
  
Figure 4. Path diagram representations of the moderation model 
X= the independent variable, Y= the dependent variable, Z= the moderator variable, XZ= the 
product of X and the moderator variable, β1 = the effect of X on Y, β2 = the effect of Z on Y, 
and β3 = the effect of XZ on Y (Fairchild & MacKinnon, 2009). 
 
 
Limitations of the Study 
 
  
There are important limitations in the study design and models, and of PISA, that will 
be acknowledged in this section. The assumptions for all of the statistical tests were tested. If 
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there were any violations of these assumptions, they were reported as limitations. The 
researcher’s positionality, and any associated bias, has also been stated earlier in the 
dissertation. 
  
First, although cross-country evidence is valuable for many types of studies to analyze 
trends across countries, it also has shortcomings. PISA (and TIMSS and PIRLS, and other 
international assessments) collect extensive information on family and school variables so that 
those factors can be accounted for and students can be compared equally on selected observable 
factors. However, since there is no randomization in terms of students or the other variables of 
interest, the findings must be interpreted with caution. No clear causal inferences can be made 
using this international data due to unobserved heterogeneity at the country level, since there 
could be many unobservable characteristics or omitted variable bias, that are correlated with the 
variables of interest and all variables cannot be accounted for in this design. 
  
The literature review discusses different forms of educational PPPs that include 
different classifications and dimensions. However, PISA data does not allow identification of 
different types or models of PPPs such as the specific sources around funding or the conditions 
of the partnership. The exact nature of partnership between the public and private sector cannot 
be deduced from PISA data. So, the data analysis only centers on the effectiveness of PPPs 
where PPP schools are not purely publicly funded and managed or privately funded and 
managed but have some shared form of school funding and management and have been 
classified as a PPP school using a two-step clustering method. It only focuses on the resource 
and operational aspects of educational PPPs. The findings must be interpreted keeping in mind 
86  
that the PPP schools were identified using school sector (public or private), school autonomy, 
and source of school funding (governmental or non-governmental) variables. It is an innovative 
method of grouping schools, and one that is much needed for large-scale analyses. However, 
there must be caution while making inferences about the findings and applying them to specific 
PPP designs.  
  
The literature shows many other variables that are linked to educational PPPs like 
student selection, enrollment, innovation, cost-benefit, access to schooling, and impacts on 
other local schools, in addition to achievement and school quality assurance measures. This 
research only focuses on the school quality assurance variables that are provided by PISA. 
Although there are other important indicators related to educational PPPs, they go beyond the 
scope of this paper. Using different measures of school quality assurance could potentially lead 
to different results. This study also does not account for the possible negative impacts on other 
local schools that have been raised as an issue from several case studies.  
 
It is important to remember that assessments work only if they are measuring the right 
thing, and they can have unintended consequences (Griffin, McGaw & Care, 2012). The 
questionnaire for PISA’s school quality assurance measures needs to be tested for its reliability 




Aggregation bias is a limitation of the study although PISA has established that the data 
can be aggregated and analyzed at multiple levels. However, student level variables 
(achievement and ESCS) are used at the school level in this study. 
 
The outcomes for some of the school quality assurance measures were manipulated to 
either match other sections or based on some logical theory. It is expected that the outcomes 
may be different if the variables were manipulated differently. 
  
There are several critiques of PISA and large-scale assessments overall that are 
acknowledged as a limitation. The OECD is an economic organization and concerned about the 
economic role of schools and education, and PISA is widely regarded as a valid measure of the 
quality of educational systems in different countries. However, the PISA framework was 
developed for and by OECD members, which are all countries that are mostly considered 
developed or industrialized. Thus, the assumptions regarding education systems and policy for 
PISA do not necessarily fit every country. PISA is also considered unrepresentative since most 
of the countries included are high-income countries and it is a self-selected sample. The PISA 
for Development program, which attempts to encourage more low-income countries to 
participate, has so far not been successful. The inclusion of more countries in PISA could lead 
to making it more relevant for different contexts and the possibility of being more inclusive. 
  
In addition, the purpose of education is not only economic but includes goals of being 
responsible, moral and empathetic citizens, being curious and innovative, addressing wellbeing 
and mental health, improving the lives of others and the planet, among others. PISA has been 
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criticized for homogenizing and standardizing education that limits innovation and the joy of 
learning and possibly leads to the exclusion of students with special needs. I also firmly believe 
that there are negative consequences of involving private corporations like Pearson to design 
tests and have access to global data about students and schools, and PISA should continue 
being designed by different non-profit organizations and education professionals. 
  
Acknowledging these limitations, PISA nonetheless provides a platform to compare 
countries on generic indicators. It can highlight good practices or shed light on harmful ones. It 
can be a useful tool for educators, parents, schools and policymakers when mindful that it is not 
the only measure of a good education system but should be used along with other measures and 
























This chapter presents the results of the analyses discussed in Chapter Three. This 
dissertation used PISA 2015 data and SPSS 25 software to measure differences in school 
quality assurance measures and achievement among school types based on funding and 
management. To reiterate, the first step was to identify and classify PPP schools, public schools 
and private schools. There are numerous ways to define and classify school types based on 
funding and management, reflecting the complexity and intricacy of the educational process 
and its inputs and outputs. Two-step clustering was selected as a novel method to proceed in 
this study. 
 
The clustering results are followed by a description of the schools by country in the 
sample with respect to their sociodemographic and background characteristics. There were 
2017 schools and 58,994 students that were part of PISA 2015 in the six countries. A 
correlation analysis was carried out in order to examine the association among the independent 
variables, as well as to gain an understanding of the strength of relationships between the 
explanatory factors, school type and socio-demographic variables. There is no multicollinearity 
issue because there is no correlation between any of the two variables that is larger than 0.3. 
Correlations for the dependent variables, school quality assurance measures, varied between 
0.12 to 0.47. The dependent variables, achievement in math, reading and science, are highly 
correlated but distinct constructs. This does not pose a problem since a MANCOVA analysis 
can be used to investigate the variance explained by each dependent variable. Missing data on 
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the school quality assurance measures ranged from 0.6% to 7.1% and these cases were not 
removed or imputed. 
 
Research question 1 
The first research question asked, “Can PPP schools be identified and classified using school 
funding and school management variables in the sample countries?” 
 
Clustering was used to explore whether schools could be classified based on the level of 
school management and school funding. The clustering procedure identified the most optimal 
grouping of schools, and then this grouping was used as the basis of this study to examine 
whether the clusters formed differ from each other on school quality assurance measures.  
 
Cluster analysis output 
 
School sector, school autonomy and school source of funding were used in a two-step 
clustering process to create school classifications based on funding and management. The 
number of clusters was selected according to Schwarz’s Bayesian Criterion (BIC) and resulted 
in 1274 schools in three clusters. The same result was obtained using AIC. The silhouette 
measure of cohesion and separation is 0.6 thereby indicating a good cluster quality (IBM, 
2015b; Wendler & Gröttrup, 2016). Internal criterion analyses are used to assess the validity of 
the clustering solution and describe the clusters obtained.  
 
Validation of clustering 
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Validity of the two-step cluster solution was checked using the following methodology. 
First, model fit was evaluated by the silhouette coefficient, which is a measure of cohesion and 
separation of clusters. The obtained value is 0.6, suggesting good validity of the within- and 
between-cluster distances.  
 
Second, Pearson’s chi-squared tests and analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests for the 
categorical and continuous predictor variables were used to check that the clusters vary 
significantly.  
 
Finally, the cluster solution was assessed by taking random samples from the dataset 
and running the same two-step clustering procedures. This resulted in similar clusters in terms 
of the number and characteristics of the clusters, and silhouette measures of cohesion and 
separation. 
 
Features of the clusters and predictor importance 
 
Table 6 summarizes the distribution of the clustering variables in each cluster and the 
mean value. Figure 5 shows the predictor importance of each of the variables towards the 
formation of the clusters. The percentage of funding from the government, school sector, and 
funding from tuition have the highest importance while school autonomy, and the percentage of 
funding from donations, sponsorships and other sources have the lowest importance. Figure 6 
shows the distribution of the clustering variables for these schools. A large number of schools 
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receive a high percentage of funding from the government and a low percentage of funding 
from non-governmental sources. School autonomy varies with a high number of schools not 
having low or high autonomy.  
 
Cluster 1, which consists of 74.4% of the schools in the sample, has 100% schools that 
are public sector schools. 96.14% of funding for these schools come from the government. 
Cluster 3 consists of schools that are 100% private sector schools, and consist of 12.1% of the 
sample. 27.44% of funding at these schools comes from the government. Most of the funding 
for these schools comes from tuition, with a small percentage of funding from the government, 
from donations and fundraising, and other sources (Figure 7). These schools have a high level 
of school autonomy. Cluster 2 consists of both public and private sector schools with 26.19% 
of funding coming from the government. This cluster was classified as PPP schools and has 
162 public sector schools and 10 private sector schools, indicating that they are mostly 
privately-funded and publicly-managed schools. These schools have funding from both 
governmental and non-governmental sources. Levels of autonomy vary, with most schools 
having low to medium amounts of autonomy (Figure 8). For further analysis, Cluster 1 schools 
are classified as public schools, since they are all publicly managed and operated and most of 
their funding comes from public sources; Cluster 3 schools are classified as private, since they 
are all privately managed and operated and most of their funding comes from non-
governmental sources; and Cluster 2 schools are classified as PPP schools since they are 
distinct from public and private school classifications based on the shared character of their 
funding sources and management. The level of autonomy at private schools is much higher 
than at public and PPP schools. 
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The countries with the highest percentage of PPP schools are Mexico (51.1%) and 
Turkey (37.0%) of the schools in the country sample, while China (5.4%) and Russia (0.5%) 
have the least (see Table 7). Two-step clustering by country revealed different numbers of 
clusters for each country. China and Russia had two school clusters, Indonesia, Brazil and 
Turkey had three school clusters, and Mexico had four school clusters. For the analyses in this 
study, the overall classifications from the two-step clustering will be used.  
 
Table 6.  
Distribution of clustering variables 
Cluster 1 (Public) 2 (PPP) 3 (Private) 
Size 74.4% (948) 13.5% (172) 12.1% (154) 
Inputs 
% of funding from 
Government (Mean: 96.14) 
% of funding from 
Government (Mean: 26.19) 
% of funding from 
Government (Mean: 27.44) 
Public or private school 
(Public: 100%) 
Public or private school 
(Public: 94.2%) 
Public or private school 
(Private: 100%) 
% of funding from 
fees/parents (Mean: 1.84) 
% of funding from 
fees/parents (Mean: 40.85) 
% of funding from 
fees/parents (Mean: 69.27) 
School autonomy (Mean: 
0.52) 
School autonomy (Mean: 
0.43) 
School autonomy (Mean: 
0.94) 
% of funding from 
sponsorships, fundraising 
etc. (Mean: 1.23) 
% of funding from 
sponsorships, fundraising 
etc. (Mean: 16.26) 
% of funding from 
sponsorships, fundraising 
etc. (Mean: 1.26) 
% of funding from other 
non-governmental sources 
(Mean: 0.79) 
% of funding from other 
non-governmental sources 
(Mean: 16.71) 


















Figure 6. Distribution of clustering variables for public schools 
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Figure 8. Distribution of clustering variables for private schools 
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Table 7.  
Clusters by Country  
Country Public N (%) PPP N (%) Private N (%) Total 
Brazil 360 (83.91) 21 (4.89) 48 (11.18) 429 
China 191 (85.65) 12 (5.38) 20 (8.96) 188 
Indonesia 63 (46.66) 8 (5.92) 64 (47.4) 135 
Mexico 53 (38.68) 70 (51.09) 14 (10.21) 137 
Russia 185 (98.4) 1 (0.53) 2 (1.06) 162 
Turkey 96 (59.25) 60 (37.03) 6 (3.7) 223 





The sample consists of 1274 schools in the six countries. Table 8 summarizes the 
descriptive statistics of socio-demographic characteristics by school type. ESCS scores are 
lowest in PPP schools and highest at private schools. School size and class size are the smallest 
in private schools and largest at PPP schools. Student-teacher ratios are highest at PPP schools. 
The mean for number of teachers is highest at public schools and lowest at private schools. 
Parents at public and private schools had an average of 11 to 12 years of education, while 
parents at PPP schools had an average of 9.8 years. Since PISA is conducted among 15 year 
olds, the average age in each cluster is almost the same.  
 
The mean ESCS score for students in each cluster ranges between -0.85 to -1.47 
standard deviations from the score of an average OECD student (Table 8). The ESCS index 
was standardized so that the mean of the index value for the OECD student population was zero 
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and the standard deviation was one, with countries being given equal weight in the 
standardization process (OECD, 2016). Negative values for an index indicate that the 
respondents scored less positively with regard to home possessions, parental occupation and 
education than all respondents did on average across OECD countries and a positive value on 
an index indicates that the respondents answered more favorably, or more positively than 
respondents did, on average, across OECD countries (OECD, 2016).  
 
Table 9 shows the country differences in the demographic variables, establishing the 
different contexts in each country. ESCS measures by country and school type show that PPP 
schools in Mexico and China have lower ESCS scores than public and private schools in the 
countries, while in Indonesia PPP schools have higher scores than public and private schools, 
and private schools in Turkey have a much higher ESCS score compared with public and PPP 
schools which have the same average ESCS score. In China, PPP schools have a higher school 
size, class size and total number of teachers. These are also much higher compared with the 
other countries. Private schools in China have a higher student-teacher ratio that public and 
PPP schools, while the total number of teachers at PPP schools is higher than the other two 
school types. In Mexico, public school sizes, total number of teachers, and student-teacher 
ratios are higher than PPP and private schools. Private schools in Brazil have a higher average 
number of teachers at each school that public and PPP schools. In Indonesia and Turkey, 
private schools have a lower number of teachers at each school that public and PPP schools.  
 
Table 10 shows the mean score in math, science, and reading by country and the PISA 
2015 ranking of each country. China ranked 10 out of the 72 countries that participated in PISA 
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2015, while Brazil ranked 63. This further highlights the differences in performance between 
countries in the sample. Further analyses around achievement are conducted in the next 
research question. 
 
Table 8.  
Demographics by School Type 
 Public (N=948) PPP (N=172) Private (N=154) Total (N=1274) 
Age, Mean (SD) 15.7 (0.3) 15.7 (0.2) 15.7 (0.2) 15.7 (0.3) 
ESCS, Mean (SD) -1.1 (1.1) -1.4 (1.1) -0.8 (1.4) -1.1 (1.2) 
School Size, Mean (SD) 1036.4 (1128.7) 1124.5 (1254.6) 908.9 (1825.3) 1033.8 (1247.1) 
Class Size, Mean (SD) 35.0 (11.5) 39.9 (12.4) 33.3 (12.1) 35.5 (11.8) 
Student-teacher ratio, Mean 
(SD) 20.3 (14.0) 23.3 (12.0) 20.5 (18.5) 20.7 (14.4) 
Total teachers at school, Mean 
(SD) 62.7 (71.2) 57.7 (77.7) 41.3 (52.2) 59.5 (70.4) 
Parents years of schooling, 













Table 9.  
Demographics by Country and School Type 
Country  Public, Mean (SD) PPP, Mean (SD) Private, Mean (SD) Total, Mean (SD) 
ESCS scores 
Brazil -1.31 (1.09) -1.28 (1.16) 0.13 (1.01) -0.97 (1.17) 
China -1.07 (1.13) -1.40 (0.55) -0.58 (1.11) -0.87 (1.11) 
Indonesia -1.87 (1.21) -1.14 (1.46) -1.93 (1.03) -1.79 (1.11) 
Mexico -1.12 (1.13) -1.44 (1.25) -0.19 (1.15) -1.14 (1.20) 
Russia -0.17 (0.76) 0.22 (.) 0.61 (0.14) 0.07 (0.74) 
Turkey -1.67 (1.16) -1.67 (1.04) 0.07 (1.41) -1.44 (1.16) 
Total -1.10 (1.18) -1.47 (1.14) -0.85 (1.41) -1.01 (1.21) 
School size  
Brazil  866.4 (518.8) 962.3 (453.1) 913.1 (904.5) 876.5 (570.6) 
China 1821.7 (1875.4) 4824.7 (1597.1) 2081.7 (2138.3) 2006.6 (1996.8) 
Indonesia  669.3 (347.9) 715 (488.8) 625.0 (2335.8) 651.8 (1604.8) 
Mexico  1545.3 (1726.5) 658.2 (661.5) 563.3 (717.9) 978.7 (1250.7) 
Russia  637.3 (438.2) 905 (.) 474.5 (328.8) 637.0 (436.1) 
Turkey  784.6 (566.7) 1025.2 (580.7) 558.6 (472.5) 865.5 (580.4) 
Class size  
Brazil  35.8 (7.8) 38.3 (7.1) 31.5 (12.3) 35.4 (8.6) 
China 40.9 (9.2) 51.3 (3.2) 44.05 (10.0) 41.7 (9.4) 
Indonesia  31.4 (7.9) 33 (7.0) 30.1 (9.8) 30.8 (8.8) 
Mexico  41 (9.9) 36.7 (12.0) 35.1 (12.5) 41 (9.9) 
Russia  21.5 (5.2) 23 (.) 23 (7.0) 21.6 (5.2) 
Turkey  46.3 (11.3) 43.0 (13.5) 47.1 (12.0) 45.2 (12.2) 
Student-teacher ratio  
Brazil  30.1 (16.5) 28.7 (11.0) 30.2 (21.2) 30.1 (16.8) 
China 11.0 (5.3) 17.9 (8.6) 22.5 (20.5) 12.4 (8.7) 
Indonesia  16.3 (5.5) 16.9 (5.2) 13.5 (13.4) 15.0 (10.0) 
Mexico  31.3 (12.2) 27.9 (14.4) 20 (16.6) 28.4 (14.1) 
Russia  13.9 (6.3) 13.9231 (.) 18.3 (18.4) 13.9 (6.4) 
Turkey  14.7 (5.0) 17.6 (6.1) 11.7 (4.0) 15.7 (5.6) 
Total number of teachers at school  
Brazil  33.5 (22.4) 34.7 (21.2) 42.4 (51.7) 34.5 (27.3) 
China 151.0 (107.6) 296.5 (109.0) 100.0 (94.5) 154.3 (112.4) 
Indonesia  40.0 (20.0) 39.1 (24.5) 25.6 (15.9) 33.1 (19.6) 
Mexico  45.1 (47.8) 24.2 (25.8) 24.1 (30.3) 32.3 (37.5) 
Russia  43.7 (29.1) 65 (.) 34.2 (16.6) 43.7 (29.0) 




Table 10.  
PISA 2015 Mean Achievement Score and Ranking 
 Math Reading Science 
Ranking on Average Score 
from 72 countries 
Brazil 377 407 401 63 
Indonesia 386 397 403 62 
Mexico 408 423 416 57 
Russia 494 495 487 28 
Turkey 420 428 425 50 
China 531 494 518 10 
Note: Source is the PISA 2015 Results in Focus Report 
 
 
Research question 2 
 
The second research question asked, “Do PPP schools in the sample countries have 
higher achievement outcomes than private and public schools, and does this effect vary by 
country?” 
 
Table 11 and Figure 9 show the differences in mean achievement by school type and 
country. In China, Russia and Indonesia, PPP schools scored higher in math and science than 
other school types in the country, with public schools in China scoring highest in reading. In 
Mexico and Turkey, public schools scored highest in all three subjects, while in Brazil, private 
schools scored more in math, reading and science than the other school types.  
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Brazil 377.35 (6.82) 371.48 (9.36) 363.64 (2.31) 
Indonesia 417.27 (5.61) 453.44 (15.19) 433.11 (5.63) 
Mexico 383.87 (11.64) 418.27 (5.25) 423.61 (5.90) 
Russia 444.18 (30.46) 478.23 (42.96) 446.53 (3.72) 
Turkey 394.80 (17.61) 430.47(5.60) 436.75 (4.55) 
China 511.1 (9.62) 538.23 (12.39) 533.31(3.12) 
Reading 
Brazil 402.49 (7.03) 399.20 (9.65) 392.58 (2.38) 
Indonesia 435.95 (5.79) 454.50 (15.66) 444.35 (5.80) 
Mexico 406.05(12.00) 433.27 (5.42) 439.62 (6.08) 
Russia 442.40 (31.41) 507.60 (44.30) 440.11 (3.84) 
Turkey 386.67 (18.16) 442.65 (5.78) 444.85 (4.69) 
China 472.46 (9.92) 492.12 (12.77) 497.13 (3.22) 
Science 
Brazil 403.52 (6.38) 393.93 (8.76) 387.11 (2.16) 
Indonesia 434.91 (5.26) 457.37 (14.23) 450.21 (5.27) 
Mexico 392.74 (10.90) 424.85 (4.92) 429.80 (5.52) 
Russia 447.34 (28.53) 486.90 (40.23) 436.16 (3.49) 
Turkey 392.39 (16.49) 436.62 (5.25) 441.10 (4.26) 






Figure 9. Achievement scores by school type and country 
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MANCOVA was determined to be an appropriate method to analyze differences in 
achievement outcomes, across and within countries, since it can be used to examine the 
influence of two or more independent variables - school type and country membership - on 
more than one dependent variable - math, reading and science achievement - while removing 
the effect of the covariate factors - ESCS scores and school resources. Before starting, the 
assumptions of MANCOVA were tested. Skewness and kurtosis statistics were within an 
acceptable range (−1 to 1) for all dependent variables within each subgroup (Chan, 2003). 
Normality was assumed. The MANCOVA design was unbalanced (i.e., there was not an equal 
number of cases per cell). Box’s M test of equality of covariance matrices was performed and 
was significant at p<.001. Equality of variances were assessed through the Levene’s Test and 
the variances were not homogenous. Pillai’s trace criterion was used to account for the 
inequality of covariance matrices caused by the unbalanced design since it is considered a 
robust test statistic when there are violations of assumptions (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996; 
Rimarcik, 2010). It ranges from 0 to 1 and the higher the value of the test statistic is, the 
stronger the evidence that the predictor variables have a statistically significant effect on the 
outcomes variables. 
 
PISA calculates plausible values for achievement outcomes for each student. These are 
defined as “random numbers drawn from the distribution of scores that could be reasonably 
assigned to each individual” and as “better suited to describing the performance of the 
population” (OECD, 2012, p. 142). In this analysis, all 10 plausible values were used for math, 
reading and science literacy, and 10 separate analyses were performed, since as recommended 
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by PISA, population parameters should be estimated using each plausible value separately. The 
reported population parameter is the average of each plausible value statistic for each subject. 
 
Significant multivariate effects were found for country membership and the interaction 
between school type and country membership on math, science and reading achievement after 
controlling for socio-economic factors, suggesting that achievement outcomes differ 
significantly by school type and country (see Table 12). There is a significant main effect of all 
the independent variables except school type, F (6, 2488) =1.89, p=.086, Pillai’s Trace=.004, 
ηp2 =.01. This shows that when controlling for country membership and socio-economic 
variables, there are no differences between school types on achievement. There is a significant 
main effect of country membership, F (15, 3735) = 38.42, p<.001, Pillai’s Trace=0.4, ηp2 =.13, 
and a significant school type by country interaction, F (30, 3735) =1.84, p=.008, Pillai’s 
Trace=.04, ηp2=.01. The main effects of the control variables, school resources and ESCS, were 
also significant (F (3, 1245) = 12.74, p<.001, ηp2 =.03 and F (3, 1245) = 227.60, p<.001, ηp2 
=.36, respectively). The effect size for the interaction term between school type and country 
membership is small (Cohen, 1988), and most of the variables other than school resources do 
not have much of an effect on achievement. Country membership has a large effect size and 
accounts for approximately 13% of the variance in achievement outcomes. Almost 40% of the 
variance in achievement is unsurprisingly associated with the covariates, ESCS scores and 




Table 12.  
Multivariate Analyses for Math, Science and Reading Achievement 
 Pillai’s Trace F p ηp2 
Independent variables 
School type 0.01 1.89 0.089 0.00 
Country membership 0.40 38.42 <.001 0.13 
School type*Country membership 0.04 1.85 0.008 0.01 
ESCS scores 0.35 227.61 <.001 0.36 
School resources 0.03 12.74 <.001 0.03 
 
ANCOVAs were conducted to further investigate the multivariate results (see Table 
13). Levene’s test for homogeneity of variance was significant for math, reading and science. 
Equal variances were not assumed for follow-up tests performed on this variable, and robust 
errors were used. Results indicated a significant school type by country interaction for math, 
F(10, 1265) = 2.66, p=.004, ηp2 =.02; reading, F(10, 1265) = 2.36, p=.011, ηp2 =.01; and 
science, F(10, 1265) = 3.15, p<.001, ηp2 =.02. Significant main effects of school type were 
observed for math, F(2, 1265) = 4.24, p=.024, ηp2 =.006; reading, F(2, 1265) = 4.43, p=.014, 
ηp2 =.007; and science, F(2, 1265) = 3.7, p=.027, ηp2 =.005. Significant main effects of country 
membership were observed for math, F(5, 1265) = 115.12, p<.001, ηp2 =.31; reading, F(5, 
1265) = 36.18, p<.001, ηp2 =.12; and science, F(5, 1265) = 80.1, p< .001, ηp2 =.24. The effect 
size from partial eta squared for school type is small, and the interaction between school type 
and country membership is medium, for each subject. The effect sizes for country membership 





Table 133.  
ANCOVA Analysis for Achievement Outcomes with School Type and Country 
Source df MS F p ηp2 
Math 
School type 2 7,775.43 4.24 0.024 0.01 
Country membership 5 211,759.68 115.12 <.001 0.32 
School type*Country membership 10 4,908.90 2.66 0.004 0.02 
ESCS scores 1 1,062,499.83 577.73 <.001 0.32 
School resources 1 32,523.77 17.70 <.001 0.01 
Error 1245 1,840.12    
Reading 
School type 2 8,685.14 4.43 0.014 0.01 
Country membership 5 70,744.99 36.18 <.001 0.13 
School type*Country membership 10 4,625.02 2.36 0.011 0.02 
ESCS scores 1 60,455.16 30.90 <.001 0.34 
School resources 1 1,247,953.96 638.34 <.001 0.02 
Error 1245 1,955.79    
Science 
School type 2 5,968.80 3.70 0.027 0.01 
Country membership 5 129,220.08 80.10 <.001 0.24 
School type*Country membership 10 5,082.60 3.15 <.001 0.02 
ESCS scores 1 53,437.27 33.12 <.001 0.34 
School resources 1 1,049,639.89 650.69 <.001 0.03 




Post-hoc pairwise comparisons were run to examine the univariate findings. The 
marginal means indicated that overall, PPP schools scored significantly higher than private 
schools in math (Mean difference=26.9, s.e.=10.9, p=.044, effect size =.62), reading (Mean 
difference=29.7, s.e.=10.8, p=.021, effect size =.67), and science (Mean difference=24.3, 
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s.e.=9.8, p=.038, effect size =.61) (see Table 14). Public schools scored significantly higher 
than private schools in math (Mean difference=18.0, s.e.=6.9, p=.040, effect size =.42), reading 
(Mean difference=18.1, s.e.=7.1, p=.039, effect size =.41) and science (Mean difference=14.6, 
s.e.=6.4, p=.038, effect size =.37). The effect sizes for all the pairwise comparisons are medium 
to large. 
 
Pairwise comparisons with country membership showed that schools in China scored 
significantly higher than schools in the other five countries in math, reading and science 
(except Russia in reading) while Brazilian schools scored significantly lower than the other five 
countries in math, reading and science.  
 
Table 14.  
Post-hoc Pairwise Comparisons for Overall School Type 
















PPP schools (N=172) 
Private schools (N=154) -26.9* (10.9) 0.62 -29.7* (10.8) 0.67 -24.3* (9.8) 0.61 
Public schools (N=948) 
Private schools (N=154) -18.0* (6.9) 0.42 -18.1* (7.1) 0.41 14.6* (6.4) 0.37 




Table 15 shows the pairwise comparisons between school types in each country. In 
Brazil, private schools performed significantly better than public schools on achievement 
outcomes, though with small effect sizes, in math (Mean difference=31.9, s.e.=8.8, p=.002, 
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effect size =.01), reading (Mean difference=32.1, s.e.=10.2, p=.009, effect size =.01), and 
science (Mean difference=35.3, s.e.=8.5, p<.01, effect size =.02). PPP schools in Indonesia 
performed significantly better than private schools, with small effect sizes, in math (Mean 
difference=37.7, s.e.=14.2, p=.029, effect size =.02), and science (Mean difference=24.1, 
s.e.=7.8, p=.033, effect size =.02). PPP schools in Turkey scored significantly higher than 
private schools in reading (Mean difference=62.4, s.e.=22.2, p=.02, effect size =.004) and 
science (Mean difference=54.6, s.e.=20.7, p=.035, effect size =.02), and public schools scored 
significantly higher than private schools in reading (Mean difference=47.5, s.e.=22.2, p<.03, 
effect size =.02) and science (Mean difference=8.1, s.e.=20.7, p=.039, effect size =.02), though 
with small effect sizes. There were no statistically significant differences in achievement 























Table 15.  
Achievement by School Type for each Country 



























Brazil (PPP N=21)       
Private schools (N=48) -22.4 (12.0) -22.5 (13.9) -27.1 (11.7) 31.9** (8.8) 32.1** (10.2) 35.3** (8.5) 
Public schools (N=360) 8.9 (9.1) 9.5 (10.5) 8.1 (8.8)    
China (PPP N=12)       
Private schools (N=20) 1.0 (14.2) 9.8 (15.2) 3.1 (13.2) 16.9 (14.5) 2.2 (14.2) 2.4 (13.1) 
Public schools (N=191) 11.8 (12.8) 9.7 (13.1) 8.5 (12.4)    
Indonesia (PPP N=8)       
Private schools (N=64) -37.7* (14.2) 23.5 (12.7) 24.1 (7.8)* -16.1 (6.7) -8.9 (6.0) -15.7 (5.4) 
Public schools (N=63) 21.5 (14.2) 14.5 (12.7) 11.3 (11.6)    
Mexico (PPP N=70)       
Private schools (N=14) 7.4 (11.8) 7.4 (12.5) 7.7 (10.9) -19.2 (11.1) -18.2 (11.8) -18.6 (10.3) 
Public schools (N=53) -11.8 (6.2) -10.8 (6.6) -10.9 (5.7)    
Russia (PPP N=1)       
Private schools (N=2) 31.7 (49.6) 58.7 (44.9) 40.9 (46.2) -2.7 (28.3) -4.41 (26.1) -10.9 (26.9) 
Public schools (N=185) 34.5 (40.6) 63.1 (36.8) 51.9 (37.8)    
Turkey (PPP N=60)       
Private schools (N=6) -37.3 (22.3) -62.4* (22.2) -54.6* (20.7) -43.7 (22.4) -47.5* (22.2) -8.1* (20.7) 
Public schools (N=96) 6.3 (8.1) 2.7 (8.0) -5.6 (10.1)    











Research question 3 
 
The third research question asked, “Are PPP schools more likely than private and 
public schools to have school quality assurance measures, and does this effect vary by 
country?” 
 
Multiple regression analyses were used to analyze this research question. A total of 24 
outcomes were included. For each outcome, there were three groups of predictor variables, 
namely, 1. School type, composed of public, private and PPP schools, 2. Country membership, 
with dummy variables of the six sample countries, and 3. Covariates, ESCS scores and the 
school resource index. Block-wise multiple regression was used to determine the individual and 
cumulative effect of the predictors on each outcome, by first including school type and country 
and then adding the covariates. Block-wise selection method is sequential in entry, which 
allows the selection of the most appropriate predictors based on research theory.  
Binary logistic regression analyses were conducted to investigate whether the 
probability of schools conducting school quality assurance measures can be predicted by 
school type and country membership. The assumptions of the binomial sequential logistic 
regression analyses include absence of multicollinearity, independent observations, linearity 
of the relationship between the independent variables and the log odds of the outcome 
variable. The Hosmer and Lemeshow test was checked for non-significance, indicating a 
good fit of the model to the data. Tolerance and VIF statistics were used previously to check 
for multicollinearity. Finally, since each response came from different, unrelated cases, the 
assumption of independent observations was also satisfied. Logistic regression generates OR 
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which compare the relative odds of the occurrence of an outcome (for example, conducting a 
school quality assurance measure), given the exposure or variable of interest (i.e. school 
type). There are a number of different methods proposed to convert OR to effect size 
(Newcombe, 2006; Chinn, 2000; Chen, Cohen & Chen, 2010; Rosenthal, 1995). From these 
studies, it is broadly deduced that OR up to 1.5 are equivalent to Cohen’s d small effect sizes, 
and OR above 5 are equivalent to Cohen’s d large effect sizes. The 95% CI is used to 
estimate the precision of the OR, with a large CI indicating a low level of precision of the 
OR, and a small CI indicating a higher precision of the OR. 
The results for each outcome are summarized in Tables 16 and 17. Significant 
differences were found in the likelihood of conducting school quality assurance measures 
around external evaluations, written specifications of school curricular profiles and 
educational goals, and systemic recording of school data; and for implementing school 
improvement actions around school equity and student cross-curricular competencies, after 
controlling for country membership and socio-economic covariates, although with mostly 
small effect sizes. PPP schools are significantly less likely to have written specifications of 
school curricular profiles and educational goals than public schools (OR=1.99, p=0.050), 
while PPP schools are significantly more likely to have systematic recording of school data 
than public schools (OR=0.33, p=0.049). PPP schools are significantly more likely to 
implement school improvement actions on school equity than private schools (OR=0.46, 
p=0.008). PPP schools have a significantly higher likelihood than both public (OR=0.6, 
p=0.022) and private (OR=0.46, p=0.010) schools of implementing measures in students' 
cross-curricular competencies. Public schools are significantly more likely than private 
schools to conduct external evaluations (OR=0.43, p=0.004).  
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Table 16.  
Logistic Regression Analysis of School Quality Assurance Measures with PPP schools as 
Reference 
 PPP Schools as reference 
 Public Schools Private Schools 
 OR 95% C.I. p OR 95% C.I. p 
School Quality Assurance Processes 
Internal evaluations -0.68 0.3-1.5 0.338 2.31 0.4-12.4 0.329 
External evaluations 1.21 0.75-1.9 0.441 -0.53 0.2-1.0 0.066 
Specification of school’s goals 1.99 0.9-4.0 0.050 2.01 0.5-7.2 0.287 
Specification of student performance 
standards 1.09 0.6-1.8 0.749 -0.67 0.3-1.4 0.290 
Systematic recording of school data -0.33 0.1-1.0 0.049 -0.64 0.1-3.1 0.584 
Systematic recording of student data -0.75 0.3-1.8 0.545 -0.85 0.2-3.0 0.802 
Seeking written feedback from students 1.14 0.6-1.8 0.617 1.65 0.7-3.7 0.230 
Teacher mentoring -0.84 0.5-1.3 0.451 -1.94 0.6-5.4 0.209 
Consultation for school improvement -0.88 0.5-1.3 0.523 -0.97 0.5-1.7 0.919 
School Improvement Actions from Internal Evaluations 
Student achievement -0.88 0.5-1.5 0.667 -0.52 0.2-1.1 0.094 
Equity in school -0.70 0.4-1.0 0.105 -0.46 0.2-0.8 0.008 
Staff education 1.05 0.6-1.6 0.831 1.02 0.5-1.9 0.960 
Curriculum implementation -0.82 0.5-1.2 0.353 -0.61 0.3-1.1 0.108 
Quality of teaching and learning -0.76 0.4-1.2 0.300 -0.52 0.2-1.0 0.072 
Parental engagement in school 1.23 0.7-1.9 0.365 -0.86 0.4-1.5 0.624 
Teacher professional dev. 1.05 0.6-1.6 0.842 -0.87 0.4-1.6 0.661 
Cross-curricular competencies -0.60 0.3-0.9 0.022 -0.46 0.2-0.8 0.010 
School Improvement Actions from External Evaluations 
Changes in school policies -0.99 0.6-1.6 0.975 1.16 0.5-2.3 0.674 
Action for school development -0.82 0.3-1.7 0.604 1.47 0.2-7.9 0.655 
Improvement of teaching 1.30 0.5-2.9 0.522 1.23 0.2-5.4 0.782 
Measures put into practice promptly 1.01 0.5-1.7 0.963 -0.94 0.4-2.1 0.876 
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Table 17.  
Logistic Regression Analysis of School Quality Assurance Measures with Public schools as 
Reference 
 Public Schools as Reference 
 OR 95% C.I. p 
School Quality Processes Private Schools 
Internal evaluations 3.41 0.7-15.8 0.117 
External evaluations -0.43 0.2-0.7 0.004 
Specification of school’s goals 1.01 0.3-3.3 0.992 
Specification of student performance standards -0.61 0.3-1.1 0.100 
Systematic recording of school data 1.95 0.5-6.5 0.280 
Systematic recording of student data 1.13 0.4-2.8 0.800 
Seeking written feedback from students 1.45 0.7-2.9 0.295 
Teacher mentoring 2.32 0.8-6.2 0.094 
Consultation for school improvement 1.10 0.6-1.7 0.689 
School Improvement Actions from Internal Evaluations 
Student achievement -0.59 0.3-1.0 0.080 
Equity in school -0.66 0.4-1.0 0.064 
Staff education -0.97 0.5-1.6 0.912 
Curriculum implementation -0.74 0.4-1.2 0.236 
Quality of teaching and learning -0.68 0.3-1.2 0.187 
Parental engagement in school -0.70 0.4-1.1 0.146 
Teacher professional dev. -0.83 0.4-1.4 0.488 
Cross-curricular competencies -0.77 0.4-1.2 0.252 
School Improvement Actions from External Evaluations 
Changes in school policies 1.17 0.6-2.0 0.579 
Action for school development 1.80 0.3-8.5 0.461 
Improvement of teaching -0.95 0.2-3.6 0.938 
Measures put into practice promptly -0.92 0.4-1.8 0.823 
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A country-wise analysis was conducted to examine the likelihood of each school type 
conducting school quality assurance processes and implementing school improvement actions 
(Table 18a, 18b, and 18c). Results showed that in China, public schools have a significantly 
higher likelihood than PPP schools for conducting external evaluations (OR=4.41, p=0.019) 
and measures around teaching quality (OR=4.28, p=0.048), with medium effect sizes. Public 
schools also have a significantly higher likelihood than private schools to implement measures 
for educational staff (OR=0.3, p=0.025), and school curriculum (OR=0.32, p=0.022). Private 
schools in Turkey are significantly less likely to conduct external evaluations than both PPP 
schools (OR=0.05, p=0.007), and public schools (OR=0.06, p=0.009). PPP schools are more 
likely to implement measures around cross-curricular competencies than public schools 
(OR=0.43, p=0.016). In Mexico, PPP schools have a higher probability of implementing 
actions for improving student achievement than public schools (OR=0.18, p=0.047), 
implementing school actions around school equity than both public (OR=0.38, p=0.05) and 
private schools (OR=0.14, p=0.023), and implementing school actions around curriculum than 
private schools (OR=0.08, p=0.004). Public schools are significantly more likely than private 
schools to have school actions around curriculum (OR=0.18, p=0.03). The effect sizes are all 
very small. PPP schools in Brazil have significantly lower odds than private schools in 
collecting student feedback (OR=5.71, p=0.014), with a large effect size. Private schools are 
less likely than PPP schools to have school improvement actions on teaching quality (OR=0.09, 
p=0.036), and having cross-curricular competencies (OR=0.22, p=0.033). Public schools are 
more likely than private schools to conduct external evaluations (OR=0.27, p=0.019), actions 
around student achievement (OR=0.31, p=0.029), teaching quality (OR=0.32, p=0.037), school 
policy (OR=0.26, p=0.028), and put in practice findings from external evaluations (OR=0.30, 
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p=0.05), all with very small effect sizes. In Indonesia, private schools are more likely than PPP 
schools to put in practice results from external evaluations (OR=300.39, p=0.031), with a large 
effect size. There was no variance between school types in Russia due to small samples and 
outcomes were not included.
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Table 18a.  
Logistic Regression Analysis of School Quality Assurance by School Type and Country between PPP and Public Schools 
 PPP Schools as Reference 
 Brazil Indonesia Mexico Turkey China 
 OR (95% C.I.) OR (95% C.I.) OR (95% C.I.) OR (95% C.I.) OR (95% C.I.) 
 Public Public Public Public Public 
School Quality Assurance Processes      
Internal evaluations -0.66 (0.0-5.) 0 (0-.) -0.9 (0.26-3.33 -0.65 (0.1-2.4) 0 (0-0) 
External evaluations 1.74 (0.5-5.4) 0 (0-.) 1.03 (0.4-2.4) -0.91 (0.4-2.1) 4.41* (1.2-15.2) 
Specification of school’s goals 3.22 (0.3-29.2) 22.4 (0.7-699.3) 2.5 (0.5-10.8) 2.04 (0.7-5.2) 0 (0-.) 
Specification of student performance standards 1.02 (0.2-3.6) 6.29 (0.4-86.1) 1.60 (0.4-5.3) 1.20 (0.4-2.9) -0.48 (0.1-2.3) 
Systematic recording of school data 0 (0-.) 0 (0-.) -0.60 (0.1-2.8) 0 (0-.) 0 (0-.) 
Systematic recording of student data -0.63 (0.1-2.8) 0 (0-.) -0.90 (0.1-4.3) 0 (0-.) 0 (0-.) 
Seeking written feedback from students 2.14 (0.8-5.2) 0 (0-.) 1.218 (0.4-3.0) -0.50 (0.1-1.4) -0.77 (0.1-6.4) 
Teacher mentoring -0.83 (0.1-3.7) 0 (0-.) -0.65 (0.2-1.4) 1.05 (0.5-1.9) 2.11 (0.2-19.0) 
Consultation for school improvement -0.77 (0.3-1.9) 0 (0-.) -0.46 (0.2-1.0) 1.78 (0.8-3.5) 1.87 (0.5-6.2) 
School Improvement Actions from Internal Evaluations 
Student achievement 0 (0-.) 0 (0-.) -0.18* (0.0-0.9) 1.39 (0.5-3.2) 2.97 (0.8-11.0) 
Equity in school -0.67 (0.2-2.0) 1.16 (0.2-6.5) -0.38* (0.1-1.0) -0.96 (0.4-1.9) -0.99 (0.2-3.4) 
Staff education -0.9 (0.3-2.2) 0 (0-.) -0.9 (0.4-2.4) 1.22 (0.6-2.4) 1.61 (0.3-8.0) 
Curriculum implementation -0.76 (0.2-1.9) 2.38 (0.1-29.3) -0.46 (0.1-1.1) -0.89 (0.4-1.7) 1.38 (0.3-5.4) 
Quality of teaching and learning -0.29 (0.0-2.2) 4.15 (0.2-60.2) -0.72 (0.2-1.9) -0.6 (0.2-1.3) 4.28* (0.1-18.6) 
Parental engagement in school -0.32 (0.0-2.4) 1.79 (0.2-11.3) 1.42 (0.5-3.5) 1.56 (0.7-3.2) 2.43 (0.7-7.9) 
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Teacher professional dev. -0.92 (0.3-2.3) 17.14 (0.8-368.9) 1.18 (0.4-3.1) 1.01 (0.5-1.9) 1.92 (0.3-9.1) 
Cross-curricular competencies -0.43 (0.1-1.3) 1.2 (0.2-6.7) -0.88 (0.3-2.4) -0.43* (0.2-0.8) 1.38 (0.3-4.8) 
School Improvement Actions from External Evaluations 
Changes in school policies 2.02 (0.6-6.5) 0 (0-.) -0.73 (0.2-1.9) -0.89 (0.4-1.9) 1.73 (0.3-8.2) 
Action for school development 1.89 (0.2-16.1) 0 (0-.) 1.96 (0.1-25.4) -0.7 (0.2-1.8) 4.86 (0.4-50.1) 
Improvement of teaching -0.41 (0.0-3.5) 0 (0-.) 0 (0-.) -0.9 (0.3-2.5) -0.17 (0.0-1.82 
Measures put into practice promptly 1.25 (0.3-4.1) 39.65 (0.6-2374.5) 1.95 (0.6-5.6) -0.49 (0.1-1.3) 1.42 (0.1-13.0) 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01 
Note. Russia was not included since no variance between schools  
 
Table 18b.      
Logistic Regression Analysis of School Quality Assurance by School Type and Country between PPP and Private Schools 
 PPP Schools as reference 
 Brazil Indonesia Mexico Turkey China 
 OR (95% C.I.) OR (95% C.I.) OR (95% C.I.) OR (95% C.I.) OR (95% C.I.) 
 Private Private Private Private Private 
School Quality Assurance Processes 
Internal evaluations 36011083.14 (0-.) 0 (0-.) 117737366.55 (0-.) 59950639.2 (0-.) 0.74 (0-0) 
External evaluations -0.46 (0.1-2.0) 0 (0-.) 1.52 (0.2-8.3) -0.05** (0.0-0.4) 3.09 (0.5-17.4) 
Specification of school’s goals 2.93 (0.0-113.6) 11.5 (0.4-270.9) 4.51 (0.3-64.9) 281180873.23 (0-.) 0.74 (0-.) 
Specification of student performance standards -0.81 (0.1-4.4) 1.51 (0.14-15.4) 1.47 (0.1-12.1) -0.71 (0.1-8.1) 0.61 (0.0-4.0) 
Systematic recording of school data 0 (0-.) 895.80 (0-.) 53174694.86 (0-.) 0 (0-.) 0.77 (0-.) 
Systematic recording of student data -0.59 (0.1-3.8) 0 (0-.) 44272496.27 (0-.) 0 (0-.) 0 (0-.) 
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Seeking written feedback from students 5.71* (1.4-23.0) 0 (0-.) 1.30 (0.1-8.7) 107192479.68 (0-.) 1.49 (0.1-27.2) 
Teacher mentoring 1.24 (0.1-11.6) 0 (0-.) 3.18 (0.5-19.4) 1.01 (0.1-6.8) 115197467.6 (0-.) 
Consultation for school improvement 1.03 (0.2-3.7) 0 (0-.) 1.70 (0.2-11.7) -0.27 (0.0-2.2) 1.29 (0.2-6.3) 
School Improvement Actions from Internal Evaluations 
Student achievement 0 (0-.) 0 (0-.) -0.12 (0.0-1.3) -0.70 (0.1-5.2) 4.0 (0.5-27.8) 
Equity in school -0.35 (0.09-1.4) 1.40 (0.2-8.0) -0.14* (0.0-0.7) -0.84 (0.1-5.1) -0.58 (0.1-2.6) 
Staff education 1.29 (0.4-4.3) 0 (0-.) -0.79 (0.1-3.8) 1.04 (0.1-6.3) -0.48 (0.1-3.0) 
Curriculum implementation -0.72 (0.2-2.45 2.35 (0.12-29.0) -0.08** (0.0-0.4) 3.16 (0.4-22.1) -0.44 (0.1-2.2) 
Quality of teaching and learning -0.09* (0.0-0.8) 7.76 (0.4-139.3) -0.63 (0.1-3.4) -0.72 (0.1-5.1) 2.85 (0.4-19.5) 
Parental engagement in school -0.17 (0.02-1.6) 3.16 (0.4-21.1) 1.16 (0.2-5.7) 1.05 (0.1-7.3) 2.6 (0.5-12.1) 
Teacher professional dev. -0.77 (0.2-2.6) 2.53 (0.2-30.3) -0.2 (0.0-1.1) -0.95 (0.1-5.8) 2.42 (0.2-22.1) 
Cross-curricular competencies -0.22* (0.1-0.8) 1.21 (0.2-6.8) -0.73 (0.1-4.4) 1.22 (0.1-8.2) 1.02 (0.2-4.8) 
School Improvement Actions from External Evaluations  
Changes in school policies -0.52 (0.1-2.5) 0 (0-.) -0.4 (0.1-2.1) -0.63 (0.0-14.2) 2.97 (0.4-18.9) 
Action for school development 0 (0-.) 0 (0-.) -0.38 (0.0-28.3) 125047924.74 (0-.) 1.75 (0.1-43.3) 
Improvement of teaching -0.31 (0.0-4.3) 0 (0-.) 0 (0-.) 96424479.4 (0-.) -0.5 (0.1-4.6) 
Measures put into practice promptly 0.38 (0.1-1.1) 300.39* (1.1-53.4) 2.07 (0.2-14.8) 132048334.86 (0-.) -0.83 (0.1-10.2) 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01 






Logistic Regression Analysis of School Quality Assurance by School Type and Country between Public and Private Schools 
 Public schools as Reference 
 Brazil Indonesia Mexico Turkey China 
 OR (95% C.I.) OR (95% C.I.) OR (95% C.I.) OR (95% C.I.) OR (95% C.I.) 
 Private Private Private Private Private 
School Quality Assurance Processes 
Internal evaluations 0 (0-.) 1.89 (0.2-12.3) 0 (0-.) 0 (0-.) 0 (0-.) 
External evaluations -0.27* (0.1-0.8) 2.01 (0.6-6.4) 1.48 (0.3-7.2) -0.06** (0.0-0.5) -0.7 (0.1-2.7) 
Specification of school’s goals -0.91 (0.0-24.1) -0.52 (0.0-6.6) 1.8 (0.13-24.6) 0 (0-.) 0 (0-.) 
Specification of student performance standards -0.8 (0.2-2.7) -0.24 (0.1-1.2) -0.92 (0.1-6.86) -0.59 (0.05-6.7) 1.26 (0.3-4.1) 
Systematic recording of school data 1.6 (0.3-7.2) 0 (0-.) 0 (0-.) 0 (0-.)  
Systematic recording of student data -0.94 (0.2-3.2) 0 (0-.) 0 (0-.) 0 (0-.) 1.82 (0.2-14.5) 
Seeking written feedback from students 2.66 (0.8-8.4) 1.58 (0.3-7.5) 1.07 (0.1-6.6) 0 (0-.) 1.94 (0.2-15.8) 
Teacher mentoring 1.5 (0.2-8.6) 0 (0-.) 4.88 (0.8-27.4) 1.01 (0.1-6.8) 0 (0-.) 
Consultation for school improvement 1.35 (0.4-3.8) -0.91 (0.1-4.7) 3.63 (0.5-25.9) -0.15 (0.0-1.3) -0.69 (0.2-2.1) 
School Improvement Actions from Internal Evaluations 
Student achievement -0.31* (0.1-0.8) 0 (0-.) -0.64 (0.1-4.2) -0.64 (0.1-4.2) 1.34 (0.3-6.3) 
Equity in school 0.52 (0.2-1.3) 1.21 (0.5-2.8) -0.37 (0.08-1.7) -0.87 (0.1-5.4) -0.6 (0.2-1.5) 
Staff education 1.43 (0.5-3.4) 2.02 (0.1-23.4) -0.79 (0.1-3.4) 0.85 (0.1-5.3) -0.3* (0.1-0.8) 
Curriculum implementation -0.94 (0.3-2.2) 0.99 (0.2-5.2) -0.18* (0.0-0.8) 3.53 (0.5-25.1) -0.32* (0.1-0.8) 
Quality of teaching and learning -0.32* (0.1-0.9) 1.87 (0.2-12.7) -0.88 (0.1-4.2) 1.2 (0.1-8.7) -0.67 (0.1-2.6) 
Parental engagement in school -0.55 (0.1-1.7) 1.77 (0.6-4.8) -0.82 (0.2-3.5) 0.67 (0.1-4.8) 1.07 (0.3-3.1) 
Teacher professional dev. -0.83 (0.3-2.0) -0.15 (0.0-1.3) -0.17 (0.0-0.8) -0.94 (0.1-5.8) 1.26 (0.2-6.1) 
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Cross-curricular competencies -0.52 (0.2-1.2) 1.01 (0.4-2.3) -0.83 (0.1-4.2) 2.84 (0.4-19.3) -0.74 (0.2-2.1) 
School Improvement Actions from External Evaluations   
Changes in school policies -0.26* (0.1-0.8) 2.27 (0.6-8.4) -0.55 (0.1-2.6) -0.71 (0.0-16.4) 1.72 (0.5-5.1) 
Action for school development 0 (0-.) 0 (0-.) -0.19 (0-24.7) 0 (0-.) -0.36 (0.0-4.1) 
Improvement of teaching -0.08 (0.0-1.4) 0 (0-.) 0 (0-.) 0 (0-.) -0.48 (0.0-5.3) 
Measures put into practice promptly -0.3* (0.1-1.01) 7.58 (0.3-149.9) 1.06 (0.1-7.1) 0 (0-.) -0.59 (0.1-2.2) 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01      





The accountability survey consisted of three questions on accountability procedures 
around achievement data - i. Achievement data are posted publicly, ii. Achievement data are 
tracked over time by an administrative authority, such as a district, state, or national 
education agency, and iii. Achievement data are provided directly to parents. Table 19 shows 
the cross tabulation of school types with the number of accountability procedures conducted. 
38.7% of public schools completed all three school accountability procedures, while 26.6% 
of private schools and 34.8% of PPP schools did the same.  
Logistic regressions were conducted for each accountability procedure separately 
with school types, and controlling for country membership, ESCS scores and school 
resources. The results indicated that PPP schools in the sample have a significantly higher 
likelihood than public schools to provide achievement data directly to parents (OR=2.00, 
p=0.039) (see Table 20). There were no significant differences in accountability procedures 
between public and private schools. 
 
Table 19. School Type and Accountability Procedures 
 Number of Accountability Procedures Conducted 
 0 1 2 3 
Private Schools 4.55% 12.34% 54.55% 26.62% 
PPP Schools 1.16% 7.56% 56.40% 34.88% 






Table 20. Logistic Regression Analysis of School Type and Accountability Procedures 
 Public Schools Private Schools 
 OR (95% C.I.) OR (95% C.I.) 
Achievement data are posted publicly 0.88 (0.5-1.3) 0.79 (0.5-1.2) 
Achievement data are tracked over time 0.99 (0.4-2.1) 0.70 (0.3-1.3) 
Achievement data are provided directly to parents -2.00* (1.0-3.8) 1.3 (0.6-2.4) 
*p<0.05 
 
A country-wise analysis was conducted to examine the likelihood of each school type 
within a country conducting accountability measures around achievement data (Table 21). In 
Brazil, private schools are significantly less likely than public schools to track achievement 
data over time (OR=0.23, p=0.025), with a small effect size. In China, public schools are 
significantly less likely than PPP schools to directly provide accountability data to parents 
(OR=0.2, p=0.044), with a small effect size. Public schools in Indonesia are significantly more 
likely than PPP schools to track achievement data over time (OR=17.65, p=0.035), with a large 
effect size. There were no significant differences between school types in Mexico and Turkey 
in the likelihood of conducting accountability measures. There was no variance between school 
types in Russia due to small samples and outcomes were not included.
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Table 21.  
Logistic Regression Analysis of School Type and Accountability Procedures by Country 
 PPP schools as Reference Public schools as Reference 
 Public Schools Private Schools Private Schools 
 OR (95% C.I.) OR (95% C.I.) OR (95% C.I.) 
Brazil    
Achievement data are posted publicly 1.47 (0.5-3.6) 0.99 (0.2-3.3) 0.67 (0.2-1.6) 
Achievement data are tracked over time 0.87 (0.1-3.9) 0.20 (0.0-1.3) 0.23* (0.1-0.8) 
Achievement data are provided directly to parents 0.95 (0.2-4.3) 0.88 (0.1-11.1) 1.05 (0.21-7.3) 
China    
Achievement data are posted publicly 0.24 (0.0-1.3) 0.53 (0.0-4.8) 2.20 (0.4-11.4) 
Achievement data are tracked over time 0.79 (0.2-2.53) 0.69 (0.2-2.9) 0.88 (0.3-2.2) 
Achievement data are provided directly to parents 0.20* (0.0-0.93) 0.07 (0.0-1.1) 0.95 (0.3-2.4) 
Indonesia    
Achievement data are posted publicly 1.19 (0.2-6.8) 1.58 (0.2-9) 1.33 (0.5-2.9) 
Achievement data are tracked over time 17.65* (1.2-254.0) 5.51 (0.6-47.6) 0.31 (0.0-3.1) 
Achievement data are provided directly to parents 0.00 (0-.) 1.00 (0-.) 2.62 (0.6-10.6) 
Mexico    
Achievement data are posted publicly 1.45 (0.6-3.2) 1.26 (0.2-5.6) 0.87 (0.2-3.5) 
Achievement data are tracked over time 1.21 (0.1-14.4) 0-. (0.5-3.6) (0-.) 
Achievement data are provided directly to parents 0.27 (0.0-3.2) 0.13 (0.0-2.3) 0.19 (0.0-4.6) 
Turkey    
Achievement data are posted publicly 0.90 (0.4-1.7) 0.42 (0.1-2.6) 0.47 (0.1-2.9) 
Achievement data are tracked over time 0.00 (0-.) 6.50(0-.) 0-. 





Research question 4 
 
The fourth research question asked, “Can differences in achievement outcomes be 
attributed to conducting school quality assurance measures by school type in the sample 
countries, and does this effect vary by country?” 
 
This research question aimed to examine whether conducting school quality measures 
by each school type is associated with higher achievement outcomes. A moderator analysis was 
used to examine whether conducting school quality assurance measures moderates the 
relationship between school type and country with achievement. MANCOVA was determined 
to be an appropriate method for the moderator analysis since it can be used to examine the 
influence of two or more independent variables - school type and country membership - on 
more than one dependent variable - math, reading and science achievement - while including 
the interaction effect from the moderator variable, school quality assurance measure. ESCS 
scores and school resources were included as covariates. All 10 plausible values were used for 
reading, math and science literacy, and 10 separate analyses were performed, for each outcome. 
The assumptions of MANCOVA were tested for each outcome. Box’s M test of equality of 
covariance matrices was performed and was significant at p<.001 and so Pillai’s trace criterion 
was used to account for the inequality of covariance matrices caused by the unbalanced design 
(Rimarcik, 2010). 
 
The moderation hypothesis is supported if the interaction between the three independent 
variables - school type, country membership and the school quality assurance measure - is 
significant. Multivariate results revealed that there were no statistically significant three-way 
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interactions between school quality assurance measures, school type, and country membership. 
It was initially expected that the three variables would explain a statistically significant portion 
of variability in achievement, and the interaction would be significant. In this sample, however, 
there is no statistically significant difference between school types and countries with 
achievement in terms of conducting school quality assurance measures. This was expected after 
the analyses in the previous research questions which showed a small number of significant 
differences between school types for some achievement outcomes as well as in the likelihood 
of conducting certain school quality measures along with the small effect sizes.  
 
There were no significant three-way or two-way interactions for any of the school 
quality assurance measures except external evaluation. A significant main effect was observed 
in the interaction between school type and external evaluation after controlling for country 
membership, ESCS and school resources (F (6, 2430) = 2.72, p=.02, Pillai’s Trace=.01, ηp2 
=.01) (Table 22). Further univariate analyses were conducted to examine the effect of the 
interaction between external evaluation and school type on achievement. A significant main 
effect of the interaction was observed for math, F(2, 1251) =5.45, p=.009, ηp2 =.009; reading, 
F(2, 1251)=4.28, p=.025, ηp2 =.007; and science F(2, 1251)=6.25, p= .002, ηp2 =.01. The effect 
sizes for school type, the interaction between school type and country membership, and the 
interaction between school type and conducting external evaluations are all small. Descriptive 
analyses in Figure 10 show differences in achievement by school type and if external 
evaluations were conducted, after controlling for country, ESCS scores and school resources. 
For each subject, PPP schools scored higher than other school types, and schools that 
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conducted external evaluations scored higher than schools that did not, but the difference is 
smaller for PPP schools than for the other two types. 
 
Table 22.  
Multivariate Analysis of Moderator External Evaluation 
 Pillai's Trace F p ηp2 
Independent variables     
School type 0.01 2.51 0.024 0.01 
Country membership 0.30 27.37 <0.001 0.10 
External evaluation 0.00 0.65 0.586 0.00 
School type*Country membership 0.04 1.58 0.036 0.01 
School type*External evaluation 0.01 2.73 0.020 0.01 
Country membership*External evaluation 0.01 1.21 0.285 0.00 
School type*Country membership*External evaluation 0.02 0.91 0.573 0.01 
ESCS scores 0.35 215.60 <0.001 0.35 
School resources 0.03 12.76 <0.001 0.03 
 
 
Figure 10. School types by achievement and whether external evaluations were conducted 
Note: The equation controlled for country membership, ESCS, and school resources 
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The next set of analyses tested whether within each country a significantly higher 
likelihood of conducting a particular school quality measure is associated with higher 
achievement. From the previous research question, it was observed that in every country except 
Russia, there were significant differences between school types on some school quality 
assurance measures. Moderator analyses by country using MANCOVA were conducted where 
significant relationships were found within each country. There were no significant interactions 
between school type and any school quality measures in any country. To further explore the 
relationship between school type and the likelihood of conducting a school quality measure on 
achievement, descriptive analyses for the measures with observed significant differences are 
presented below after controlling for ESCS and school resources. 
 
In Brazil, private schools were significantly more likely than PPP schools to collect 
student feedback, public schools were more likely than private schools to conduct external 
evaluations and to track achievement data over time, and PPP schools were more likely than 
private schools to conduct school improvement around teaching quality. Private schools scored 
significantly higher than public schools on math, science and reading outcomes. As shown in 
Figure 11 below, private schools that conducted measures around external evaluations, student 
feedback, cross-curricular competency and teaching quality scored higher than private schools 
that did not. For public and PPP schools, the achievement outcomes were more mixed, with 
PPP schools that did not conduct measures around student feedback and teaching quality 
scoring higher than PPP schools that did, and public schools that did not conduct measures 
around cross-curricular competency and teaching quality scoring higher than public schools 
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that did, which is a surprising finding. All school types, except PPP schools in math 








Figure 11. Brazil, achievement by school type and school quality assurance measure 
 
There were no significant differences between school types on achievement outcomes 
in China. Public schools have significantly higher odds of conducting school quality measures 
around staff education and curriculum than private schools, and conducting school quality 
measures around external evaluation and teaching and learning quality than PPP schools. PPP 
schools are significantly more likely than PPP schools to directly provide accountability data to 
parents. Figure 12 shows descriptively that most schools in China that did not conduct 
measures around staff education and curriculum scored higher than schools that did. Schools 
that conducted external evaluations did score higher than schools that did not. Private schools 
that conducted teaching quality measures scored higher than private schools that did not, but in 
public and PPP schools, the schools that did not conduct teaching quality measures scored 
higher than those that did, with private schools that did scoring higher than other school types 
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in reading and science. All school types, except public schools in math achievement, that 







Figure 12. China, achievement by school type and school quality assurance measure 
 
In Indonesia, PPP schools scored significantly higher than private schools in math, and 
public schools scored significantly higher than private schools in science. Private schools are 
significantly more likely than PPP schools to put in practice the results of external evaluations. 
Public schools are significantly more likely than PPP schools to track achievement data over 
time. Figure 13 shows that except for PPP school results in science, all other schools that have 
put results of external evaluations in practice score higher than schools that do not. Schools that 
do not track achievement data over time score higher than schools that do not. 
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Figure 13. Indonesia, achievement by school type and school quality assurance measure 
 
 
There were no significant differences between school types on achievement outcomes 
in Mexico. PPP schools were significantly more likely than private schools to have measures 
around school equity and teaching and learning quality, and significantly more likely than 
public schools to have measures around school equity and curriculum implementation. Public 
schools were significantly more likely than private schools to have measures around curriculum 
implementation. For all school types, there was hardly any difference in achievement between 
those that conducted school equity measures and curriculum implementation and those that did 
not, except for private schools that did not, scored higher in math and science than private 
schools that did (Figure 11). PPP and public schools that did not conduct measures around 





Figure 14. Mexico, achievement by school type and school quality assurance measure 
 
Private schools in Turkey performed significantly lower than both public and PPP 
schools on all achievement outcomes. Public and PPP schools are significantly more likely to 
conduct external evaluations than private schools, and PPP schools are significantly more likely 
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to conduct actions around cross-curricular competencies than private schools. PPP schools that 
conduct external evaluations and measures around cross-curricular competencies score lower 
than PPP schools that do not (Figure 12). Private schools that do conduct these measures score 
higher than those that do not. 
 
 
Figure 15. Turkey, achievement by school type and school quality assurance measure 
 
Overall, differences between school type in achievement outcomes, across and within 
countries, were not explained through school quality assurance processes. Research questions 2 
and 3 showed differences in school types on a few measures, but significantly higher 
achievement outcomes are not associated with a significantly higher likelihood of conducting 
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school quality assurance measures. A moderator analysis to find significant associations 
between achievement outcomes and a likelihood of conducting school quality measures may 
have been inappropriate given that there were not many significant differences between school 
types on school quality assurance measures and many of the effect sizes were small. 
 
Summary of Results 
 
A two-step clustering process using school funding sources, school autonomy, and school 
sector revealed three distinct clusters that were classified as public, private, and PPP schools 
based on their associated characteristics. This section examined the relationships between these 
school types in each country with achievement and school quality assurance measures. Table 
23 shows a snapshot of all 27 outcomes and which ones had statistically significant differences 
after controlling for country membership, ESCS scores and school resources. The results show 
that PPP schools performed significantly better than private schools on five outcomes and 
public schools on three outcomes. Public schools performed significantly better than private 
schools on three outcomes and PPP schools on one outcome. Private schools did not show 
significantly higher performance on any outcome compared to public and PPP schools. It is 
important to note that the effect sizes were small for many of the significant differences. There 
were no significant interactions between school type, country, and school quality assurance 
measures on achievement.  
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Table 23.  
A Snapshot of Statistically Significant Differences by School Type with School Quality Assurance 
Outcomes 
 Private PPP Public 
Achievement outcomes 
Math - > private > private 
Reading - > private > private 
Science - > private - 
School Quality Assurance Processes 
Internal evaluations - -  
External evaluations - - > private 
Specification of school’s goals - - > PPP 
Specification of student performance standards - > public - 
Systematic recording of school data - - - 
Systematic recording of student data - - - 
Seeking written feedback from students - - - 
Teacher mentoring - - - 
Consultation for school improvement - - - 
School Improvement Actions from Internal Evaluations 
Student achievement - - - 
Equity in school - > private - 
Staff education - - - 
Curriculum implementation - - - 
Quality of teaching and learning - - - 
Parental engagement in school - - - 
Teacher professional dev. - - - 
Cross-curricular competencies - > public & private - 
School Improvement Actions from External Evaluations 
Changes in school policies - - - 
Action for school development - - - 
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Improvement of teaching - - - 
Measures put into practice promptly - - - 
Accountability procedures 
Achievement data are posted publicly - - - 
Achievement data are tracked over time - - - 
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The aim of this chapter is to offer further insights about the relationship between 
school type and school quality assurance outcomes by connecting the study’s results with 
previous literature, and provide ideas for further research. The findings from this study 
contribute towards an enhanced understanding of the overall performance of PPP schools and 
their effectiveness compared with public and private schools. The section begins with an 
overview and discussion of the study’s cross-country results, followed by the study hypotheses 
and outcomes, whether the findings were expected, relevance with previous studies, why the 
study matters, and a brief country-wise analysis. The chapter concludes with limitations of the 
study, and recommendations for future research and incorporating learning from existing PPPs. 
 
Overview of Study 
 
This dissertation examined four main research questions. The first research question 
explored whether PPP schools can be identified and classified using school funding and school 
management variables. Using the PISA 2015 dataset variables on percentage of school funding 
received from governmental and non-governmental sources, level of school autonomy, and 
school sector, three school types emerged in the sample through two-step clustering. The 
clusters had high reliability and validity measures. These were classified as public, private and 
PPP based on the characteristics of each school type. 
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The second research question explored the relationship between the school types and 
achievement in math, reading and science on the PISA 2015 assessment, after controlling for 
country membership, school resources and ESCS. PPP schools scored significantly higher than 
private schools in all three subjects, and public schools scored significantly higher than private 
schools on math and reading outcomes. There was a significant main effect of country 
membership and significant multivariate effects were found for the interaction between school 
type and country membership on achievement after controlling for socio-economic factors, 
although with small effect sizes, suggesting that achievement outcomes differ significantly by 
school type and country. Further country-wise analyses were conducted to examine this. 
 
The third research question explored whether PPP schools are more likely than private 
and public schools to conduct school quality assurance processes. Using the PISA 2015 survey 
on Policies and Practices for Successful Schools, the results showed that PPP schools have a 
significantly higher likelihood than private schools of conducting two school quality assurance 
measures, school equity and cross-curricular competencies, and a significantly higher 
likelihood than public schools of conducting two school quality assurance measures, systematic 
recording of school data and cross-curricular competencies. Public schools have a significantly 
higher likelihood compared with PPP schools to conduct school quality assurance measures on 
one outcome, specification of school goals, and with private schools on one outcome, external 
evaluation. The effect sizes were all small. 
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The fourth research question explored whether differences in achievement outcomes 
could be attributed to schools conducting school quality assurance processes. The analyses did 
not result in any significant three-way interactions between school type, country membership 
and school quality assurance measures to predict achievement outcomes. There was a 
significant interaction between school type and conducting external evaluations, after 
controlling for country membership, ESCS scores and school resources, which showed that 
PPP schools that conducted external evaluations scored significantly higher in math, reading 
and science than other school types. 
 
Additional findings from these research questions have to do with the characteristics of 
the PPP schools classified and the covariates in the study. In this sample, PPP schools had the 
largest school sizes, classroom sizes, and student-teacher ratios, along with the lowest ESCS 
scores, and the lowest average years of parental education. The PPP schools overall appear to 
be economically and demographically ‘worse off’ than their public and private counterparts. 
This suggests the possibility of some PPP schools in this sample sharing characteristics of low 
fee private schools (LFPS), briefly discussed earlier, that mainly cater to low-income 
communities.  
 
The covariates ESCS and school resources play an important role in the study and 
explain a significant portion of variance in achievement outcomes. Both are also significantly 
associated with multiple school quality assurance outcomes. Private schools in the sample have 
the highest number of teachers per school and comparable student ESCS scores, student-
teacher ratio and parental education to public schools. After controlling for ESCS and school 
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resources, private schools do not significantly outperform public or PPP schools on any 
measure, but in fact underperform compared with other school types on several outcomes.  
 
Discussion of Findings 
 
 
This section discusses the study’s findings in depth, and connects the findings to 
previous literature. There have been inconsistent findings on the performance of PPP schools in 
the literature so far as discussed earlier, with mixed findings on the value add of PPP schools. 
While previous analyses largely focused on achievement outcomes and compared PPP schools 
with only public schools, this study included the performance of PPP schools on quality 
assurance measures in addition to achievement outcomes, and compared them with both public 
and private schools. Keeping in mind the results from the previous section, the discussion 
builds on the implications of the findings. These implications include the possible 
repercussions from PPPs performing better than, worse than, or no differently than other school 
types. 
 
Similar to prior research on PPP school performance, this study had mixed 
findings. There were no significant differences between school types on the majority of school 
quality assurance outcomes included. However, the results lean towards slightly encouraging 
results for PPP schools, with PPP schools significantly outperforming public and private 
schools in more areas than the others outperform PPPs, but with mostly small effect sizes. In 
addition, PPP schools did not significantly underperform compared with the other school types 
except on one outcome compared with public schools. This raises the possibility of next steps 
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in exploring and understanding why PPP schools perform better and then considering 
investment and implementation. Policymakers looking to PPPs in education for different 
reasons can propose them not only because of resource shortfalls, but to achieve better 
practices around school quality assurance or encourage similar standards to which PPP schools 
are held for other schools. If PPP schools performed better due to being held at higher or 
different standards when compared with public and private schools, similar standards can be 
implemented uniformly. Alternatively, since there are no significant differences on many of the 
outcomes in the study, it can also be used to justify not having a PPP when the cost-benefit is 
high or there may be other identified risks, such as resources being taken away from a public 
school.  
 
Private schools did not perform significantly better than the other school types on 
any outcome. One reason for private schools underperforming compared with public and PPP 
schools could be that private schools are subjected to relatively fewer standards and 
regulations. Private schools in the sample had a higher level of autonomy than public and PPP 
schools, and PPP schools had the lowest level of autonomy (see Table 6). This indicates that 
there may have been higher regulation through lower autonomy at PPP schools that may have 
led to improved outcomes. Then it may be proposed that all schools be held by similar 
standards. Closer scrutiny of PPP schools could also arise from the need for having higher 
standards of accountability and transparency because of the involvement of the private sector. 
Similar oversight of private schools and having comparable regulations could then be useful to 
improve their outcomes. 
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Study Hypotheses and Outcomes 
 
First, it was hypothesized in this study that school type is not binary, i.e. simply 
public or private, but rather that there are also school types that have shared characteristics of 
public and private schools. A two-step clustering process using school funding and school 
management variables revealed that this is indeed likely the case, as the analysis resulted in 
three clear clusters of school types: public, private and PPP schools. Until now, there is no 
standard method of identifying PPP schools, making research of PPP schools difficult on a 
large scale. In the absence of explicit categorization of PPP schools in educational surveys, the 
method established in this report could provide a reliable way to classify PPP schools to 
understand their performance. It therefore contributes to the field by making possible future 
assessments of PPP schools on many fronts. 
 
Second, it was hypothesized in this study that PPP schools would perform better 
than other school types on school quality assurance measures including learning outcomes, 
since the foundation of PPP schools is to have shared funding and management which could 
lead to more effective school quality assurance practices. PPP schools were expected to score 
higher on achievement outcomes and be more likely to conduct school quality assurance 
measures. While there were no differences on most indicators, PPP schools performed better 
than the other school types on more outcomes than vice versa, although with small effect sizes. 
From the 27 school quality assurance measures (three achievement outcomes, nine quality 
assurance processes, eight school improvement actions from internal evaluations, four school 
improvement actions from external evaluations, and three accountability processes), PPP 
schools performed better than private schools on five outcomes and public schools on three 
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outcomes. Public schools outperformed PPP schools on one outcome and private schools on 
three outcomes. Private schools did not perform significantly better than the other school types 
on any outcome. On a per-country basis, however, PPP schools did not always perform better 
than the other school types such as in Brazil.   
 
Third, it was hypothesized that those schools that conducted quality assurance 
measures would have higher achievement outcomes. This was not the case for any school type, 
either in the entire study sample or within specific countries. Since there were no significant 
differences on most school quality assurance measures between school types, this was 
unsurprising. However, since these measures are put in place in order to improve the overall 
standard of education, it is surprising to find that they do not act as significant moderators that 
influence achievement. One possible reason for this could be that the measures included in the 
PISA survey have overly broad definitions. PISA does not make available information 
regarding how the school quality assurance measures were selected and phrased. According to 
Long and Dunne (2017), the components used to design and evaluate education systems should 
be aligned with context, including country, cultural and historical factors, curriculum, and other 
issues that may differ between schools. Thus, it is possible that the PISA school quality 
assurance indicators are not relevant across countries. Another possible reason could be that if 
all school types in the sample already perform a minimum level of school quality assurance 
actions leading to low variance, more fine-tuned measures may be needed to examine 
differences between school types. Since these school quality assurance measures help schools 
self-evaluate their performance, this finding also indicates the need for additional measures of 
transparency and accountability, such as cost effectiveness, transparency, and access, while 
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continuing to have measures on school quality assurance. This was the first time the survey on 
PISA’s Practices and Policies for Successful Schools was conducted. It will be interesting to 
see whether going forward the same indicators are retained or modified, and if new indicators 




In educational research, educational PPPs must not be given short shrift compared 
to public and private schools. First, given the recent proliferation of educational PPPs, 
understanding their full effects is of paramount importance. In addition, PPP schools, with 
shared characteristics of both public and private schools, can provide insight on different 
educational practices and regulations.  
 
Countries looking to evaluate PPPs should consider the characteristics of the 
existing public and private education sectors and the regulations around them. Proponents of 
PPPs often argue that the private sector characteristics of educational PPPs make them 
successful, such as more efficiency leading to better outcomes. This study found that PPPs and 
public schools have similar outcomes, while private schools fall short. A possible reason for 
this might be that both PPP and public schools have a connection with government - although 
to different extents - and therefore have government standards to uphold and regulations to 
adhere to. For PPP school critics, however, the involvement of the private sector and potential 
similarities to private schools is what draws most concern due to the potential of lack of 
transparency and accountability. The extent of government regulations on private schools 
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differs between countries, and having these regulations can restrict how much PPP schools can 
differ from private schools (Woessman, 2006). In this study, we see that PPP schools may not 
be as similar to private schools as previously perceived. It is possible that comparable 
regulations have resulted in PPP schools in the sample being more similar to public schools 
than private schools, at least in terms of educational standards. This means that policymakers 
and practitioners assessing PPPs could potentially use a framework where PPP schools are 
assumed to share or are designed to share more characteristics with public schools in terms of 
regulations. In cases where there were no significant differences in school quality assurance, 
the policy takeaway could also be that if PPP schools did not perform worse, and as long as 
they did not have a negative impact, they may not be as controversial as they are currently 
regarded, but this should be assessed taking other factors into account. 
  
Within three countries -- China, Russia and Mexico -- there were no differences 
between school types in achievement outcomes. The education systems in these countries also 
lean towards more centralized control and regulations. Would that imply that having a high 
degree of centralized regulations leads to an education system with fewer outcome differences 
between school types? There are many limitations that come with highly regulated education 
systems that must be taken into account since the nature and scope of regulation can also 
negatively influence the amount of school autonomy, choice, and innovation. 
  
The moderator analysis showed that conducting school quality assurance practices 
are not associated with achievement outcomes. So, while it is responsible for schools to 
conduct them to assure quality standards, the indicators of school quality assurance in this 
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study did not lead to increased learning outcomes. This does not mean that policymakers and 
practitioners designing or evaluating PPPs must only focus on achievement outcomes and 
ignore other quality assurance processes. Other factors associated with educational PPPs, such 
as improved access to schooling, increased accountability, and higher cost efficiency, should be 
included to make studies more robust. 
  
Linking findings with Previous Studies 
  
The results of this study are in line with findings from some existing studies that 
have been discussed previously. Baum’s study (2018) found that while PPP schools 
outperformed public schools in several PISA achievement outcomes, only a small margin of 
variation in performance remained after accounting for student selection. Overall, there were no 
consistent cross-country effects with respect to PPP school performance in his study using 
PISA 2009 data. In this study, after controlling for socio-demographic factors, PPP and public 
schools performed better than private schools overall on most achievement outcomes, but there 
were no differences on most other outcomes after controlling for country membership and 
socio-economic covariates, and where there were differences the effect sizes were mostly 
small. Woessman’s study (2006) using PISA 2006 data found that PPP schools with public 
funding and private operations were associated with positive performance on math, science and 
reading outcomes, while PPP schools with private funding and public operations performed 
more poorly than public schools. This study did not distinguish between PPP schools that are 
publicly owned and privately operated or vice versa, but since most of the PPP schools 
classified in the sample identified as public sector operated schools, the results are dissimilar to 
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Woessman’s study in that PPP schools performed significantly better than private schools on 
all three learning outcomes. It is worth noting that these studies may not be comparable as they 
did not control for the same socio-demographic variables or include all the same countries, both 
of which were important predictors in this study. 
  
Prior studies have not examined school quality assurance measures, other than 
achievement, of PPP schools compared with other school types. However, a number of similar 
school quality assurance measures have been identified in past studies as associated with PPP 
schools, even though they were not compared with other school types. In the case studies 
discussed earlier, some of the limitations around educational PPPs are lack of accountability 
and transparency (Liberia, Colombia, Philippines, Tanzania), issues of inequality (Chile), lack 
of evaluations (Jordan), lower achievement (Pakistan), and lack of training and professional 
development for teachers (Tanzania). The measures on which PPP schools seemed to perform 
well from the case studies are higher enrollment (Uganda) and access to higher education 
(Tanzania), increased resources (Uganda, Colombia, Liberia), and overall school quality 
(Philippines). On achievement outcomes PPP schools performed better than the comparison 
group in some cases (Liberia, Chile, Philippines, Jordan, Colombia, Uganda). From these case 
studies the limitations as well as added value of PPP schools were brought to light, but these 
studies did not compare them with other school types. In this study, PPP schools overall had 
significantly better achievement outcomes than private schools but not public schools. From the 
remaining quality assurance measures, PPP schools performed better than private schools in 
having practices around school equity and cross-curricular competencies, and better than public 
schools in processes around identification of student performance standards, cross-curricular 
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competencies, and accountability measures around providing parents with achievement data. 
Public schools were more likely than PPP schools to have processes around specification of 
school goals. On the other indicators associated with evaluation and accountability, PPP 




While examining related education policy is beyond the scope of this study, a brief 
overview of the education landscape in the sample countries in this section provides some 
context for the results of this study. When looking at outcomes by country, the factors to keep 
in mind include not only those associated with which school types performed better, but also 
the implications of there being no differences between school types. The level of centralization 
and regulation of education varies by country, and how those factors affect educational 
outcomes is dependent on various socio-economic and political factors (Hanushek, Link & 
Woessman, 2012). With a decentralized education system, state governments play an important 
role in financing and delivering education, which can also lead to disparities not just between 
school types but between regions (Winkler & Gershberg, 2000). This study controlled for some 
socio-economic variables and is a cross-sectional analysis. However, pertinent socio-economic 
factors related to the countries are still used to explain findings because resources available to 
schools often play an important role in outcomes over time and so can have delayed effects. 
 
In achievement outcomes, private schools in Brazil significantly outperformed 
public schools, while in Indonesia and Turkey, private schools scored significantly lower than 
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PPP and public schools, and in China, Russia, and Mexico, there were no significant 
differences between school types in achievement. A more in-depth policy analysis of the 
education system in each country than in this study is included as a recommendation to 
examine educational PPPs. 
  
Unlike every other country in this research, private schools in Brazil did better on 
achievement outcomes than public schools. However, on school quality assurance measures, 
private schools generally performed worse than PPP and public schools. Private schools also 
had the smallest class sizes and the most number of teachers at schools, compared with the 
other school types. One explanation for this outcome is that there has been an increase in 
private networks in Brazilian public education that are more opaque and less accountable; that 
blur the line between public and private and for-profit and non-profit; and that have led to a 
shift in privatization and education for investment and profit making (Avelar, 2018; Kauko, 
Rinne & Takala, 2018). Kauko, Rinne & Takala (2018) in their research found that quality 
assurance in education in Brazil is an important education policy goal, and assessing education 
quality closely is a means for the government to control private education. The Brazilian 
education sector is also heavily regulated by federal and state laws (Mora, 2005), and private 
schools in Brazil are more heavily regulated than those in other countries. Private schools in 
Brazil have the highest ESCS measures, while public schools have the lowest. So, although 
private schools were not better at implementing school quality assurance practices, having 
access to more resources and possibly additional regulations, or a focus on achievement over 
quality assurance practices, could have led to higher achievement outcomes. 
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In Indonesia, PPP schools have the highest ESCS scores, while private schools 
have the lowest ESCS scores and performed worse than other school types. In this sample, the 
total number of teachers at schools was much lower than at PPP and public schools. Private 
education in Indonesia was developed to close the education gap through increasing access to 
education for which public schools had not been successful, and most private schools are 
religious schools or schools run by low-income communities (Sari, 2019). They are generally 
believed to have lower quality education with lower resources and students having lower access 
to textbooks (Kristiansen & Pratikno, 2006). Considering the challenges faced by poorly 
resourced schools, this aligns with the findings in this study for private schools in Indonesia to 
be performing more poorly than public and PPP schools on achievement outcomes. 
 
In Turkey, in contrast to Indonesia, private schools have the highest ESCS, with 
public and PPP schools having the same ESCS scores. Private schools in the sample were much 
smaller than the other school types and had a lower number of teachers. The private education 
sector in Turkey is believed to provide a higher quality education than public schools which are 
fraught with regulations and bureaucracy. Private schools are also associated with higher 
tuition, and in turn usually cater to students of higher socio-economic status (Cinoglu, 2006). 
However, in this study private schools scored significantly lower on some achievement 
outcomes than PPP and public schools. Private schools in Turkey are also significantly less 
likely to conduct external evaluations than PPP schools and public schools. Reforms in 2004 
led to a higher degree of decentralization of education with higher autonomy to local authorities 
and both private and non-governmental organizations (Aksit, 2006). This has led to some 
accountability and transparency issues around funding and student selection at private schools 
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(Cinoglu, 2006). Lower regulations and increased decentralization may have led to private 
schools performing poorly compared to public and PPP schools. 
 
Overall in this sample, schools in China performed better than the other countries 
on all achievement outcomes. There were no differences in achievement between school types, 
though public schools performed better than PPP and private schools on a few school quality 
assurance measures. There are numerous studies on the success of Chinese students and schools 
on PISA and other international assessments with different explanations. The education sector 
here underwent a significant form of decentralization in the 1990s, the goal for which was 
fiscal decentralization and not operational decentralization (Hawkins, 2000). However, Chinese 
education is largely public with the state keen on retaining control of education and 
apprehensive of large-scale privatization (Shulte, 2018). The central government still closely 
monitors all school systems and maintains control over the content of schooling, and this 
centralized control is believed to have maintained stability and addressed regional inequalities 
(Hawkins, 2000), which could explain the lack of significant differences in achievement 
between school types. Private and PPP schools in China have proliferated in recent years, and 
Schulte (2018) claims that there are differences between low and medium fee private schools 
that cater to poorer households, while high fee private schools cater to the upper class with 
higher quality education and a separate curriculum aimed at foreign higher education. Private 
school students in China have the highest ESCS scores while PPP schools have the lowest. 
Public schools in China are significantly more likely to conduct school quality assurance 
practices around two outcomes compared to private and PPP schools, but there were no 
significant differences between school types on achievement outcomes. Having centralized 
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control may have contributed to all school types having similar regulation frameworks and 
similar outcomes. 
  
Similar to China, there were no significant differences between school types on 
achievement outcomes in Russia. According to Zajda (2003), Russian education until the 1990s 
was based on equity and access, regardless of ethnicity, social class, gender, or geographic 
location. Recent increases in fee-based private schools have led to increasing levels of inequity 
in many areas, which are in turn being reinforced by weak government social programs. The 
goal of the government was to encourage private investment in education to reduce fiscal 
pressure while maintaining control (Verbina & Chowdhury, 2004). There is widespread 
reluctance to allow market-based school systems in the country and to reduce governmental 
control of education (Zajda, 2003), which is evident in the small number of private schools 
(two out of 188) that participated in the PISA assessment. 
 
In Mexico, the education system is highly centralized. While local and state 
governments have some educational responsibilities, financing of education is controlled by the 
central government (Winkler & Gershberg, 2000). In the present study, private schools have the 
highest ESCS, while PPP schools have the lowest. Public schools in the sample had the biggest 
schools size, student-teacher ratio, and total teachers per school. There are no differences 
between any school types in achievement. However, PPP schools have a higher probability of 
having a number of school quality assurance outcomes over public and private schools. This 
indicates that there may be stricter regulations for PPP schools to conduct assessments. A 
report on Mexico’s education system, labor force, and economy commissioned by the 
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government stressed the need to “involve national stakeholders in a concerted effort” (p. 52) 
with careful planning and designing of alliances (Ricart, Morán, & Kappaz). While the report is 
mostly focused on higher education, it highlights challenges of PPPs being overcome through 
legal frameworks and states that international research has shown that successful PPP models 
are those that are state-driven, and not market-driven or supply-driven models. 
 
The important takeaways from this country-wise analysis are first, that the 
historical and political context of educational inputs and outcomes vary by country and often 
vary even within regions in a country; and second, that a high level of regulation may serve to 
minimize educational outcome differences between school types. 
 
Directions for Future Research 
  
 
This study shows that it is indeed possible to identify and classify PPP schools 
from large scale data. Two step clustering, or other similar methods arising from this study, can 
be used to identify PPP schools in datasets in which they are not explicitly categorized. This 
method allows grouping of PPP schools using different combinations of school funding and 
school management variables. PISA, and TIMSS and PIRLS are large-scale, international 
comparative evaluations of education indicators that provide feedback on the functioning of 
education systems. Classifying PPP schools within these multi-level, large-scale assessments to 
classify PPP schools allows researchers to benchmark PPP schools’ performance in contrast 
with public and private schools. Two similar studies by Baum (2018) and Woessman (2006) 
use PISA data to categorize PPP schools. An idea for a future study is one that can compare the 
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results of all three methods to understand overlap and differences in the schools classified as 
well as differences in outcomes. 
  
This study showed that different school types may have different rates of 
conducting school quality assurance measures, which are important for schools to evaluate their 
own function and performance. For future studies comparing school types, including these 
indicators may lead to more comprehensive studies. While in this sample school quality 
assurance indicators were not significant predictors of achievement, they are nevertheless 
important for showing the commitment of schools to self-evaluation. According to Ladd and 
Loeb (2013) evaluation processes may not be related to student achievement since they have 
not been validated in the literature as being linked to those outcomes, or the validation is based 
on measures of quality that are imperfect or narrow. This raises topics for future research to 
improve indicators for school quality assurance. 
  
Indicators of school quality assurance in PISA and other large-scale assessments 
may need to be improved or adapted for contextual differences. Current indicators may be 
insufficient, and some may not be relevant for every country. Improved indicators can take the 
form of optional country-specific questions for students, teachers and principals. With a need 
for more empirical research on PPPs, future options can also include additional questions on 
the nature of public or private involvement – whether the partnership was through financial 
support, management or some form of shared autonomy. Contextual questionnaires can include 
more detailed questions on sources of funding, factors influencing partnerships, and school 
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quality measures. National option questions can allow individual countries to adapt questions 
that are of national interest. 
  
A longitudinal study including the same PISA outcomes can assess the effects of 
funding and management changes that may not be apparent in short term outcomes. This can 
inform the field more thoroughly on whether some outcomes change over time, or if the effects 
of changes in funding and management have delayed effects. It would require PISA to maintain 
continuity in the student and school background questionnaires. For example, PISA 2018 did 
not include the question on school autonomy thereby making it impossible to conduct similar 
clustering analyses as conducted with the PISA 2015 data. A future study can also distinguish 
between PPP schools that are publicly owned and privately operated or vice versa. 
  
Further examination of each country’s education and economic systems and 
policies can be conducted to triangulate the results of the quantitative analyses which would 
make it feasible to identify patterns between a country’s policies on educational PPPs and other 
outcomes. There is limited information clearly detailing educational PPP policies in the 
countries in the study. A qualitative research undertaking with education policymakers and 
practitioners can enhance understanding of whether some countries perform better on the 
variables of interest due to more regulated PPP policies, and gain insight on the nature of 
educational PPPs in each country and the scope of implementation, in order to align the 
findings from the PISA quantitative assessment. This can allow us to make policy 
recommendations on whether educational PPP policies are beneficial, under what 
circumstances and in what contexts. 
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Findings from this study can be used to inform designs for common regulatory 
frameworks for all school types that could be able to improve the quality, efficiency and 
accountability of overall education systems, and provide ways to evaluate context-specific 
issues and solutions. If, as in this sample, there are no significant ways in which PPPs are better 
than public schools, but they do better than private schools, frameworks regulating private 
schools can be compared with PPP frameworks to identify gaps that might lead to improvement 
of both school types. 
  
Incorporating Learning from Past PPP Research 
  
For countries looking to educational PPPs, what lessons can be drawn upon from 
past studies and this study to make these partnerships sustainable, ethical and beneficial to all 
stakeholders, especially to students and educators? While moving forward with caution, some 
of the learning from past PPPs includes the following. First, policymakers must establish 
metrics for measuring the success of new PPP systems – and those metrics should include 
outcomes other than student achievement. Rather than focusing solely on learning outcomes 
such as standardized test scores, measures should account for robustness of internal processes 
and practices, like practices around school accountability and evaluation. These measures are 
proxies of overall school quality, and are often associated with positive literacy outcomes. 
Second, international assessments can consider including measures directly related to PPPs or 
measures that can contribute to enhanced research on PPPs. Third, in establishing PPPs, it is 
vital to understand the policy and regulatory environments, and to ensure a strong legal 
framework, so that they are developed collaboratively, with measures to enhance transparency, 
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prevent oversight, outline party roles and responsibilities, and build sustainable partnerships. 
School autonomy can only benefit education systems through effective accountability systems 
and rigorous internal and external evaluations that can prevent opportunistic behaviors by 
schools (Hanushek, Link and Woessman, 2013). Fourth, PPPs should arise from transparent 
and competitive bidding processes in which education officials can select the most suitable 
partner/s, avoiding the possibility of bias and corruption. Fifth, in turning to educational PPPs, 
policymakers should ensure that existing public schools are not negatively impacted. As seen in 
previous examples, PPP schools can put pressure on other schools in different ways -- both 
financial and otherwise -- and it is important to be aware of the possible harmful, unintended 
effects of educational PPPs on other schools. Finally, since financial reasons are possibly the 
foremost reason for PPPs, a program’s cost-effectiveness must be thoroughly assessed with 
other social and economic factors, before initiating a PPP and as part of continuous monitoring. 
Monitoring PPPs as well as government education expenditures over time can help countries 




Countries around the globe, particularly LMIC, often face severe budget shortfalls 
that can drain education systems of critical resources, and hence affect the health, wellbeing 
and educational progress of millions of children. Verger, Zancajo & Fontdevila (2018) have 
discussed how disasters often provide opportunities for international and private actors to enact 
policy reforms in vulnerable countries, taking advantage of economic desperation to ignore 
legitimate democratic reform processes. They provide examples from Liberia, Haiti and 
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Honduras. The current COVID-19 pandemic is also leading to reductions in education budgets 
as limited resources are diverted towards public health. The World Bank (May 2020) used GDP 
growth forecasts and public spending by country to estimate that education budgets will be 
reduced by an average of 10% across countries. It predicts that education spending will 
increase more slowly than it did pre-COVID for LMICs, which will lead to a decline in per 
capita education spending. This has already been observed in a number of countries. In Ukraine 
USD$217 million or four percent of its education budget (World Bank, May 2020), and in 
Kenya and Nigeria millions of dollars from education budgets, have been diverted to COVID-
19 emergency relief (World Bank, 24 June 2020). Educational PPPs may be one way for 
governments to address these budget shortfalls. 
  
The aim of this study was to contribute to the field of educational PPP research by 
exploring the possibility of creating a PPP school classification method to examine possible 
differences in school quality assurance measures between school types. It is important to 
remember that the involvement of the private sector in a public service like education raises 
issues including the potential for diminished access to quality education for marginalized 
groups, rising inequality, differences in standards between school types, misuse of public funds, 
and profiteering at the cost of universal quality education. The fact that PPP schools in this 
study were shown to perform marginally better than private schools, and comparable to public 
schools, does not necessarily reduce the importance of those aforementioned issues. 
Furthermore, if forming PPPs is inevitable, they must not come at the cost of diminished public 
funding for public schools, and public instruments of accountability must be used to maintain 
quality. Free and quality public education should remain the goal of governments. 
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Education is political and educational PPPs have been highly controversial in 
recent decades. Educational PPPs have not been grassroots movements, but have often been 
associated with wealthy donors, international aid organizations, philanthropists and private 
corporations, with top-down approaches and potential political or financial gains (Barkan, 
2018). Educational PPPs have sometimes been able to contribute to education systems by 
increasing resources available to schools, and improving learning outcomes and other school 
quality measures. Yet governments hoping to tap into private sector resources for bolstering 
education should not do so with blinders on. The story of educational PPPs is not one of 
universal success. Risks include lax oversight, lack of transparency and accountability, 
increased inequality and higher costs, along with negative impacts on other schools and 
students. As previously stated, PPPs are often inspired by models that come from well-
developed, regulated, and professionalized education systems, and should not be expected to 
perform in the same way in partially developed, unregulated, and poorly professionalized 
education systems (Lewin, 2007). As with other educational issues, there is no one-size-fits all 
solution for countries. Increased governmental regulation and legislation, clear frameworks and 
roles, and balancing local factors with innovation, have been shown to increase the efficacy of 
educational PPPs while decreasing negative impacts. As found in this study, it is important to 
acknowledge the existence and prevalence of this school type, and the country contexts of their 
existing public and private education sectors. By incorporating learning from existing 
methodologies, experiences and literature, policymakers turning to educational PPPs can 
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The Government recognizing the important role of the private sector in 
implementing PPP projects has approved a PPP policy during the 98th session of 
the Lhengye Zhungtshog held in March, 2016. The PPP policy provides a 
structured, transparent and institutionalized approach to PPPs – establishing 
uniform procedures for ensuring fair and equal access in the award of PPP 
projects. The PPP policy provides an excellent platform for the private sector to 
partake in development of viable and feasible projects that offer reasonable 
returns to the private sector, better service delivery options for the citizens of 
Bhutan, while assuming the associated risks. Therefore, the PPP policy 2016 
provides the enabling environment to strengthen the role of the private sector in 
achieving the noble goal of economic growth and sustainable development 
through improved infrastructure and optimal utilization of resources. 
  
Global experience has shown that there is a close relationship between economic 
growth and infrastructure development. Insufficient and inefficient infrastructure 
stifles economic growth whereas efficient infrastructure results in higher rates of 
growth by increasing and enhancing productive capacity. Infrastructure can also 
contribute significantly to a country’s social development strategies such as 








Like many countries, the Government of Botswana faces challenges in the 
delivery of public services infrastructure including their maintenance and 
operational obligations. New infrastructure needs to be provided and existing 
infrastructure upgraded to deliver public services more effectively and extend 
access to services to a greater number of the population. Under the National 
Development Plan 11, for example, development expenditure of over P100 
billion is planned for the plan period 2017/18 – 2023/24 the bulk of which is to 
fund infrastructure projects in areas such as water, energy, tourism, agriculture, 
education and health, priority being given to the maintenance of existing 
infrastructure. 
In order to deliver such needed capital investments whilst maintaining sound 
fiscal policies, there is need to look for support and collaboration from other 
sectors of the economy. 
Public-private partnership (PPP) is one of the forms of such collaboration 
between government and the private sector. It is based on the recognition that 
both the public and private sectors can benefit by pooling their financial 
resources, know-how and expertise to improve the delivery of basic services to 
all citizens. It is one of the alternative means of financing the much needed 
public infrastructure and services. 
Accordingly, Government of Botswana is promoting the use of PPPs in 
developing and operating public infrastructure and related facilities. 
PPPs are important in the context of the Botswana economy in terms of the 
strategic and operational choices they offer to Government. They are strategic in 
the form of fostering economic growth by developing new commercial and 
investment opportunities for citizen investors and increasing competition in the 
provision of public services. They are operational in terms of providing 
opportunities for efficiency gains in the form of better quality and more cost-
effective delivery of services by private sector participants. 
By entering into a PPP, the delivery of a public service infrastructure is enhanced 
by accessing the private sector’s financial, managerial, professional and technical 
expertise. The necessary maintenance and operation of this infrastructure is also 
enhanced by private sector resources. This allows public services to be delivered 
more efficiently, which allows Government resources to be channeled into other 






The intent is to systematically improve the quality of education for children, 
young people and adults studying at public educational institutions in Chile. 
Objectives: 
Create a new public education system through a series of socio-educational 
projects that are collaborative, participatory, inclusive, diverse, non-religious and 






The Government of Ghana is currently facing monumental challenges in 
infrastructure development and public service delivery which constrain the 
growth of the Ghanaian economy. The provision of public infrastructure and 
services has typically been viewed as the responsibility of the Government. But 
the deficit in infrastructure cannot be met by the public sector alone. It is 
Government policy, therefore, to encourage the use of Public-Private Partnership 
as a means of leveraging public resources with private sector resources and 
expertise. A PPP has several advantages in the provision of infrastructure and 
services. Principally, it enables the Government to provide better infrastructure 
and services through the use of private sector financial, human and technical 






A Draft Public/Private Partnership Policy Document outlining Government’s 
plan to invest heavily in catalytic physical infrastructure, renewable energy and 
other key areas, will be laid in the National Assembly by Finance Minister, 
Winston Jordan.This announcement was made today by Minister of State, Joseph 
Harmon during a post-cabinet press conference. The Minister said the document 
also proposes that investments be made in the environment, agricultural 
diversification, agri-industrial development, Education and Training and 
Information and Communications Technology (ICT). 
The Policy document is intended to create the appropriate institutional and legal 
framework for encouraging the private sector to play a more important role in 












of India, 2011 
In the 12th Five Year Plan(FYP), there have been active efforts to engage the 
private partner in the school education. We have proposed an overall scheme: 
“PPP framework for enhanced access to inclusive quality School Education”. 
Key principles underlying the framework are: • Equity and inclusion • 
Efficiency/commonality in standards • Continuous Professional Development • 
Teacher Learning Resources • Support services : administration, building, 
infrastructure. The primary purpose of PPP in education is not just for using the 
private party as an executor or a source of funds though these may be parts of the 
role in specific cases, but to seek a collaborative engagement that builds on the 
strengths of different players and creates a total greater than the sum of the parts. 
In this regard, 12th five year plan envisages involvement of private players to 




The government has collective responsibility for formulating overall budgetary 
policy. 
Legal Framework 
─ State Authorities (Public Private Partnership Arrangements) Act 2002 
─ National Development Finance Agency Act 2002 
─ National Development Finance Agency (Amendment) Act 2007 
Department of Public Expenditure & Reform has the same role in relation to PPP 
projects as it does in relation to capital investment projects generally 
─ Sets overall capital investment framework 
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─ Establishes basic principles to be observed for the appraisal, assessment, 
procurement and evaluation of projects. 
  
Potential Advantages of PPP 
Better Value for Money 
─ Utilise private sector expertise 
─ Optimal transfer of risk 
Improve delivery of projects 
─ Payments linked to delivery/performance 
Spread the cost of financing over the life of the project 
Focus on lifecycle /longterm costs 
Incentivising sustainability, Innovation and R&D 




The delivery of good quality, inclusive and affordable education in Liberia 
continues to be undermined by limited funding, weak enforcement of regulations 
and polices as well as limited trained manpower. The Ministry of Education 
(MOE) has described challenges to resolve simultaneously and multi-faceted 
approaches needed to fix the system. Although experts believe such approaches 
must be well-designed and based on evidence, system. Although experts believe 
such approaches must be well-designed and based on evidence, the involvement 




A public private partnership (PPP) is an agreement between the Ministry of 
Education and a consortium of private companies to build a new school or 
rebuild an existing school. The agreement is a single, long-term contract, usually 
for 25 years. The agreement includes the ongoing maintenance of the property. 
Under a PPP, the Ministry engages the private partner to design, finance, build 
and maintain a particular school. We pay the private partner quarterly once the 
new buildings are open. We reduce the payment if the school facilities do not 
meet the standards in the contract. This effectively provides a 25 year guarantee 
on that school’s buildings and service delivery. 
The Government still owns the land and buildings. The principal and board of 
trustees are responsible for all education matters. Because it does not deal with 
property and maintenance issues, the board of trustees in a PPP school has more 








National Commission for Human Development (NCHD) and Pakistan Human 
Development Fund (PHDF) is a unique public private partnership model for 
social sector development in Pakistan. Under this public private model, the two 
organizations have been established simultaneously in 2002. PHDF receives 
funds for the programs of NCHD along with overseeing its operations and 
program implementation. While NCHD, working as statutory autonomous 
federal body, is mandated with implementation of basic education and basic 
health programs for human development in Pakistan. One of the prime mandates 
of NCHD is to help Pakistan achieve the Millennium Development Goal-target 
of 86%literacy by 2015.In order to achieve this goal, the Commission has 
prioritized “Education for All” and taken a two-pronged approach towards this: 
  
Ensuring that all children enroll in schools and retained in schools for the 
completion of full primary schooling cycle. 
Dealing with the “back-log” of adult illiterates by implementing literacy 
programs in communities. 
  
Leverage multi-source funding, tapping into resources like the -Industry, Public 
Private Partnerships and Donors 
Swaziland, 
Government 
The Government of Swaziland is currently facing challenges in infrastructure 
development and public service delivery. Government has made slow progress in 
addressing the infrastructure gap due to low implementation rate of capital 
projects, low economic growth rate and the most recent cash flow challenges 
faced, not only by Swaziland but by international economies as well. The 
demand from the citizenry for more and efficient social service delivery has also 
increased. There is demand for better quality education services, better health 
care facilities and service to name a few. Though infrastructure development and 
public service delivery has traditionally been perceived as the sole responsibility 
of the public sector, increasingly, this perception has been changing. Both the 
private and public sectors have realized this as a collective responsibility and 
have joined hands in pursuance of this goal resulting in the development of 
Public Private Partnerships (PPPs). 
  
The Government of the Kingdom of Swaziland is committed to improving the 
quality of life of its citizens through the provision of quality infrastructure and 
services. This is in recognition of the economic developmental role infrastructure 
plays in any economy. In pursuance of this goal, the Government acknowledges 
the role the private sector can play in the provision of infrastructure and services 






The Public/Private Partnership (PPP) initiative of the Ministry of Education was 
launched in 2014. It is a project geared towards the expansion of spaces in the 
Early Childhood Care and Education (ECCE) sector and is an essential element 
in the provision of Universal ECCE. In the PPP, the Government of Trinidad and 
Tobago pays private providers for spaces in their ECCE settings. Currently, there 
are one hundred and ninety nine (199) private providers throughout Trinidad 
providing acceptable spaces for preschoolers. The PPP project is a useful and 
viable initiative of the MoE. It has brought relief to many parents of preschoolers 



























1. In your school, are achievement data used in any of the following accountability 
procedures? 
 Yes No 
Achievement data are posted publicly (e.g., in the media).   
Achievement data are tracked over time by an administrative 
authority, such as a district, state, or national education agency.   
Achievement data are provided directly to parents.   
  
  
2. Do the following arrangements aimed at quality assurance and improvements exist in 
your school and where do they come from? 
 









Internal evaluation / Self-evaluation    
External evaluation    
Written specification of the school’s curricular profile and 
educational goals    
Written specification of student performance standards    
Systematic recording of data such as teacher or student 
attendance and professional development    
Systematic recording of student test results and graduation 
rates    
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Seeking written feedback from students (e.g. regarding 
lessons, teachers or resources)    
Teacher mentoring    
Regular consultation aimed at school improvement with 
one or more experts over a period of at least six months    
  
 
3. Based on your last internal school evaluation results, did your school implement any 





No, for other 
reasons 
Educational staff (e.g., workload, personal 
requirements, qualifications)    
Implementation of the curriculum    
Quality of teaching and learning    
Parental engagement in school    
Teacher professional development    
Student achievement    
Students' cross-curricular competencies    
Equity in school    
  
  
4. Thinking about the last external evaluation in your school, do the following 
statements apply? 
 Yes No 
The results of the external evaluation led to changes in school policies.   
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We used the data to plan specific action for school development.   
We used the data to plan specific action for the improvement of teaching.   
We put measures derived from the results of the external evaluation into 
practice promptly.   
  
  
 
